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Summary 
 
This thesis provides a critical analysis of shifting US foreign policy toward India. The 
study covers the period from the end of the Second World War up to the end of the first 
Obama administration. With Indo-US relations since India’s independence in 1947 used 
as a backdrop, the focus is on policy from the end of the Cold war and, specifically, 
from the time of the 9/11 attack. The thesis explores, in both conceptual and empirical 
terms, the reasons for United States growing involvement in the South Asian region and 
its enhanced engagement with India. The principle aim of the study is to determine 
whether the ramifications of 9/11 were mainly responsible for present state of Indo-US 
relations, or whether US policy toward India was driven by the broader changes in 
international affairs associated with globalisation, among which the rise of China is 
paramount. The approach taken is a critical historical analysis that has involved review 
of secondary literature and close examination of a range of primary US and Indian 
government material, supplemented by field work conducted in the US that involved 
interviews with policy makers and academics.  
This thesis shows that US policy toward India has two major dimensions:  the first is the 
US adaptation of its foreign policy in response to the changed international political 
climate after the Cold War, a shift in which the question of its relative decline from sole 
superpower status was critical. The second dimension is India’s rise, which has given it 
growing geo-strategic importance in the 21st century and has created the potential for 
India to become an essential partner in US attempts to maintain the stability of the 
international order and its own hegemonic role with this order. The argument of the 
thesis is that US policy toward India is more one of continuity than change, and that the 
driving force behind recent Indo-US relations is not primarily the consequences of 9/11, 
but is rather the result of power shifts within a more globalised world. In this changed 
context both the US and India have looked for closer, strategic relationships with 
countries that share their interests. While far from being united in this respect, their 
interests are sufficiently common so that from the end of the Cold War the US and India 
have developed a closer partnership. The effects of 9/11 contributed to an environment 
conducive to this partnership, but they were not the primary factor.
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CHAPTER – ONE 
Introduction 
1.1 Background  
We have an ambitious agenda with India. Our agenda is practical. It builds on a relationship that 
has never been better. India is a global leader, as well as good friend… my trip will remind 
everybody about the strengthening of an important strategic partnership. We will work together 
in practical ways to promote a hopeful future for citizens in both our nations.1 
For thousands of years, South Asia has been the primary route for invaders from 
different parts of the world. Central Asians, Persians, Arabs and even Greeks from 
7,000 miles away have invaded the region. The Aryans from Central Asia invaded after 
about 1500 BC2  through the Khyber Pass in Afghanistan and proceeded to subdue the 
indigenous people. Then in 483 BC, the Persians conquered the northwest of India. 
Alexander the Great of Greece abolished the Persian Empire and entered into the 
extreme northwest of India. In 317 BC, after his death, the Greeks withdrew and 
eventually left little impact on Indian civilisation.3 
After the Greek withdrawal, Alexander’s empire was divided between his generals. 
They fought fiercely with each other until a strong state was established in Bactria. In 
about 120 BC, India faced a new invader in the form of the Kushan Empire, again from 
Central Asia, which captured Bactria. Divisions within the empire were a common 
phenomenon during that period. As a result of division, a new empire was established 
by Ghandra Gupta early in the 4th century. After that, a number of dynasties like the 
Hun, the Harshavardana, and the Chola ruled India until the late 10th century. In latter 
part of 10th century, Turks from Central Asia conquered the Punjab and Afghanistan. 
Sultan Mahmud (971-1030) of the Turks established the Delhi Sultanate which lasted 
                                                        
1 President George W. Bush speech before embarking on his visit to India in February 2006, available at 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2006/62422.htm, accessed on 21 May 2014. 
2Burjor  Avari in his book India: The Ancient Past - A History of the Indian sub-continent from c. 7000 
BC to AD 1200 maintained that there was no Aryan invasion, but there was a migration of an Indo- 
European speaking group of nomadic people from Iran and Afghanistan, who called themselves Arya, or 
the nobles. 
3Joshua J. Mark, India, Ancient History Encyclopaedia, available at http://www.ancient.eu/india/ accessed 
on 6 August 2015. 
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until the late 14th century.4 The Mughal Empire was then established in 1526 at Panipat, 
northwest of Delhi, by the skilled military strategy and strong artillery of Muhammad 
Babur (1483–1530).  The Mughal Empire had been able to bring Persians, Turks and 
native Indians together in an extensive empire that survived until British took over.5 
From ancient times then, the Indian sub-continent appears to have attracted the interest 
of external powers. Motivations have varied but the pattern has continued to the present. 
During the ancient period, the outsiders occupied the territory and subjugated 
indigenous people. In the middle ages the region was first colonised by Muslims and 
then in the early modern period by Europeans until it came under the control of British. 
There were many causes for Muslim invasion or conquest but the major reason was the 
desire to spread Islam. The decline of the Mughal Rule resulted in a power vacuum 
which led the Europeans to move into the region. The Portuguese were the first among 
Europeans to come to India by sea, reaching Goa in 1498. By the 17th century 
Portuguese influence declined and the British and Dutch influence grew.6 Europeans 
were interested in establishing trade and commerce with India. The British became 
interested in India for two reasons:  raw materials and consumers. They ruled the sub-
continent for about 200 years until Indian independence in 1947, using the 
subcontinent’s resources for the development of other colonies and to support prosperity 
at home. US interest in the region does not reflect the same kind of history as that of 
other powers that had engaged with India before independence. It was India’s political 
independence and the partition of the subcontinent that was the fundamental turning 
point for US interest. 
The region had been considered marginal to the interest of the United States as it had no 
dependence on South Asian resources; instead its interest and involvement came from 
the desire to contain international communism and to rein in Soviet expansionism in the 
area. In terms of geopolitics7, traditionally the subcontinent had been considered a 
                                                        
4Tim Lambert, A Brief History of India, available at http://www.localhistories.org/india.html accessed on 
7 August 2015. 
5 Barbara D. Metcalf and Thomas R. Metcalf, A Concise History of Modern India, Cambridge University 
Press, 2006, p. 14. 
6 Tim Lambert, A Brief History of India, op. cit. 
7The term ‘geopolitics’ was first coined by Rudolf Kiellen, a Swedish political scientist, during the first 
decade of the 20th century. The traditional meaning of geopolitics is the impact and influence of 
geography on politics. In international relations, it refers to the study of relationship between politics and 
geography (human and physical) as they affect the foreign policy of a state. It is an approach to study 
foreign policy that seeks to understand, explain and even to predict political behavior of international 
actors in light of a combination of political and geographical determinants. These include demography, 
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single entity. The creation of Pakistan through partition changed the geostrategic 
importance of the region to the superpowers. After World War II and throughout the 
entire Cold War, the subcontinent came to be an object of interest in the rivalry between 
the US, the USSR and China. Northeast Asia assumed great significance in 
Washington’s calculations but within the South Asian region, the US, despite its 
preoccupation with Soviet communism, chose not to challenge the Soviet role in India, 
and this confirmed the relatively low priority Washington gave to relations with India.8 
Instead the US focussed on two concerns, the Indian Ocean and Pakistan’s integrity. But 
with the end of the Cold War, the whole South Asian region came to occupy greater 
importance to the US and other developed democracies.9 
Today, South Asia is a region that stands on the edge of becoming an important 
economic, political and military power. Its location as a neighbour of Afghanistan, Iran 
and China, and proximity to the Gulf States and Central Asia, as well as the growing 
power of its economy makes it not only of interest to the United States but to the rest of 
the world. Towards the end of the 20th century, the region was still regarded as a relative 
backwater by the United States10 but this is now far from the case and this attitude has 
dissipated. This brief analysis of the history of the subcontinent demonstrates that the 
region has always been shaped by conquest and imperial subordination. This tradition 
has been renewed in the post Cold War period with all the great powers, but particularly 
the United States, taking a renewed interest in India’s development.  
India’s growing capabilities in different fields, however, mean it is no longer the passive 
recipient of outside influence, but is becoming an active power that is shaping its region 
and helping to forge a new world order. India now rejects dependence on outside forces 
whether in the economic, political, cultural sphere. India has begun to overcome its 
weaknesses as skilled and capable strategic Indian leaders have become able to exploit 
India’s strengths. Growing American strategic interest in India and India’s growing 
strength, due in part to the opening up of its economy, meant that with the end of the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
topography, location, size, natural resources, arable land, access to the sea, industrial advancement, 
military preparedness among other resources and capabilities. . 
8Dilara Chodhury,  Bangladesh in South Asian International Systems, Academic Publishers, Dhaka, 1992. 
9 A. Z. Hilali,‘Cold War Politics of Superpowers in South Asia’, The Dialogue, Pakistan Vol.1, No. 2, 
April-June, 2006,  p.71. 
10Dana Robert Dillon, Testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the 
Pacific, hearing on ‘The United States and South Asia: An Assessment of Appropriate US Strategic 
Objectives in South Asia, including an outline of the Specific Policy Instruments, through which we 
should achieve our goals’, Heritage Foundation, 2005, p. 7. 
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Cold War both had an interest in and an opportunity for a closer relationship. Not only 
has the United States had to adapt to a changed world scenario, but India has also come 
to need US support if it is to develop. This has created a new pattern of mutual 
involvement that is unique in sub-continental history. 
The region consists of eight countries and, although Pakistan and Afghanistan will be 
discussed in due course, particularly because of their importance as the focal point of 
the War on Terror, this study will concentrate on India as the most significant actor in 
the region and the one whose bilateral relationship with the US has the greatest long- 
term significance. As the largest democracy and having developed its capabilities in 
various fields, India is in a position to pose particular challenges to the current 
‘imperial’ power, the US. Since India is no longer susceptible to conventional imperial 
domination and yet the US remains keen to play a leading role in world affairs, how 
these two powers cope with this historically distinctive reality will be the subject matter 
of this study. 
1.2 The Argument of this Thesis 
The Post-WWII period is accurately described as the American era of international 
relations. Certainly, America has occupied a central position in world politics since 
1945. Its policies have affected the lives of countless millions thousands of miles from 
its shores. Israel and the Middle East, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq and very recently 
Libya are some examples but the record goes back further. History has seen at least 180 
instances of the use of US armed forces in different parts of the world during the last 
century.11 The change in American foreign policy orientation from isolationism12 to 
total involvement, and from having no entangling alliances to having multiple 
alignments in the post-1945 world demonstrated how its interpretation of national 
interest has changed as its power has grown. 
On all significant measures, such as industry, agriculture, finance, commerce, GDP, 
GNP, per capita income, education, scientific discoveries, technological inventions, 
techno-scientific manpower, defense, and nuclear capability, the United States is a 
major force. American ideas, images and artefacts have fired the world’s imagination 
                                                        
11Stephen Burman, The State of the American Empire: How the USA Shapes the World, Earthscan, 
London, 2007, p.10. 
12 There is of course much debate as to whether the US was ever truly isolationist in the 20th century.  The 
term is used here loosely to capture the difference between pre and post World War II foreign policy 
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and influenced its cultural movements. This not only evoked awe and fear but also 
regard and admiration and few can doubt that, by virtue of its overarching military, 
diplomatic, cultural and military equipment and assets, the United States has been the 
pre-eminent power of the post war era.. For some, this has led America to act as a world 
policeman, controlling international affairs in the name of maintaining world peace and 
security.13 
There is much debate about the meaning of the term ‘policeman’ in this context.  
Barbara Conry in the late 1990s, for example, used the phrase ‘global leadership’ as a 
euphemism for world policeman. She argued that global leadership does not mean the 
US leads the world by example, but rather it has been ‘essentially coercive, relying on 
‘‘diplomacy’’ backed by threats or military action’.14 William Blum in his book Killing 
Hope: US Military & CIA Interventions since World War II showed more than one 
hundred examples of the US attempting to topple a regime or ruler15 and in an earlier 
book, Rogue State, he called the US an empire. On the other hand, a leading intellectual 
figure on the right, Dinesh D’Souza articulated the idea widely held within the US that 
‘America is the most magnanimous imperial power ever’.16  Robert Kagan17 wrote: 
‘And the truth is that the benevolent hegemony18 exercised by the United States is good 
for a vast portion of the world’s population. It is certainly a better international 
                                                        
13Prakash Chandra, International Relations: Foreign Policies of Major Powers and Regional Systems, 
Vikash Publishing House Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 1994. 
14 Barbara Conry, US ‘Global Leadership’: A Euphemism for World Policeman, Policy Analysis No. 267, 
CATO Institute, February 1997. Available at http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa267.pdf 
accessed on 11 August 2015. 
15 William Blum, Killing Hope: US Military & CIA Interventions since World War II, Zed Books, 2003. 
16Dinesh D'Souza, ‘In praise of American empire’ The Christian Science Monitor, April 26, 2002, 
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0426/p11s01-coop.html, accessed 21 February 2016. 
17Although Kagan prefers to be described himself as ‘liberal interventionist’, he came to prominence as a 
leading neoconservative US foreign policy analyst and commentator. In 1997, he founded, along with 
William Kristol, the neo-conservative think tank, Project for the New American Century (PNAC). This 
had considerable influence on the foreign policy of George W Bush, including its strong advocacy of 
military action in Iraq to remove President Saddam Hussain from power. In 2016, Kagan left the 
Republican Party and supported Hilary Clinton due to disaffection with Donald Trump’s foreign policy. 
He now claims a more centrist orientation seeking to articulate foreign policies that are deeply rooted in 
US history and reflect the views of the majority of Americans.  
18The term ‘hegemony’ is itself subject to much contestation. In international relations, it refers to a form 
of domination that goes beyond more kinetic forms of power and relies as much on the realm of ideas, 
‘soft power in modern parlance, as a means of securing leadership by consent. It implies a sophisticated 
mixture of consent and coercion. Gramsci explained how in a domestic context a strong economic and 
social group can dominate a system without maintaining a state of constant fear and that its rule will be 
more sustainable if it can secure consent of the governed. In the international context relevant to this 
thesis the term is used to capture the broad spectrum of factors that underpin American leadership of the 
international order,   
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arrangement than all realistic alternatives’.19 Although there is an extensive debate 
about the character of US foreign policy along these lines, whether the US is aggressive 
or not in its stewardship, whether it can be fairly described as imperial or not in its 
period of pre-eminence, is not the main point of our discussion. 
Of more importance to this thesis is the extent to which US actions, however 
characterised, have become more significant in relation to South Asia. Perhaps for the 
first time, the United States sees India as increasingly important to its core foreign 
policy interests. By contrast, in the early years after the end of the Cold War, South Asia 
was a low priority in American foreign policy compared to other parts of the world, 
particularly the Middle East and East Asia.20 Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War set 
in train structural changes in the international order which, together with a reorientation 
of Indian economic policy, were destined to increase the importance of the Indo-US 
relationship. The end of the Cold War, while not having an immediate or obvious 
impact, laid the groundwork for a new era in Indo-US relations. 
Three significant events in the late 90s moved the region to the front burner of US 
attention.21 These were the explosion of a total of eleven nuclear devices in 1998 by 
India and Pakistan, the Kargil War of 1999 and President Clinton’s visit to South Asia 
in March 2000.22 In this period, South Asia’s regional desires and ambitions began to 
converge with those of the US.23 In part this was because the variety of potential 
disasters that might emanate  from the region made South Asia of paramount concern to 
US policy makers and gave it greater significance than before for international stability 
and for US grand strategy. Specifically, the rise of politicised Islam and terrorism in the 
name of Islam increased the strategic importance of South Asia at the end of the 20th 
century. 
                                                        
19 Robert Kagan, ‘The Benevolent Empire’, Foreign Policy, No. 111, Summer, 1998, p. 26. 
20Zhang Guihong, US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its implications for 
China: A Chinese Perspective, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 27, No. 2 April-June, 2003, p. 145.  
21Lloyd Rudolph and  Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Making of US Foreign Policy for South Asia: 
Offshore Balancing in Historical Perspective, Economic and Political Weekly, February 25, 2006, p. 703. 
22Zhang Guihong, US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its implications for 
China: A Chinese Perspective, p. 145.  
23Stephen P. Cohen, The US and South Asia, available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/articles/2005/1/01southasia%20cohen/20050101.pdf, 
accessed on 4 September 2014. 
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These trends were accentuated by the 9/11 attacks, which threatened the US sense of 
security in the same way that Pearl Harbour had done.24 They brought about a major 
reconfiguration of US South Asia policy, to the extent that some claimed the new 
century had not started on 1 January 2000 rather 11 September 2001.25 The South Asian 
scholar Stephen P. Cohen has argued that no part of the world was more affected by the 
terrorist attacks than South Asia.26 The 9/11 attacks changed South Asian political 
contours, altered US perspectives on the sub-continent, made a previously marginalised 
Pakistan a front-line state, and put parts of the US-India agenda on hold. They led the 
United States to attempt to bring New Delhi and Islamabad together in a common cause 
for ‘the war against terrorism’. President Bush quickly waived sanctions and extended 
assistance to both, with Washington intending to establish a more balanced relationship 
in the region, with a partnership with Pakistan and a strategic relationship with India.27 
Although US focus on the War on Terror did not interrupt gradual development of 
closer US-Indian relations, it did change US and Indian priorities in the short term. 
After 9/11, South Asia became a significant security concern for the US because for the 
first time it was a region that could threaten the security of the homeland for its citizens. 
It was in South Asia, in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the success of the US struggle 
against terrorism was likely to be decided. Richard Boucher argued that America’s 
success in the region was critically important to US national interests, asserting that 
‘September 11th cemented our realization that stability in South and Central Asia was 
ever vital’.28 One consequence was to give the US an interest in strengthening the 
political foundation of its relationship with India, in enabling India to play a greater role 
not only at the regional level but also at the global level, and, more specifically, in 
engaging India as an ally in checking terrorism. The imperative for the United States to 
maintain regional stability also enhanced India’s value as a bulwark against another 
threat of instability, namely the rise of China. The Bush administration saw clearly that 
a strong, stable and conflict-free India in partnership with US could serve to restrict 
                                                        
24 Stephen Burman , The State of the American Empire: How the USA Shapes the World, op.cit., p.12. 
25Zhang  Guihong,  US Security Policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its implications for 
China: A Chinese Perspective, p. 154. 
26 Interview with Stephen P. Cohen in Washington DC in 7 December 2012. 
27Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, The Making of US Foreign Policy for South Asia: 
Offshore Balancing in Historical Perspective, p. 704. 
28Ambassador Richard A. Boucher, ‘Pursuing Peace, Freedom, and Prosperity in South and Central Asia’, 
The DISAM Journal, 2006, p. 55. 
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Chinese influence in the region.29 This trend was continued by the Obama 
Administration, which gave even more importance to India and, in the eyes of some, 
took this as far as side-lining Pakistan, in contrast to Bush who had sought to give equal 
standing to both.  
More broadly, a strong Indo-US strategic partnership became an indispensable 
component for any US strategy that seeks to minimise future hindrances to American 
influence in Asia, whether it is terrorism, trade, nuclearisation or the shifting global 
balance of power. A strong strategic partnership can also enhance US economic growth, 
and increase cooperation in energy security and climate change. The fact that both states 
are multi-ethnic and multi-religious democracies provides a strong foundation for 
convergence of interests on the key issues of the world. India’s increasing economic 
growth will over time lead to its ascent as a global power and to an increasing role in 
maintaining peace and security in the South Asian region, and this furthers the incentive 
for the US to ensure that India is a partner rather than a rival.30 
Partnership cannot be taken for granted, however, and India’s wish to establish a wide 
range of good relations with many countries has strained, and may further strain in the 
future, its relationship with US. If we take the example of Iran, the picture becomes 
clear. Traditionally, Indo-Iran relations have been positive and they began a ‘strategic 
partnership’ in 2003, which created great concern for many in the US Congress. There 
was also concern when New Delhi sought energy resources from Tehran, with high 
New Delhi officials insisting they were ‘fully committed’, where Bush strongly opposed 
any project benefiting Iran. As a result, the United States prevented Indian scientists 
from visiting the United States, and chemical companies from transferring to Iran 
WMD-related equipment and other technology for three consecutive years.31 Again 
concern arose when, in April 2008, Iranian President Ahmadinejad visited New Delhi 
and met with senior Indian leaders, and when the then Indian Finance Minister Pranab 
Mukherji (later president) declined a request from Washington, while visiting America 
at the beginning of 2012, not to import oil from Iran. 
                                                        
29Bouton, Marshall M., ‘America’s Interests in India’, US-India Initiative Series, Centre for a New 
American Security, October 2010, p.9. 
30Ibid., pp. 5, 11. 
31K. Alan Kronstadt, India-U.S. Relations, CRS Report for Congress, February 13, 2007, pp. 26-7. 
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The tallest buildings, biggest dams, biggest plane, largest ferries wheel, biggest 
shopping mall, bestselling movies and most advanced mobile phones are now all being 
made outside Europe and the US. The world’s richest man is not an American and the 
largest factories are not in the US. Countries that previously lacked political confidence 
and national pride are now finding it. India has found itself one of those emerging 
countries.32 US policy toward South Asia since the 1950s was largely one of failure and 
neglect but events and global trends since the collapse of the USSR have led India and 
the US to accelerate the process of improving relations because its sympathetic values 
and political system and its strategic location place India among the most suitable of 
potential partners for the US as it adapts to the changing world order.33 
The strength and sustainability of their relationship will depend on how their mutual 
interests converge and on how they overcome their past indifference and hostility. But 
their current partnership derives from the fact that while New Delhi wishes to be one of 
the major players in the international political scene, Washington believes that New 
Delhi has the potential to act as a supporter of the liberal international political order. 
Although India is in the ascendant, it does not want fundamentally to alter the prevailing 
world order. Its stance therefore favours a continuing prominent or even dominant role 
for the US, particularly in a context in which the rise of China will ultimately alter the 
global balance of power, a development which both India and the US, as Asian powers, 
have an interest in happening in a restrained and gradual fashion. 
1.3 The Contribution of this thesis  
This study is distinctive in that it will critically analyse the reasons for US involvement 
in the region and for its close relationship with India after the September terrorist 
attacks. It will focus on the period from 2001-2012. Its importance lies in the challenge 
it offers to the orthodoxy that 9/11 ushered in a new era of international relations. This 
orthodoxy stems from the fact that, although President Bush had been willing to adopt 
an ‘India First’ policy toward the region from the beginning of his administration, the 
terrorist attacks brought Pakistan back into predominance in US strategic calculations 
and Bush started treating them on an equal footing. For President Bush, 9/11 changed 
everything, and not to India’s relative advantage, and yet the US developed a very close 
                                                        
32Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World And the Rise of the Rest, Penguin Books, 2009, pp. 1-3. 
33 David. S. Chou, US Policy Toward South Asia in the Post-Cold-War Era, Sheng- Chih Book Co. Ltd., 
Taipei, 2003, p. 27. 
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relationship with India after the attacks and this continued until the end of the period 
covered by this study. This thesis seeks to understand why this was the case. 
The dominant interpretation of the US/India relationship in post 9/11 suggests that the 
current state of cordial Indo-US relations are the outcome of 9/11 attacks on US soil. 
This view is frequently captured in the idea that this heinous attack marked the true 
beginning of the 21st century rather than the formal date of January 1, 2000. My 
findings challenge that interpretation and argue that there are two main factors that 
explain the evolution of US/India relations after 9/11: the first derives from the shifts in 
power that have been associated with the process of globalization in this century, shifts 
that have the effect of threatening the single superpower status the US had enjoyed since 
the end of the Cold War. This is most apparent in the rise of China to something 
approaching superpower status. The different strategies employed by Bush and Obama 
to avoid a diminution of US power forms a major part of the argument of this thesis. 
The second driver of the relationship is India’s emergence as a significant power in the 
international sphere and the attendant appetite to influence developments on the global 
stage.  The fact that India’s emergence and aspirations had implications for its possible 
role as a counterweight to China provided the connective tissue of the US/India 
relationship. 
Among academics who believed that the 9/11 changed everything, Douglas Kellner, 
Bacevich and Prodromou, McCartney, Hirsh, and Gaddis were prominent. Kellner 
claimed in terms that in the wake of 9/11 ‘everything has changed’.34 He went further 
saying, ‘In the context of US politics, 9/11 was so far-reaching and catastrophic that it 
flipped the political world upside down; put new issues on the agenda; and changed the 
political, cultural and economic climate almost completely overnight’.35 The role of 
religion in giving rise to an extreme US reaction to 9/11 is shown by Bacevich and 
Prodromou who argue that 9/11 allowed President Bush, a man of strong religious 
belief, able to apply his religiosity to the making of US foreign policy.  Bush had 
declared that ‘There is only one reason I am in the Oval Office and not in a bar,’ and 
that was ‘I found faith. I found God.’36 The combination of this sense of mission when 
                                                        
34 Douglas Kellner, From 9/11 to Terror War: the Dangers of the Bush Legacy, Rowman & Littlefield, 
Lanham, Maryland, 2009, p. 27. 
35Ibid., p. 39. 
36Bacevich, A. J. and Prodromou, E. H., ‘God Is Not Neutral: Religion and U.S. Foreign Policy after 
9/11’, Orbis, Vol. 48 No.1, (Winter), 2004, p. 46. 
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combined with 9/11 enabled President Bush to infuse American foreign policy with a 
moral passion, indeed a crusader spirit which was lacking before the attacks.37 
On a more conventional political plane, although 9/11 was a tragedy, many neo-
conservatives saw it as an opportunity to transform US foreign policy. After the attacks, 
the Bush administration appointed many new neo-cons including Elliot Abrams, 
Victoria Nuland, the wife of Kagan and Aaron Friedberg in the administration to 
implement their preconceived vision of a more assertive America.38 Analyzing the 
response of the Bush administration to nationalistic impulses, McCartney emphasized 
the great role that the 9/11 played in not only clarifying US nationalism but also in 
merging with its foreign policy.39 By means of applying the legitimate power of 
American nationalism to describe the incidents of 9/11, President Bush ‘was able to 
provide a context in which Americans could understand and accept a set of foreign 
policy goals far broader and more ambitious than a simple response to the immediate 
attacks would have suggested’.40 
Hirsh was convinced that the 9/11 had the single most vital effect on American foreign 
policy since the end of the Cold War. He stated ‘The United States was faced with an 
irreconcilable enemy; the sort of black-and-white challenge that has supposedly been 
transcended in the post-Cold War period, when the great clash of ideologies had 
ended’.41 He argued it was the National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2002 that 
highlighted the 9/11 as a turning point for US foreign policy by re-conceiving its 
relations with other main players in the global scene, including Russia, China and 
India.42 The Bush doctrine outlined in NSS provided the rationale for assertiveness 
abroad, insisting that US would retain massive primacy of military force and 
demonstrating a ‘take-it-or-leave-it unilateralism’.43 Gaddis also argued that 9/11 
brought a change in approach to the conduct of US relations with the countries in the 
world but added another dimension beyond inter-state relations. He stated: ‘Neither 
Bush nor his successors, whatever their party, can ignore what the events of September 
                                                        
37Ibid., p. 47. 
38Ibid., p. 53. 
39 McCartney, P. T.  ‘American Nationalism and US foreign Policy from September 11 to the Iraq War’, 
Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 119, No. 3 (Fall), 2004, p. 411. 
40Ibid., p. 400. 
41 Hirsh, M., ‘Bush and the World. The Need for a new Wilsonianism’, Foreign Affairs, (Sep/Oct), 2002, 
Vol. 81, No. 5, p. 18. 
42Ibid., p. 19. 
43Ibid., p. 41. 
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11, 2001, made clear: that deterrence against states affords insufficient protection from 
attack by gangs, which can now inflict the kind of damage only states fighting wars 
used to be able to achieve’.44 It was this recognition that was in part the inspiration for 
the War on Terror 
It was not only the academics but politicians and commentators, public figures like 
British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, Paul Wolfowitz, Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Perle 
who believed that 9/11 changed everything.  Tony Blair was the first on television to 
express sympathy of British as a nation. He said ‘A lot of people didn’t realise quite 
how much this changed attitudes in America. For them, it was another Pearl Harbour. It 
changed everything.’45 Wolfowitz believed that 9/11 has changed the world forever.46 
Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Rudy Giuliani and many others believed that the day 
of 9/11 changed the world. 9/11, and, as  Condoleezza Rice put it, ‘No less than Pearl 
Harbour, September 11 forever changed the lives of every American and the strategic 
perspective of the United States.’47 
Although the weight of public argument that 9/11 changed everything was substantial, 
agreement was not universal. Change did not affect every area of foreign policy and 
some felt that the long-term objectives of American foreign policy remained the same 
with only their form changing to match changed circumstances. Leffler argues that 9/11: 
‘...did not change the world or transform the long-term trajectory of US grand strategy. 
The United States’ quest for primacy, its desire to lead the world, its preference for an 
open door and free markets, its concern with military supremacy, its readiness to act 
unilaterally when deemed necessary, its eclectic merger of interests and values, its sense 
of indispensability – all these remained, and remain, unchanged.’48 
The contribution of this thesis lies in showing that the truth lies somewhere in the 
middle of these two positions. There were dramatic short-term changes of specific 
policies, notably in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the War on Terror but at the same time 
                                                        
44 Gaddis, J. L., ‘Grand Strategy in the Second Term’, Foreign Affairs, (Jan/Feb), 2005, p. 2. 
45Lisa O’Carroll, Tony Blair knew immediately that 9/11 terror attacks 'changed everything', The 
Guardian, 10 September 2011. 
46 Suzanne Goldenberg, ‘The Guardian profile: Paul Wolfowitz’, The Guardian, 1 April, 2005. 
47 Melvyn P. Leffler, ‘9/11 and American Foreign Policy’, Diplomatic History, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2005, p. 
406. 
48 Melvyn P. Leffler, ‘9/11 in Retrospect: George W. Bush's Grand Strategy, Reconsidered’, Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 90, No. 5 (September/October 2011), p. 43. 
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fundamental security interests and ambitions of the US and indeed its grand strategy 
were not immediately transformed by the terror attack. The argument of this thesis is 
that the world order and America’s role in it were changing before 9/11, primarily due 
to the forces we use ‘globalisation’ as a short hand to capture.  These forces are not 
connected to 9/11 in a significant fashion; they were underway before it and have 
continued to this day, long after the impact of 9/11 on policy has faded. Indo-US 
relations were affected by the short term changes but the longer term transformation of 
the US and of India’s role in the world order have had a much greater impact on their 
relationship in the period examined in this thesis, and these forces remain paramount to 
this day. 
To summarise, my thesis will argue that the driving force behind changing Indo-US 
relations is not of the events of 9/11, but rather that long term changes in world order 
have forced the United States to adapt. We are witnessing a global power transition; 
unipolarity49 was giving way in the period of this thesis, although exactly to what was 
not then and is not now clear. The 20th century was the American century, and the US 
was particularly dominant in the 90s and early 2000s. But the present century, if it 
belongs to any region, is more likely to be the Asian century. Global power is shifting 
from North to South and West to East. Already the world is less American, less 
Western. The United States wants an orderly transition to a new order and to maintain 
as much of its power as possible in the new dispensation, whatever its form. A stable 
and progressive South Asia is essential to this goal, just as it is to India’s aspiration to 
exert more influence on the global stage. Both ambitions are given impetus by the fact 
that greatest threat to them comes from the adjacent region in the form of the emerging 
world superpower ‘China’. It is this common interest which drives the improvements in 
US- Indian relations, although, as the thesis will show, these same forces also cause 
                                                        
49Polarity in international relations refers to the pattern by which power and influence are distributed in 
the international system. Unipolarity is one such pattern and the most commonly referred to alternatives 
are bipolarity, as operated in the Cold War, and multipolarity, as is emerging in today’s international 
system.  Unipolarity refers to ‘the distribution of power in which there is one state with most of the 
cultural, economic and military influence’. The US variant is also referred to hegemony (see fn 18 above). 
Other characteristics of American unipolarity include the fact that it is an interstate system and not an 
empire, and that, although the US is dominant there remains other nodes of power in the system that 
compete for influence and so the power of the Hegemon is limited. The British Empire (from the end of 
Napoleonic wars to the beginning of the 20th Century) is perhaps the best recent example of Unipolarity.  
American unipolarity succeeded the British but only after the long hiatus of world wars and the Cold 
War. It is gradually being supplanted by a form of multipolarity, whose main danger is precisely the 
absence of stability that some claim is associated with the benign hegemony of the American era. 
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disruptions that lead the path to a harmonious relationship to be less than smooth or 
linear. 
American policy toward the Indian sub-continent has always been motivated by the 
geopolitical and geo-strategic consideration in the region. Its desire for stability and 
predictability and maximum influence has led it to seek good relations with the two 
major countries in the region, India and Pakistan. However, the permanent tension on 
the sub-continent between powers has meant it has always been very difficult for the US 
to have good relations with both the countries simultaneously. During the Cold War 
period the US tilted to Pakistan and with the end of war the balance swung to India. 
9/11 led the US to want strong relations with both, although for different reasons but the 
imperative to fight terrorism in Afghanistan meant that a short term tilt to Pakistan was 
inevitable. Even in the short term this was not straightforward and it was temporary 
whereas the implications of the global power shift to the East, which favoured India as a 
partner, were slower but ultimately more significant. Bringing Pakistan to the front from 
the backburner exaggerated the dramatic and temporary at the expense of focus long 
term and deeper trends.  
In this context gradual growth of India’s importance in the regional and global scene 
has made it more vital to US interests. India is the largest democracy and has the second 
largest population in the world after China; it contains roughly 20% world population 
and by 2040 it is expected to have the world’s largest population. From being an aid-
recipient country, India has become an economic development partner of the US and 
other western powers.50 During the Cold War and in few years of the Cold War ended, 
New Delhi had hardly strategic importance to Washington, policy-makers in the United 
States now has started regarding India not just a fellow democracy but a nation with a 
great strategic interests. Washington not only saw India’s rise as modest but having 
positive influence in solving problems the countries of Asia undergoing.51 For Schaffer, 
the United States looking for its deeper relationship with India not because of the 
changes made due to 9/11 but of India’s rise, and it wanted to base its policy directing 
India on objectives which include deliberate attempt to avoid nuclear war in the sub-
continent, India’s role as a balancer not to China only but to larger Asia, and the 
                                                        
50Teresita C. Schaffer, India and the United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership, CSIS, 
2009,  p.1. 
51Ibid., pp. 11, 13. 
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potential of its trade and investment.52 Washington and New Delhi has been developing 
a partnership from the end of the Cold War. India’s outward-oriented and promising 
economy began after the Cold War, leading not just the US but also the rest of the world 
to recognise India as a major power and to seek closer relations with it.  
In sum the evolution of the Indo-US relationship is the product of changes in the global 
situation. At least until the end of the Cold War, and perhaps right up to 9/11 US 
relations with India were not as close as those with Pakistan and 9/11 accentuated the 
difference. 9/11 did create a new dynamic and new dilemmas for the US but the factors 
underpinning its changing relations with India are wider and more long term than the 
impact of 9/11. The contribution of this thesis will be to demonstrate the balance 
between the short-term imperatives that 9/11 gave rise to and the longer-term structural 
changes driven by changes in world global geo-economics53 and geo-politics. My 
argument will be that, if there had been no 9/11, the Indo-US relationship would still 
have been one of gradual development in a positive direction. Although 9/11 was 
significant, it has not been the deciding factor governing the development of the US-
India relationship in the long first decade of the 21st century. 
1.4 Methodology 
My study is a contemporary historical narrative of US foreign policy toward India since 
9/11. In seeking to establish which methods are most appropriate to the study we may 
think of the possibilities as lying on a continuum: At one end lies the employment of 
general social scientific theories from which can be developed testable hypothesises 
with the objective of generating evidence-based conclusions, which, if not universal or 
law-like, are applicable across a wide range of time and space. At the other end lies 
historical research that takes as its object the understanding of specific phenomena and 
eschews the development of more general propositions in favour of deeper 
understanding of the events under consideration. This study lies towards the latter, 
                                                        
52Ibid., p. 16. 
53The term ‘geo-economics’ is relatively new and appeared in the dictionary in 1990, first used by an 
American commentator, Edward Luttwak. Closely linked to geopolitics it ‘refers to the application of 
economic means of power by states so as to realize strategic objectives’. Some argue it has the capacity to 
surpass military strength as an instrument of state power because its components such as investment 
policy, trade policy, financial and monetary policy, economic and financial sanctions, energy and 
commodities are more central over time to the lives of the world’s populations than intermittent outbreaks 
of violent conflict. Although there will always be an interplay between geo-economics, geopolitics and 
security strategy, the biggest single change in the international system in recent years, namely the rise of 
China has been led by geo-economics and illustrates the ways in which this might be true. 
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historical end of the spectrum. It does not rely heavily on the application of the 
approaches prominent in international relations such as constructivism54 or realism55, or 
depend on associated formal modelling or a focus on quantitative data. Rather it seeks 
to find evidence that generates a deep understanding of the relationship whose recent 
evolution is its specific and sole object of study. In the nature of a continuum there are 
overlaps in the methods of collecting evidence in both social scientific and historical 
approaches, even when the object of the research is quite different.  This applies to the 
use of official documents for example but also to interviewing and this study has 
generated evidence from a set of semi-structured interviews, a method that is as 
applicable in international relations as in contemporary history. But a distinction 
between the two perspectives may be seen from the example of the case study. These 
are employed in both historical and social scientific research but this study is not 
conceived of as a case study as it is not intended to illustrate or confirm wider theories 
in international relations.  
It would be misleading, however, to present this thesis as a theoretical or lacking a 
conceptual apparatus.  The argument used to explain the primary drivers of the US/India 
relationship refer to developments and theories within global political economy56 and 
strategic analysis57 and security studies58 that go beyond the direct relationship between 
                                                        
54In this context, constructivism is a theory about how people learn. Starting from the premise that human 
beings are the active creators of their own knowledge, in international politics. It argues that relations are 
not determined by unchanging human nature or immutable social structures but they are historically and 
socially constructed and by virtue of this they are open to change. Given its policy orientation the 
constructions of leading policy-making actors are part of the framework of this thesis but the focus is on 
the evolution of the structural context in which they operate and which shapes their construction of 
context and objectives. 
55Realism in this context is taken to refer to a stress in international affairs on power politics and the 
pursuit of national interests, as opposed to the idea that international relations can be guided by ideals and 
morality and, moreover, that the priority given to the pursuit of power and maximisation of interest is 
grounded in human nature and therefore carries a sense of inevitability. This leads to a focus on the state 
as the most important actor in international affairs and as the focus of the thesis is on the inter-state 
relationship between the US and India that framework is relevant.  However this thesis focuses more on 
the constraints posed by the international system than by human nature and in that sense it falls within a 
more neorealist perspective. The premise of neo-realism that it is the anarchy of the international system 
which constrains state behavior is however too general to have much relevance to this study  which, 
although it can draw on neorealist perspectives does not, as stated in the text, seek to take its subject 
matter as a case study to support or contradict neo-realist theory. 
56Global political economy and international political economy are used interchangeably. Although the 
former arguably has a more comprehensive connotation both will be used to refer to the interaction 
between political and economic forces that are reshaping domestic societies as well as relations between 
states. 
57Strategic analysis refers to the processes by which an agent seeks to achieve a specific policy objective. 
It is an assessment of how different aspects of policy-making interact to determine its success. It provides 
a crystallized view of the objectives, goals of any organization/state, and the means to achieve them 
within a specific timeframe.  
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the two countries, and which are themselves the product of social scientific analysis. 
The point is that, while ideas and evidence from these fields is used in this thesis, this is 
done in order to illuminate the relationship under consideration rather than that 
relationship being used to illustrate some broader theory in the field of international 
political economy or security studies or another sub-field of international relations. 
Neither is evidence marshalled, for example, to demonstrate the efficacy of a realist or 
constructivist approach.  
In order to avoid a charge of excessive eclecticism that this description might prompt, 
discipline in the methodological approach used here is provided by the character of the 
thesis as a policy study.  This is not to place it in the field of foreign policy analysis59 
insofar as that is associated with the study of state institutions and the policy making 
process.  But it is to suggest that the selection of ideas used to inform the analysis of the 
available primary and secondary sources is governed by their efficacy in fostering 
understanding of the concerns of leading actors charged with advancing their 
conception of national interests, understanding also the external forces that play upon 
this process and then of analysing the evolution of policy outcomes that are the product 
of the interaction of these forces. 
The study will use a variety of primary and secondary sources. Much of the information 
is available from online sources, including from the White House, US State Department, 
Department of Defence and other government agencies. As a part of secondary source, 
other than books, journal articles, the author also will use numerous PhD theses of 
previous researchers related to this field. Apart from voluminous secondary materials, 
my primary sources will be US Government publications, including those published by 
the Congress, India’s Government publications, and interviews conducted specifically 
for this thesis. Interviews were conducted some of the policy makers and academics 
involving in the decision making process at different times. The interviews are very 
important to the study because it deals with recent events for which not all relevant 
government documents are yet released. Another source of primary material will be 
                                                                                                                                                                  
58The concept of security studies developed during the Cold War period. Stephen Walt defines  security  
studies  as  ‘the  studies  of  the threat,  use,  and  control  of  military  force’. See Stephen Walt, The 
Renaissance of Security Studies (1991). It is the study how to protect a country from external and internal 
threats.  
59Foreign policy analysis is the study of management of a state’s relations and activities with other 
countries in the world.  It is concerned with theory development and empirical study of how a country 
formulates foreign policy and what would be the ultimate outcome of that policy. In a word, it analyses 
the decision making process of a country while maintaining its relations with other actors. 
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recently declassified official documents from the previous administrations. Other 
primary sources are public statements made by high officials in speeches, speeches of 
the leadership, press conferences, oral testimonies in congressional hearings and their 
interviews. Articles in the newspapers and editorials have also been used for this 
research. Another source of primary materials would be the various publications of 
think tanks and research institutions based in Washington.  
It is important to note here that all of the sources, used in this investigation, either 
primary or secondary, have their limitations. Secondary sources, books or articles, can 
quickly become dated or even obsolete when discussing the contemporary issues. The 
memoirs and other accounts by policy makers can be shaped by a desire to defend their 
own actions rather than give a balanced account of events. There is no way to 
completely avoid the distortions these and other similar factors give rise to and the goal 
of a perfectly objective account of this relationship is a chimera. However every attempt 
has been made to minimize these limitations by drawing on competing accounts from 
different ideological positions, accepting no so single source as objective without 
subjecting it critical analysis. Finally, the thesis is intended to be reflexive inasmuch as 
the author’s own potential biases in selection and interpretation of evidence are subject 
to critical scrutiny at every stage. 
Conducting semi-structured interviews with relevant actors as a method of generating 
primary data that could inform both this checking process and reveal information not in 
the public domain played a critical role in the construction of this thesis. However, in 
practice there were significant limitations on the evidence generated by this method. 
The initial plan was to conduct interviews in Washington DC. The number of 
interviewees available in the time available for the research visit to Washington was 
also constrained by finance and by the fact that many interlocutors became unavailable 
at short notice. The outcome was that the interview schedule was confined to 10 
interlocutors, as follows. 
1. Ambassador Richard Boucher 
2. Ambassador Howard B. Schaffer  
3. Ambassador Anthony Quainton in American University 
4. Dr. Satu Limaye, East West Centre 
5. Dr. Thomas Lynch, American Defence University   
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6. Robert M. Hathaway, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars 
7. Professor Thomas Farr, Georgetown University 
8. Professor  Deepa Ollapally, George Washington University 
9. Professor Stephen P. Cohen, Brookings Institution 
10. Professor Mike Green, Georgetown University. 
This group included two who were Indian-American and had strong connections with 
policy makers in New Delhi, which gave some indirect access to Indian perspectives. 
Others were former US administration officials with deep insight into, and firsthand 
knowledge of, the topics covered in this thesis. In sum the material gathered by this 
method proved helpful to the development of the argument of the thesis and made 
contributions to understanding on specific topics, but its scope was restricted by the 
constraints referred to. 
1.5 Literature Review 
This section analyses and evaluates the existing literature on the subject of the thesis, 
and indicates lacunae in it. Although the literature on US foreign policy is voluminous 
and that on US-India relations in general is large, that on US India policy in post 9/11 is 
less substantial.  
The leading work on the immediate historical background to the period examined in this 
thesis, namely US policy toward India from the establishment of diplomatic relations 
until  the end of the Cold War, is Dennis Kux’s, India and the United States: Estranged 
Democracies 1941-199. This is a comprehensive volume in which Kux describes the ups 
and downs60 of Indo-US relations during the period and explains why these two 
democracies remained estranged61 despite having same kind of political system and 
values62. Having been a career diplomat gave Kux the opportunity to observe the policy 
making process from close proximity; this distinctive perspective was supplemented 
with documentary research on declassified documents63 and interviews with US and 
Indian officials. 
                                                        
60 Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies 1941-1991, National Defense 
University Press, Washington, 1992, p. 414. 
61 Ibid., pp. 330, 450, 447.  
62 Ibid., pp. 354, 453. 
63 Ibid., p. 454.. 
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Kux recounts in detail the evolution of Indo-US relations, focussing on those factors 
that prevented more positive engagement64. Primary among these was the policy of 
containment65 of Soviet Communism pursued by the United States. Despite its avowed 
neutrality the abiding US fear was that India was too closely tied to the USSR and 
therefore had to be kept at a distance by the US. Supplementary to this Washington’s 
favouring of Pakistan as part of the Great game with the USSR was an almost 
permanent irritant for Delhi. There were points of better relations, notably during the 
Kennedy administration at the time of the Indo-Chinese War when strategic factors 
favoured US cultivation of India but the overarching determinant of estrangement was 
the struggle with Soviet communism. Kux is relevant to this thesis because it provides 
context but as the main thrust of its argument on the relationship were factors that 
disappeared more or less precisely when this thesis begins, its relevance is confined to 
background status. It helps to demonstrate just how much had changed with the end of 
the Cold War and in that sense brings into relief the process of globalisation that, as is 
argued in this thesis, becomes the new primary driver of the relationship between 
Washington and New Delhi. 
For the period most relevant to this study, Stephen P. Cohen has been perhaps the most 
eminent scholar on the US/India relationship. This thesis will argue that the emergence 
of India as a power with significant capacity to act in a leading role on the world stage 
has been one of the major factors driving the reassessments and evolution of US policy. 
Cohen’s book, ‘India: Emerging Power’, published in 2001 details the bases on which 
this emergence had begun to take place in the decade after the Cold War. India’s 
decision to drop misguided Cold War policies, both in terms of transforming antiquated 
domestic economic structures and adopting a more open attitude to the West, combined 
with the emergence of China as a serious rival to focus US attention on India and lay the 
groundwork for, if not an alliance then at least a closer more cordial forms of 
cooperation than had existed previously. Indeed as the US sought to adapt to the 
emergence of a range of new powers, India was seen by many as perhaps the most 
promising potential partner to assist in adapting to these changes. Its multicultural and 
multi ethnic identity suited it to a more diverse world and the rapidly growing diaspora 
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in the US only served to draw to act as a bridge between the two   biggest pluralist, 
multi-ethnic democracies in the world.66 
Cohen’s contribution in demonstrating India’s new found capacities is seminal to 
analyses of US-India relations, including this one.  His later contributions focussed first 
on the importance of Pakistan to the relationship and how enduring its role has been as a 
complicating factor67. Cohen recognised that the path to the improved US-India 
relationship he both analysed and sought was never likely to be smooth and, within the 
period of this thesis, his 2010 book, Arming without Aiming, he demonstrated some of 
the limitations of India’s emergence in the security field. In pointing to these limitations 
and balancing them against his optimism about India’s growing influence, he has served 
as a guide to the analysis of this thesis, which attempts to follow in this spirit of 
balance68. 
As a policy this subject area has attracted the attention of think tanks and much of 
literature is dominated by reports emanating from them, often from authors who, in the 
American fashion, have been government officials and move between the two spheres 
with ease. This can give the literature a very narrow focus on the sorts of problems that 
confront policy makers daily but which do not go beyond immediate concerns. Papers 
are often oriented towards advocacy of a particular line for policy but lack a framework 
for fundamental criticism or for placing it in wider analytic context. Perhaps the major 
think tank figure in this field, widely considered America’s top India expert and 
someone who has in some writing been able to avoid these pitfalls, is Ashley Tellis. In 
his 2007 article, ‘The Transforming US-Indian Relationship and Its Significance for 
American Interests’ Tellis traces the evolution of the relationship. He describes how the 
United States pressed the Britain to grant India its independence. In return, India, under 
the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, initially showed India’s eagerness to develop a 
friendship with the US, building on positive public attitudes towards the US, but 
eventually opted for leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement. As others have noted 
Tellis argues that 1962 was the peak of the post war relationship, although relations 
deteriorated thereafter warming only a little in the decade leading to the end of the Cold 
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War before improving significantly in the post Soviet decade under Clinton and taking a 
major step forward under George W Bush, culminating in the civil nuclear agreement 
that received congressional approval in 200869. While Tellis recognised it was the 
collapse of the USSR that facilitated this improvement he also acknowledged that the 
agreement was the culmination of a shift in strategic thinking under Bush superior to 
that under Clinton, and for which his administration deserved credit especially in its 
understanding of the strategic role India could play as a counterweight to Chinese 
assertiveness.70 This positive assessment of India’s capacity underpinned the view of 
Obama’s first administration, but after a promising start the relationship endured a 
bumpy passage as the Obama administration failed for a period to pursue it with the 
same vigour as Bush before resuming attention and reviving the upward arc that Tellis 
sees as the trajectory of the relationship. So, despite his close connections to the policy 
world Tellis is able to give a magisterial overview of the relationship.  In the bulk of his 
writing however his perspective remains close to immediate policy concerns and brings 
conventional conceptual apparatus to them.  He also acts a leading advocate for 
improving a relationship that he is analysing and while this does not undermine the 
acuity of much of his writing; it does compromise its intellectual independence in a way 
that this thesis seeks to avoid.  
Closeness to government is not a bar to making an important contribution to the 
literature as well as serving as a source, however. The work of the Congressional 
Research Service, a government agency, demonstrates this. In a series of papers since 
early this century a team led by K Alan Kronstadt has used the access it has from 
working in government to produce a series of outstanding and authoritative briefing 
papers on US/India relations. These not only offer background and detail on specific 
issues but also carry out extensive survey of all issues facing the relationship. In the 
process they sometimes offer comprehensive literature reviews as an element of their 
papers, so providing an invaluable source for this thesis. 
In a 2007 report ‘India-U.S. Relations’ Kronstadt demonstrated South Asia’s 
importance in US foreign policy calculus, where India as the biggest actor occupied a 
dominant place. He too described India as an emerging power that was a natural partner 
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of the US. He pointed to progress on a variety of issues such as civil nuclear 
cooperation, civil space cooperation, high-technology trade and security issues and 
argued that, although differences over such issues as the status of Kashmir hindered the 
development of a strategic partnership, India’s economic liberalisation  and its potential  
counterweight to China made US interest in cultivating it clear71. In other reports the 
CRS service under Kronstadt’s leadership analysed economic relations72 and security 
issues73, lauding the progress that had been made but also discussing barriers to deeper 
cooperation. This perspective thus joined and helped to create a consensus in the 
literature around the idea that while there were setbacks and difficulties, such as those 
around visas, the path  of the relationship was, and from the US perspective should be, 
upward.  
As the strategic importance of India as a strategic partner to the US has become 
accepted in the literature so the relationship has attracted increased interest from not 
only specialists but scholars of grand strategy. Harsh V. Pant is one of the most 
prominent Indian scholars who has written on both specific topics and broader strategic 
ones. Perhaps his most substantial contribution comes in his book, ‘The US–India 
Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process, and Great Power Politics’ where he provided a forensic 
analysis of the process that started during the Clinton period and ended with the signing 
of historic deal in 2008. Pant provides a detailed account of the policy, processes, 
politics, and hindrances that faced both countries at home and abroad in a messy route 
to a final deal which ended India’s 30 years of nuclear isolation74. In another article, 
‘Indian Foreign Policy Responds to the U.S. Pivot’ Pant explained India’s strategy in 
dealing with US rebalancing Asia policy. India saw the pivot as an opportunity to 
increase its leverage in the international arena gaining influence with both the US and 
China. The mutual goal of restraining the growth of Chinese influence helped India to 
become strategically closer to the US while at the same time maintaining a distance 
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from total identification in line with the  axiom  that while the United States pivots, 
India hedges75.  
Sumit Ganguly is another Indian borne, though in his case US based scholar who has 
made a significant contribution to the literature, focusing on the Indian side of the 
relationship. In his article ‘India’s Foreign Policy Grows Up’ discussed how India’s 
foreign policy evolved from a non-alignment to strategic partnership with the United 
States. For him the sign of growing maturity came as India moved beyond studied 
neutrality between superpowers in the Cold War to a more independent profile, moving 
for example  towards  making Israel a strategic partner overturning  along association 
with  Islamic countries that had reflected the interests of its own  Muslim population . It 
also   adopted a ‘Look East’ policy to capitalise on the large growing market in 
Southeast Asia76. Following the policy-oriented advocacy that is characteristic of the 
literature, in addition to analysing India’s failure in a later book, ‘India as an Emerging 
Power’ Ganguly also provided a prescription on how it could become a player in 
international politics. Its strong stance against terrorism after 9/11 and offers of 
assistance to the US were a sign of India’s growing capacity to raise its voice in the 
international arena77. 
S. Paul Kapur, added to the dominant  perspective in a 2007 article, ‘The 
Transformation of US-India Relations:  An Explanation for the Rapprochement and 
Prospects for the Future’ in which he argued that  the relationship had been on an 
upward path since the end of the Cold War where previously it had been marked by 
mutual distrust and suspicion. He traces this improvement seeing convergence not only 
in structural and domestic factors but also in the contribution played by individual 
leadership who proved capable of moving beyond the Cold War paradigm and taking 
the steps necessary to build trust and confidence.78 Kapur, in other writing, also 
demonstrates how the greatest threat to stability in the region, its nuclearisation after 
tests by both Pakistan and India in 1998, was addressed by the Clinton administration. 
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Overt conflict was avoided but perhaps this was due more to a new nuclear-based 
balance of fear than to the efforts of the US, and anyway after 9/11 the US agenda 
moved from non-proliferation to the War on Terror and this became its primary driver 
of its policy towards the sub-continent79. 
C. Raja Mohan, a distinguished think tanker brought another dimension to the literature 
by addressing in his article, Indo-U.S. relations: Who’s afraid of America? He discussed 
the question of America’s status in the international order. He suggested that, despite 
having many problems, the United States, would remain the world’s foremost military 
and economic power in the years to come but that it would have to adapt and could no 
longer lead in the same way as it had done over the previous 70 years. It is imperative 
for Indian leadership to understand this historic change as well as the continuing power 
of the US if it is to maximise the benefits of partnership80. Most of his commentary 
stressed the warming of the relationship, dating from the nuclear deal which created 
unprecedented sympathy among Indians toward the United States. This was initially 
capitalised on by Obama but this was followed by increased scratchiness before the 
advent of Modi brought a new chapter81. Whether this optimism on the latest stage is 
justified is outside the period analysed by this thesis but the narrative of a gradual if 
uneven development of a strategic partnership reinforces the optimistic narrative that, as 
we have seen, is dominant in the literature.  
Pursuant to the theme of America’s changing role in the world there is a vast literature 
on the general characteristics and evolution of US foreign policy.  This is not directly 
relevant to the specific focus of this thesis but some of the general arguments can be 
used to shed light on it. As examples Stephen Sestanovich, provides a comprehensive 
historical background in, ‘Maximalist: America in the World from Truman to Obama’82 
while Fareed Zakaria effectively started the increasingly prominent trend of analysing 
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American relative ‘decline’, a debate that reached its peak around the time of the 
beginning of the second Obama administration83.  
Several authors take the Bush Doctrine as a significant turning point in American 
foreign policy and attempt to determine   the trajectory after its enunciation. These 
include, Ivo H. Daalder, and James M. Lindsay, ‘America Unbound: The Bush 
Revolution in Foreign Policy’,84 and Robert Jervis, ‘American Foreign Policy in a New 
Era’85. The beginning of the post Bush era was a high point for literature and books 
attempting to  understand how the Obama years might play out include, Timothy Lynch 
& Robert Singh ‘After Bush: The Case for Continuity in American Foreign Policy’86, 
Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro  titled ‘To Lead the World: American Strategy 
after the Bush Doctrine’87, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft  ‘America and the 
World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign88, John Davis  ‘Barack 
Obama and US Foreign Policy: Roadmap for Change or Disaster?89 and Tariq Ali  
‘The Obama Syndrome: Surrender at Home, War Abroad’90. 
John Ikenberry is perhaps the leading analyst of US adaptation to the new world order 
in the relevant period and in several significant contributions was one of the first to 
emphasise the suitability of India as a partner in this new order91. John Mearsheimer and 
Stephen Walt have also made significant contributions from a different and more critical 
perspective and their ‘The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy’, was important in 
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understanding how US foreign policy was being formulated and influenced92. And, 
finally, the doyen of US foreign policy analysts and himself formerly a practitioner, 
Joseph Nye takes a firm stand on the debate surrounding US standing, arguing that we 
are not living in a post-American world, that America can and will maintain its 
hegemonic stance but that the world is becoming more complex and the US will need 
cooperation from partners93.  The implications for the US India relationship are clear.  
Before closing this review mention should be made of some non-US and non-Indian 
authors who have made relevant contributions to the analysis of US foreign policy. UK 
scholar John Dumbrell, in a book edited with Axel R. Schäfer, described how the United 
States maintained its relationships with its friends to help achieve its policy objectives94, 
and in other works he has surveyed the foreign policies of all the administrations since 
Carter95. Stephen Burman in, ‘The State of the American Empire: How the USA shapes 
the World’ detailed the US footprint across the globe96. 
This review can give only a brief indication of the extent of the literature surrounding 
this topic, both in analyses of US foreign policy and more specific studies on aspects of 
the US-India relationship general terms. The works highlighted here have influenced the 
argument proposed in this thesis but none mirror the specific study of the period from 
9/11 until the end of the first Obama administration or attempt to address the specific 
research questions involved. It is to these we now turn. 
1.6 Research Questions 
It is the premise of this study that US foreign policy toward India underwent a 
significant change after the end of the Cold War and that 9/11 caused this process to 
accelerate. The rise of China and India as major powers also exerted a major influence 
on policy as part of a shift in the global balance of power associated with globalisation. 
With this background, the study addresses a set of primary and secondary research 
questions. The primary questions are: 
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- What aspects of US national interest, as reconfigured after 9/11, led the US to 
develop its policy toward India?  
- What forces in the international arena after 9/11 drove the US to develop its 
policy toward India? 
- Did the growing relationship between India and the US contribute to the stability 
of the international order and America’s hegemonic role within it? 
- To what extent did US and Indian interests converge in this period? 
The secondary questions are: 
- What was the impact of 9/11 on US attitudes to the sub-continent? 
- To what extent did the approaches to India of the Bush and Obama 
administrations’ differ, both conceptually and practically? 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
My investigation will follow US relations with India since its independence in 1947 
until the end of Obama’s first term, but the main focus will be on events since 9/11. 
This study will draw a picture of the trajectory of Indo-US relations in following seven 
chapters. 
Chapter 1: the introductory chapter provides an overview of the thesis and develops its 
main argument. The primary purpose of this chapter is to lay out the overall argument 
of the thesis and give an indication of how the body of the thesis will deal with subject 
matter.  
Chapter II will illustrate the historical background of US foreign policy towards India 
since India’s independence in 1947, when two countries began their official relations, 
until the beginning of the 21st century. It will show the great change in India’s 
traditional foreign policy in 1990s, with the significant reforms to its economy leading 
the Clinton Administration to make a shift toward India.  
Chapter III delves into the conceptual thinking of the Bush administration’s policy in 
general, but specifically toward India after 9/11. It will outline the policy before 9/11 as 
a basis for comparison with the post-9/11 period. It will analyse the impact of 9/11 on 
the Bush Administration’s thinking about the South Asian region. The investigation will 
focus on the extent of change in the administration’s foreign policy from its pre-9/11 
29 
 
state both in relation to the War on Terror and with regard to the implications for the 
subcontinent.  
Chapter IV will sketch the implementation of policy by the Bush administration 
toward India. It will elucidate how after many years of being ‘estranged democracies’, 
the US and India have crossed the threshold and entered into a new era that can best be 
described as ‘engaged democracies’. It will demonstrate the clear agreement over the 
global issue of terrorism that developed between the United States and India. In 2006, 
Washington and New Delhi signed a landmark civilian nuclear cooperation pact during 
President Bush’s visit to New Delhi. The policies of the NSSP initiative of the Bush 
administration included different major issues in the Indo-US relationship and the Open 
Skies Agreement. This chapter will delineate the various stages of discussions, talks, 
agreements, cooperation and processes of the Bush administration that culminated in the 
nuclear agreement in 2008,  an agreement that  modified the US policy of nuclear non-
proliferation, acknowledged India as a nuclear state and  ended India’s quest of over 
three decades for such recognition.  
Chapter V is about the conceptual thinking of the first Obama administration in 
relation to its policy toward India. The Bush administration left Obama with 
international relationships in disarray and this chapter will compare the differences in 
thinking between the Bush and Obama administrations. President Obama came to office 
promising ‘change’ that denoted an overall transformation in the manner in which the 
US conducted its security and foreign policies. The chapter will consider how the 
Obama Administration shifted the policy of unilateralism97 pursued by the Bush 
Administration toward a policy of multilateralism. The study will also analyse whether 
the Obama administration’s efforts to restore the US presence in Asia marked a key 
point of departure from the policies of his predecessor.  
Chapter VI will assess the implementation of policy under the first Obama 
administration. It will show how the Obama administration looked for more active 
engagement with the countries of Asia, making efforts to improve Washington’s 
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relations with friends, partners, and allies, and how it cooperated with Beijing on issues 
at a bilateral, regional and global level from the beginning of its term of office.  As 
Obama was determined to combat terrorism but did not accept Bush’s concept of a 
‘global war on terror’, this study will look into how he sought to wind down the 
ongoing wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, while neutralising Al Qaeda or any 
other terrorist organisation as a threat to the people of the United States. An attempt will 
also be made to search for how the Obama administration sought to carry on expanded 
engagement and cooperation with India while continuing the long-standing US policy of 
avoiding a direct role in bilateral disputes like the Kashmir issue. During his election 
campaign and immediately after his victory, Obama said that he would transform the 
image of the US and its role in the world. This chapter will look critically at whether 
and how far Obama was successful in this regard in his first term. 
Chapter VII is the concluding chapter, which will match the conceptual framework and 
main thesis in Chapter I with the investigation of the subsequent empirical and 
conceptual chapters. 
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CHAPTER – TWO 
Historical Background of US Foreign Policy – pre-9/11 
 
2.1 Introduction: The Cold War Era 
After the Second World War, the United States of America emerged as the mightiest 
power on the world stage, and chose to capitalise on this position by taking up a leading 
role in world affairs. As D S Painter points out, ‘Before World War II there were six 
great powers: Great Britain, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, Japan and the United 
States. By the end of the war, the United States stood alone, easily the most powerful  
nation in the world, its power greatly increased  by its mobilization and war effort, its 
rival defeated, and its allies exhausted’.1 The war ‘destroyed the old balance of power, 
leaving Germany and Japan crushed and impotent and reducing Great Britain and 
France to second or even third-rate powers’.2 The United States owned the most 
powerful military in the world. Its air force directed the skies, its navy dominated the 
seas, its military occupied Japan and a part of Germany, and it possessed worldwide 
control over nuclear weapons. Its strength was enhanced by its advantageous geographic 
position. 
In the period after the war, the world came to be divided into two camps: one led by the 
USA representing the capitalist countries, and the other by the USSR, representing the 
socialist countries of the world. This situation continued until the 1990s in a period 
usually described as the Cold War. The Cold War was characterised by an absence of 
actual global war but involvement in a number of proxy wars in different regions fought 
between the client states of the two divided camps. The United States also intervened in 
the internal affairs of other states through various kinds of covert and clandestine 
operations, as did the USSR. The United States led a number of secret operations to 
topple the governments of other regions, which included not only authoritarian regimes 
but democratically elected governments. There have been around 180 examples of the 
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use of US forces worldwide in situations of military conflict or potential conflict in the 
past century.3 
Not all countries wished to belong to either of these camps and this led to the formation 
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Many newly independent states, including 
India, did not choose to align with either block, and created a third platform where 
countries could maintain equidistance between them. The NAM was popular because 
almost all third world4 countries wanted to develop their economies and infrastructure 
but also to maintain their independence.  Keeping distance from the Western and Soviet 
camps but seeking aid from both was the best way to reconcile these objectives. The 
Cold war ended when the Soviet Union dissolved and disintegrated in 1991 and the US 
gave its diplomatic recognition to the Russian Federation and other newly independent 
states separated from the Soviet Union. With these changes, 45 years of established 
diplomacy and military confrontation between two conflicting blocks ended, and new 
challenges confronted US policymakers. 
2.2 India’s Struggle for Independence (1945-47) and The US Relationship to 
Colonialism  
India’s struggle for independence was certainly one of the biggest mass movements in 
modern history. Subash Bose – less familiar to Westerners – used one of the most 
popular statements, ‘Give me blood and I shall give you freedom’– where he appealed 
to the people of India to join in the struggle for independence.5 People responded to the 
call and it turned into a huge concentrated struggle which galvanized millions of people 
from different classes, sections and ideologies into political action and finally brought 
about the downfall of a mighty colonial master.6 The departure of the British from the 
subcontinent in 1947 created a predominantly Hindu India and overwhelmingly Muslim 
Pakistan. Ironically, the partition of the subcontinent was followed by one of the 
deadliest and cruellest examples of migration and ethnic cleansing in history, and was 
accompanied by huge bloodshed. The religious rage, fighting and violence that was 
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responsible for the loss of some two millions lives including Muslims, Hindus and 
Sikhs, and at least 75,000 women raped.7 
India’s independence struggle was the creation of the obvious contradiction between 
British colonialism and the interests of the natives. The British propagated the idea that 
they were there to educate the people and giving them a better way of life: what they 
called ‘white man’s burden’. However, the leadership of the nationalist movement 
gradually reached a clear understanding of colonialism, and understood that the British 
were exercising their political control to subjugate the economy and society of the 
subcontinent to fulfil the needs of their own society and economy. Subsequently, this 
generated a clear-cut anti-colonial ideology.8 
Since the beginning of their anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movement, the people of 
India expressed their solidarity with the other parts of the world fighting for the same 
cause. The Indian leadership was firmly against the British policy of interference of 
internal matters of other states. They also opposed the use of Indian forces and 
resources of any kind to promote British imperialism in any part of the world.9 These 
attitudes, formed in the colonial period, helped shape subsequent relations with the US, 
which developed in the post-colonial era. 
Before the Second World War, the US contact with India was in name only. As Harold 
Isaacs in his book Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India stated, 
US ‘interaction with India occurs less dramatically, along a narrower arc, in a smaller 
compass of awareness and interest’10 because America has much less shared history 
with India than with Japan or China. Isaacs’s study showed a general preference of 
China and the Chinese to India and Indians by the Americans. Interestingly Isaacs’s 
findings were based on interviews conducted during the peak of the Cold War and after 
the Korean War when America fought for three years against China.11 The end of the 
Second World War, however, saw a remarkable change in their relations. 
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Britain needed India’s manpower and resources to fight the war. The Indian Congress 
denied extending its support for fighting against the Axis powers as long as Britain 
would not promise Indian independence.12 The demand of the National Congress was 
overlooked and, in September 1939, Lord Linlithgow – the British Viceroy – declared 
India’s participation in the war without consulting important leaders in India. The 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 brought the US into the war. The 
strategic significance of India as a base for operations against Japan, led Roosevelt to 
take an interest in the Indian political problem. He thought that the political disorder in 
India could jeopardize the US forces which were to be sent to India. Roosevelt wanted a 
solution to the problem but was hesitant to engage himself directly in efforts to obtain it. 
The United Kingdom did not want the two nations to engage in direct contact, fearing 
that India might get motivation and encouragement from America in escalating its 
political struggle for freedom. Finally, Roosevelt wrote a letter to Churchill on 10 
March 1942, proposing a bold initiative: the formation of an Indian Government 
comprised of the various religious, geographical, and occupational groups. Thus, the 
Second World War marks the beginning of official Indo-US relations.13 
World War II increased US interest in India. America, waging a war to establish 
democracy against the forces of totalitarianism, combined with Roosevelt’s increasing 
‘animosity toward British imperialism’,14 could hardly keep its eyes closed to the 
subjugation of 400 million Indians by Britain– its closest ally. President Roosevelt was 
under severe pressure at home from the Republicans and his vice-president to take a 
strong stand against British imperialism. The people of the United States were also 
concerned for India’s independence. American sympathy for India’s freedom struggle 
was natural in light of its own history of colonisation by the British. Roosevelt was 
particularly keen to help India, but also reluctant to pressure Churchill during the war or 
to strongly intervene on behalf of Indian nationalists. But he never stopped discussing 
the Indian issue in his regular and voluminous communication with Churchill. It became 
evident that the US was willing to support the British policy of granting independence 
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for India after the war, and that its main interest was more  in the Middle East and the 
politics of oil than in the fate of India .15 
2.3 Containment of the Soviet Union: US attitudes to India and Pakistan in the 
1950s 
The major development in US foreign policy after the WWII was the new, distinctive 
policy of ‘containment’, designed to combat the spread of communism in the world. 
This policy was developed by US diplomat George Kennan and was first coined in an 
article published in 1947.16 He branded the USSR an anti-Western and aggressive 
power whose expansion had to be contained, a portrayal which would shape American 
foreign policy for years to come.17 The containment policy dominated geopolitics and 
created a bipolar, zero-sum world. The antipathy between the two powers led to a 
worldwide competition as both nations vied for military, cultural, and economic 
supremacy. In this context, containing Soviet communism became the main focus of US 
foreign policy for over four decades of the Cold War.18 
During the entire Cold War period, the primary objective of American foreign policy 
was to limit the Soviet sphere of influence. Stephen Burman wrote in the 1990s that 
‘The initial American policy after the war was one of containment, interpreted as the 
adoption of the role of world policemen, willing to intervene in any conflict in order to 
prevent communism expanding its influence’.19 This governed the policy of the US and 
its allies in the Korean peninsula, in overthrowing the Iranian government, the Vietnam 
War, the Yom Kippur War, the Six Day War, and finally the policy of helping the 
Mujahideen in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet military. The US had some successes and 
some failures during this period. In the late1980s, a programme of high military 
expenditure by the Reagan Administration was followed by diplomatic overtures 
between President Reagan and Gorbachev. A thaw resulted, and it is arguable that it was 
this combination that contributed to the breakdown of the Soviet Union. 
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Right from India’s independence in 1947 until the end of the Cold War, India was 
viewed through a Cold War perspective by the US.20 After the Second World War when 
the rise and spread of communism became more alarming and countries of Asia, Africa 
and Europe were politically volatile, militarily and an economically weak Britain was 
no longer able to hold world leadership, US policy-makers felt they should lead the 
world in opposing communism. Given the circumstances, the United States gave up its 
so-called traditional policy of ‘isolationism’, committed to ‘internationalism’, undertook 
world leadership and adopted a global strategy of anti-communism.21  This stance had 
popular support; 71 percent of US citizens responded to a Gallup poll conducted in 
October 1945 by agreeing that it was ‘best for the future of this country if we take an 
active role in world affairs’.22 
The United States felt that the threat of spreading communism could be countered by 
the unified actions of America and the non-communist countries of Asia like India and 
Pakistan. India, however, refused to be part of a US-led military alliance. The US 
viewed India’s potential role and capabilities as unsuited to Western requirements and 
maintained strategic distance. India after independence wanted better relationships with 
both the superpowers and sought to do this, initially at least, by maintaining equi-
distance from them. The United States wanted to assist the countries in the region to 
develop a relatively open society and also develop economically, but India was not 
ready to open up its economy and society in ways that would have been required if it 
was to  be a close ally of the US. Given this, United States policy-makers did not 
believe that India was in a position to provide leadership in the region in the struggle 
against communism. Pakistan responded to the US search for allies with keen interest as 
it was looking for friends to counter its arch enemy, India. It found a sympathetic 
response in Washington. The US containment policy required that countries adjacent to 
the Sino-Soviet bloc be allied with the West in order to combat expansion of the bloc 
and Pakistan appeared well placed to contribute to this. Pakistan, as a Muslim country, 
with close relations with Middle East, geographical closeness to the major communist 
rivals and to the oil-rich Persian Gulf, plus its own potential and keenness to be an actor 
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as regional balancer to India, made it a more attractive ally to the US than India.23  
Islamabad was ready to side with the US policy of containing communism in Asia and 
to take in US military alliances, in the process gaining US support in its conflict with 
New Delhi.24 
In May 1954, the United States entered into a mutual defence pact with Pakistan, and 
Islamabad became a member both of the South East Asian Treaty Organisation 
(SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). Islamabad was not driven 
primarily by a policy of containment or an anti-Communist agenda. Rather it joined the 
military alliances to obtain US military assistance and acquire weapons that could be 
used against its principal enemy – which was India, and not the USSR or China.25 
For Nehru, the Cold War had been imported to South Asia. US interest in South Asia 
was a by-product of Cold War rivalry. From this point on, at least until the end of the 
Cold War, Indian governments always remained concerned and suspicious of American 
national security policy in the region. This led them to drift away from a policy of 
equidistance and draw closer to the USSR, developing a form of alignment with the 
Soviet Union that was an evolution of its initial position of non-alignment. The USSR 
reciprocated by boosting India as a leader of the third world and in the NAM. It used 
India’s leadership to improve its own image in the international sphere and to project a 
view of international affairs as close as possible to its own; a strategy intended 
ultimately to assist in its competition with the United States and China.26 
2.4 Indian Foreign Policy  
Jawahar Lal Nehru – first Prime Minister of India – left a deep mark on India’s foreign 
policy. The basic principles of India’s foreign policy, articulated by him, persisted as 
the guiding principles for succeeding governments. This does not mean that Indian 
policy had an element of inflexibility or rigidity; rather the principles have been adapted 
to five key turning points, 
1. US military pacts with Pakistan in 1954-55 forced Nehru to tilt towards the 
Soviet Union. 
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2. The Indo-China conflict in 1962 and the neutral attitude of the Soviet Union 
dictated improved security links with the United States. This year was critical in 
the development of India’s foreign policy as it became more pragmatic and 
realistic. 
3. The Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971 and the hostility of Nixon and 
Kissinger led India to conclude a treaty with Moscow. 
4. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Soviet communism, and the 
subsequent shifts in global power, changed the previous order of international 
affairs and led to a fundamental re-evaluation of Indian foreign policy. 
5. September 11, 2001 made India a US ally in response to the global war on 
terrorism. 
2.4.1 The Nehruvian Approach 
Unquestionably, the fabric of Indian foreign policy after independence was the 
handiwork of Nehru. As the first Prime minister of India, he was at the wheel for 17 
years (1947-1964) and enjoyed virtually monopolistic jurisdiction over foreign affairs. 
This gave him an unchallenged position to translate his ideas, accumulated during the 
freedom movement, into foreign policy. Indeed, ‘he was the philosopher, the architect, 
the engineer and the voice of country towards the outside world’.27 His vision was a 
happy amalgam of western liberalism, Marxism and Gandhism.28 
Although Indian foreign policy from independence always had some sort of realist 
element, it immediately adopted the idealistic stance that its foreign policy should 
uphold moral principles. It was against colonialism, racism, against any alignment, 
against balance of power politics, refusing to favour the containment of communism, 
but rather propagating peaceful coexistence. Nehru’s 17 years of grand strategy 
envisioned a vital role for India which was not realist but the US security alliance with 
Pakistan and other regional powers in the 50s led India gradually to shift toward the 
policy of realism.29 
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Nehru’s ability to lead the newly independent countries of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America led him to take the bold decision of refusing any alliance with either the West 
or East. Consequently, this contributed to him becoming a pioneer of the NAM. This 
policy and role was simultaneously the reflection of India’s idealism and some element 
of realism. India’s policy and efforts toward eradicating colonialism and racism 
manifested its idealist principle, while inhibiting war between the superpowers 
contained an element of realism.30 In 1949, Nehru himself articulated his policy in the 
following way while speaking to the Indian Council of World: 
India is too big a country herself to be bound down to any country, however big it may be. India 
is going to be and is bound to be a country that counts in world affairs… While remaining quite 
apart from power blocs, we are in a better position to cast our weight at the right moment in 
favour of peace, and meanwhile our relations can become as close as possible in the economic or 
other domain with such countries with whom we can easily develop them.31 
He thought the ‘containment’ doctrine was unsound and plainly said so to President 
Truman in 1949. Nehru, however, wanted to contain the spread of communism in Asia 
and took steps accordingly. For instance, he helped Prime Minister U-Nu to crush the 
communist insurgency in Burma (Myanmar), supported the British attempt in doing the 
same in Malaysia, hailed the Brussels Pact (1948), and condoned the creation of NATO 
(1949). He also saw fundamental differences between Mao’s China and Stalin’s Russia. 
He was helped in this by Marshall Tito and M.N. Roy. The latter told Nehru that: ‘Mao 
would prove a second Tito.’ Roy had also characterised Chinese communism as nothing 
but ‘nationalism painted red’. Nehru himself never regarded Mao as Stalin’s stooge. 
Nehru realised that, only by winning China’s confidence and support could India’s role 
as a bridge builder be sustained and his goal of preventing Asia from becoming a theatre 
of the Cold War be achieved.  
This perspective was the basis of a united front of Afro-Asian countries (reflected in the 
Bandung Conference of 1955) and for the declaration of the Panchsheel Treaty.32  While 
at various times in the 1950’s and 1960’s, the United States government attempted to 
improve relations with India, India became the leader of the NAM, purposely avoiding a 
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close alliance either with the US or the USSR. To this end, India pursued the policy of 
Panchsheel towards the People’s Republic of China.33 
But the Bandung spirit did not last. Nehru came to believe that that Mao’s China did not 
stand for world peace and co-existence but instead for East-West conflict. He became 
wary of China and, recognising that Khrushchev was overturning Stalin’s legacy and 
adopting a stance of peaceful co-existence, Nehru chose his company. He even helped 
Khrushchev in building bridges of understanding with America. Gradually a broad 
affinity developed between India and the Soviet Union, not only on such problems as 
Kashmir and Goa but also on wider world issues. This explains why Nehru showed 
deference to the susceptibilities of the Soviet Union and was critical of the role of the 
West in world affairs.34 
2.4.2 The Policy of Non-alignment 
Nehru adopted the policy of non-alignment as the main principle of India’s foreign 
policy for two major reasons. First, he was seriously concerned about the defence cost 
in case of any involvement either of the two blocs. Any conflict would involve huge 
resources, and might stop India’s development as a newly independent country. Second, 
he was determined to maintain India’s independence gained after a long struggle. He 
feared that aligning with either power bloc could hamper its freedom of manoeuvre. 
After his death, subsequent Indian leaders did not officially discard his stance of non-
alignment. However, India did move toward a more realist approach.35 
Non-alignment meant maintaining neutrality in world affairs and equidistance from 
both the superpowers. Its main objective was peace and security, but pursuing this 
through and independent voice rather than following the line of either of the Cold War 
protagonists whose entrenched stances were not felt to be the path to peace and security. 
Non-alignment thus became a forum of unity for the countries of the developing world 
who saw the policies of the US and the USSR as quasi-imperialistic in relation to their 
needs. It provided them a base for mutual understanding and cooperation in political, 
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economic and technological arena.36 In this sense, the non-aligned movement became 
an alignment in its own right. 
Non alignment was never strictly applied by India during the entire period of the Cold 
War. India played the superpowers off against each other switching its preference 
according to circumstances. Perhaps the most striking example was the reorientation of 
Indian foreign policy prompted by the Indo-China war in 1962. Reversing a previous 
drift towards the USSR, Nehru turned desperately to Washington for help. In the 
conflict, Washington accepted New Delhi’s stance in respect of its border with Beijing 
and openly supported its interpretation. The conflict and US support led India to take a 
more pragmatic and realistic approach to international conflict than non-alignment.37 
Indian policy was tested again by the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. This led 
India to conclude a treaty in August 1971 with the Soviet Union. The treaty was 
historic, the first of its kind that India had signed. This Treaty of friendship and 
cooperation provided for immediate consultations between them if either was attacked. 
This obviously indicated Soviet assurance to support India on the Bangladesh issue. 
Eventually, the creation of Bangladesh in 1971 made India a dominant power in South 
Asia.38 Although Mrs Gandhi tried to keep the spirit of non-alignment intact, she tore up 
its substance by accepting Soviet support in the Bangladesh War. 
As a backdrop to these crises and reversals, across the period of 1964 to 1990, India 
demonstrated its increasingly realist approach and unwillingness to be marginalised in 
world affairs, by building up its economic and military capabilities. It did not sign the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968, thereby declining to give up the nuclear 
option. India’s policy in supporting Bangladesh for achieving its independence proved 
successful and made its enemy weak in 1971 and finally became the world’s sixth 
nuclear power after its nuclear test in 1974.39 
2.4.3 Policy after the Cold War 
The turning point of Soviet disintegration was the most crucial moment in post war 
Indian foreign policy. The circumstances that influenced the principles of Indian foreign 
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policy in the late 40s and early 50s were the Cold War, bipolarization, the formation of 
military alliances, ideological struggle, the arms race, and the evils of imperialism, 
colonialism and racialism. After the Soviet collapse, most of these drivers disappeared 
and the military world became unipolar with the USA as the dominant military power; 
economically it became multi-polar with Germany, Japan, BRICS and USA as 
economic powers. Even though the national interest remained the foremost 
consideration, as was the case with the foreign policy of all governments, these dramatic 
developments required a re-assessment of India’s foreign policy.  
Policymakers in India responded to the changes in international order with prudence. 
Despite facing many developmental challenges, practicality in their thinking and 
judiciousness in adapting policy in political, strategic and economic fields enabled India 
to rise as a potential power.40 In the first ten years of the post-Cold-War era, India 
followed an adaptive approach to regional and international affairs: it started liberalising 
its economy programme, it accepted arms from Moscow, and cautiously began 
engaging Beijing. By the early 2000s, these policies resulted in a position closer to the 
status of a major power that its capacities and aspirations warranted. 41 
2.5 Historical Background of Indo-US Relations 
Having discussed the evolution of Indian foreign policy in the period up to 9/11 and the 
principles underlying it, I will now turn to a closer examination of the development of 
the relationship between the US and India from independence to 9/11. 
2.5.1 The first Kashmir War, the Truman Administration, and India 
The first Indo-US bilateral dispute arose over the Kashmir conflict,42 originating in the 
colonial history of the Indian subcontinent and its partition, when Britain granted 
independence for India and Pakistan in 1947.43 When, after a few weeks of 
independence, India and Pakistan engaged in a war over Kashmir in January 1948 
(known as the First Indo-Pak War), India referred the issue to the UN with anticipation 
that involvement of the international community might lead to a solution in its favour. 
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India asserted that the invasion by Pakistan military was illegal and demanded an 
immediate withdrawal, while Pakistan charged that India had illegally achieved 
Kashmir’s accession. The United Nations passed a resolution asking outside forces to 
withdraw. Though Pakistan initially refused to withdraw, the UN finally managed to 
obtain a ceasefire which became effective from January 1949.44 
At the beginning, the United States was unwilling to be involved in the Kashmir dispute 
and US policy makers paid relatively little attention. The United States supported the 
view of the United Kingdom that no independent Kashmir would be appropriate, but 
they agreed to a free and fair plebiscite to decide its fate.45 President Truman and the 
British Prime Minister Clement Attlee put pressure on Nehru to accept the plebiscite to 
break the deadlock but Nehru refused to accept their suggestion and said he would ‘not 
give an inch on the matter of Kashmir’.46 
The UNSC passed a resolution on 21 April 1948 setting up the UN Commission for 
India and Pakistan (UNCIP). The Indian response to the Commission was harsh, as the 
UN failed to condemn the Pakistani aggressor, and Nehru expressed his reaction 
forcefully as he saw the UN treating an aggressor and a defender equally. He blamed 
both the US and the UK for playing a ‘dirty role’ in the dispute. He regarded the US 
role on the Kashmir conflict with suspicion. He believed it to be responsible in making 
Sheikh Abdullah47 think of an independent Kashmir, and felt they did not take the 
ground reality into consideration, looking at the problem only through the lenses of their 
global interests.48 
Nehru’s suspicion and distrust of the Truman Administration’s intention and his rigid 
stance on the plebiscite made the dispute a stalemate, and left it to the next 
(Eisenhower) administration to resolve. Besides Kashmir, the US and India had 
different stances on a number of other foreign policy issues not related to the Cold War: 
these included the creation of Israel, the Palestine problem, international control of 
atomic energy, and Indo-China relations. Nehru’s insistence on being independent from 
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the West irked policy makers in the US, though the US accepted India’s decision to 
retain its non-aligned status.49 
Aid has always been an important issue in the relations between a developed and an 
under-developed or developing country. It was not a major issue immediately after the 
independence of India but in the 1950s and 1960s, economic assistance became 
important element of US policy toward India. The Truman Administration remained 
ambivalent about India and US Congressmen complained that India showed neither 
sympathy nor understanding toward US international problems and urged that its aid 
bill be rejected. At the end of 1949, severe food shortages50 in India caused a famine 
and New Delhi asked the US for help to meet the food shortage. America responded 
positively though some misunderstandings created frustration. To remove the 
misunderstandings, when, in December 1950, the Indian Ambassador officially 
requested two million tons of wheat aid from Secretary Acheson, Ambassador 
Henderson supported the Indian request, saying the food shortage was genuine.51 
Consequently, on 15 June 1951, President Truman signed a bill granting India two 
million tons of grain.52 
At the end of the Truman Administration, Indo-US relations had acquired a pattern of 
chronic friction which puzzled many people. The reasons were however clear. During 
the Korean War, Indian and American views clashed sharply. Whereas the US 
perceived a threat world-wide from the USSR and communist countries, and thought 
that peace could be achieved only through a military approach and collective security, 
India perceived that the communist menace was exaggerated and East and West were in 
the grip of mutual fear. It was Nehru’s worry that this security perception would not 
bring peace, but invite war. Peace could be achieved through dialogue but never by 
force.  And thus it was that Indo-US relations got off to a rocky start in the early years 
of Indian independence.53 
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2.5.2 The Eisenhower Administration 
After 20 years of Democratic rule, a Republican – Dwight D. Eisenhower – assumed the 
presidency in January 1953. He did not change the national security goals of the 
previous administration but pursued a stronger policy to contain communist adversaries. 
In pursuit of national security goals, Eisenhower, unlike his predecessor, showed more 
interest in developing closer links with India.54 The American security alliance with 
Pakistan and military aid to Islamabad upset India and challenged its dominance in the 
region.55 President Eisenhower in a letter to Nehru tried to mitigate India’s anger by 
assuring him personally and publicly that US weapons would not be used against New 
Delhi and, if used at all, appropriate action would be taken both within and without the 
UN.56 But this did not restrained India from criticising American policy, as became 
more apparent after the Bandung Conference in 1955.57 Relations between the US and 
India did not improve in Eisenhower’s first term  and after his re-election in 1956 they 
continued to have different approaches, for example in relation to communist China 
where India argued for Chinese entry58 to the UN while the US opposed on the grounds 
that China had not met the required basic norms of international conduct.59 
Security concerns during the eight years of Eisenhower’s Administration led policy 
makers in Washington to focus increasingly on economic aid to developing countries, of 
which India was one of the largest recipients.60 Despite differences in their foreign 
policy approaches, the US still had significant interest in India remaining out of 
communist influence. To pursue this, President Eisenhower granted significantly 
increased economic aid to New Delhi in 1957.61 A gradually more positive attitude 
toward India made their relations run more smoothly. By 1957, Eisenhower became 
convinced that India’s nonalignment policy was not against American interests and he 
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even expressed his support for India’s staying nonaligned, in stark contradiction of US 
foreign policy up to that point.62 Eisenhower feared the eruption of another Indo-Pak 
war over Kashmir and, although the administration failed to make India and Pakistan 
reach a settlement on the conflict, Eisenhower became successful at resolving the Indus 
Waters dispute. This was negotiated by the World Bank and in order to improve 
bilateral relations, the US provided funds to cover half the $1 billion cost of the 
projects.63 
Eisenhower became the first American president to visit India in 1959. He received an 
unprecedented welcome, stayed four days, spoke to parliament, addressed huge 
gatherings, attracted crowds with his friendly gestures and broad smile, and had 
extensive discussions with Nehru, all of which made his trip very successful.64 
Eisenhower’s enthusiasm to support India was described by the New York Times: ‘It 
did not seem to matter much whether Nehru had actually requested or been given a 
guarantee that the US would help India to meet further Chinese communist aggression. 
What mattered was the obvious strengthening of Indian-American friendship to a point 
where no such guarantee was necessary.’65 
The US gradually came to appreciate India’s importance to its grand strategy in the 
region. They improved relations by personal contact and by recognising the common 
ground. The respective leaders reached such a good understanding that Nehru believed 
Eisenhower was much more sympathetic to India than the previous administration, 
while Eisenhower became convinced that India would never countenance an alliance 
with USSR. From that point onward, Indo-US relations developed momentum and by 
the time the Eisenhower presidency was drawing to a close, their relations were 
increasingly cordial. 
2.5.3 The Kennedy Administration and the Indo-China War of 1962 
The Kennedy policy toward the sub-continent continued Eisenhower’s second 
administration policy of an increasingly cordial approach to India. President Kennedy 
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extended his hand to India as a senator to provide economic assistance even before 
becoming president. He appointed a taskforce to ponder over economic aid to India, 
approved the plan designed by the taskforce, and thus committed $1 billion per year in 
grants for the first two years of a third Five Year Plan. He promised to lend to India 
triple what the Eisenhower Administration had given in 1960.66 
Kennedy considered India a strategic partner against China and wanted to save India 
from becoming ‘another domino’ to fall to communism. In the wake of the Chinese 
attack in 1962, India asked for help and the US responded positively with Britain to 
save India from a military disaster.67 In May 1963, President Kennedy and Secretary of 
Defence, Robert McNamara and General Maxwell discussed the feasibility of using 
nuclear arms in case of a second Chinese attack. Kennedy said, ‘We should defend 
India, and therefore we will defend India’ if attacked.68 Kennedy believed that it was in 
the greater US interest to promote India rather than relying entirely on a military 
alliance with Pakistan, as India was the largest country in the region. The Indo-Chinese 
war came at a time when the Cold War tension reached an apex. Though the past 
relationship between India, the US, and the UK since Indian independence was not 
particularly warm, the latter two did come swiftly to India’s aid.69 
President Kennedy had a deep interest in India and made clear that American would 
economically assist India, saying ‘I want to give you support as well as sympathy’ in a 
letter to Nehru on 28 October 1962.70 Nehru replied the next day, ‘I am deeply grateful 
to you for what you have written and for the sympathy and the sympathy of the great 
nation whose head you are at a moment of difficulty and crisis for us’.71 
The war lasted only a few weeks. But the US continued to provide military assistance to 
India, while attempting to advance the Kashmir conflict to a settlement. Due to pressure 
from Washington and London, four rounds of talks between India and Pakistan had 
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been attempted to settle the Kashmir dispute but they failed to reach to a mutually 
acceptable agreement. The Kennedy Administration persisted in maintaining a closer 
relationship with New Delhi without losing or crushing the alliance links with 
Islamabad even though in the end the US was not able to facilitate a settlement of the 
Kashmir conflict.72 
As a consequence of the improvement in Indo-US relations from 1957-64, the aid flow 
to India increased. This flow surpassed the amount granted to Pakistan, despite the 
latter’s closer ties. US aid to India was $364 million in 1957, $305 million in 1958, and 
$758 million in1960, compared to $170 million, $163 million, and $301 million given 
to Pakistan over the same period.73  It should be noted that US aid to Pakistan was 
primarily in military components while India received mainly economic aid. The 
increasing US aid to India was prompted by the perception that if India lost out to 
Chinese economic competition, it could mean 450 million people losing out to 
communism.74 
J.K. Galbraith – a Harvard Professor and adviser to President Kennedy – served as US 
Ambassador to India from 1961 to 1963. During this short tenure, he contributed an 
enormous amount to relations with India, and continued to be a strong advocate for 
India until his death in April 2006.75 He had an extraordinary role and voice in India’s 
war against China in 1962, and played a substantial role in providing US military aid to 
India.76 Realising Nehru’s mood, Galbraith regarded the plebiscite on Kashmir as ‘out 
of date and bearing in no practical way to a settlement’.77 Galbraith was the original 
author of Indo-US nuclear cooperation deal in 1962 and he continually pushed 
Washington hard to increase aid to Nuclear Power Station at Tarapur. This nuclear 
cooperation deal, aimed at being a great symbol of American high technology assistance 
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to India, subsequently became an obstacle to their relations in the 1970s when India 
tested its nuclear weapons.78 
2.5.4 The Indo-Pak War (Second Kashmir War) of 1965 and the Johnson 
Administration 
Johnson became president after the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963. He 
inherited a strained relationship with Pakistan and cordial relations with India as the 
United States was providing economic and some military aid to India in the wake of the 
Indo-China War. The situation demanded US attention toward repairing relations with 
Pakistan.  On the second day of Johnson’s presidency, Robert Komer, of the NSC, 
wanted the president’s approval for the proposal to aid India with arms. The president 
refused any further approval of military assistance but the programme of military aid 
approved by the previous administration continued until the war of 1965 which was 
known as the Second Kashmir War.79 
The Kashmir dispute was a continuous irritation in Indo-US relations. When the war 
broke out, the US expressed its deep concern as the war not only created a threat to the 
peace in the region but also posed a potential threat to the world if it should involve 
other states in the war.80 The United States suspended arms shipments to both the 
parties and the embargo continued during the next Indo-Pak War of 1971.81 
The war deteriorated Indo-US relations further as, despite firm assurances from the US 
government (in a letter to Nehru from President Eisenhower) that Pakistan would not 
use US weapons against India, India noticed that US-supplied arms were heavily used 
in the war and every single casualty on the Indian side was caused by American arms.82 
Since the Johnson Administration was overwhelmed in the Vietnam War, the primary 
goal of America was to stop the war through UN negotiations. The US urged the 
warring states to obey the UN appeals to pull back to the ceasefire line of 1949. 
However, because of its pre-occupations elsewhere the US supported Soviet attempt to 
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negotiate the conflict, contrary to the age-old policy of containing Soviet influence in 
the region.83 In January 1966, Prime Minister Alexsei Kosygin invited Lal Bahadur 
Sastri and Ayub Khan to Tashkent and, after negotiations, they signed the Tashkent 
Declaration. The declaration ended the war and both countries withdrew their forces to 
pre-war ceasefire lines. The declaration bound them to settle the conflict on Kashmir 
through peaceful means under the UN Charter.84 
The five years of Johnson’s presidency witnessed a major shift in Indo-US relations. 
Because of India’s criticism of the Vietnam War, and the tensions during the second 
Kashmir war, the Johnson Administration decided to use economic pressure on New 
Delhi to reform agriculture policies and liberalise India’s national economy and to 
increase access for foreign investment. In this period, disappointed by the failure of its 
attempts to bring the two hostile neighbours into a negotiating table to settle their main 
dispute – Kashmir – the US ‘for all practical purposes lost interest in India’ and 
disengaged from South Asia.85 
2.5.5 The Nixon-Kissinger Approach, the Bangladesh War, and India’s First 
Nuclear Test 
After assuming office in 1969, President Nixon criticised the preceding administration 
for the ineffectiveness of its policies. He believed that the changing international system 
needed a ‘fresh approach’ to meet the challenges. The primary concern of his 
administration was to wind down the Vietnam War. As discussed above, the United 
States lost its interest in South Asia after 1965 due to its failure in bringing India and 
Pakistan together to settle the dispute over Kashmir. The Nixon Administration from the 
beginning, however, wanted to maintain good relations with both of them. Nixon wrote 
to Henry Kissinger ‘our policy objective on the subcontinent was, quite simply, to avoid 
adding another complication to our agenda.’86 
But there was no denial that President Nixon’s strategic concern in South Asia was to 
limit Soviet and Chinese influence in the region. The main interest of the US in South 
Asia remained promoting their economies, providing humanitarian assistance and, on 
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top of everything, encouraging them to giving up their differences. Two events within a 
short period made the region occupy a central focus in American foreign policy. One 
was the 1971 Indo-Pak War and the other was Nixon’s efforts of rapprochement with 
China.87 
In 1971, South Asia saw a third Indo-Pak war, just six years after the second war, 
known as the Liberation War of Bangladesh. This war ended up with Indian 
involvement, resulted in the dismemberment of Pakistan, with East Pakistan becoming 
the new country of Bangladesh. India played a vital role in the emergence of 
Bangladesh. India had wanted to divide and weaken Pakistan since its independence in 
1947, and the people of East Pakistan needed India’s help to get rid of political 
suppression, economic exploitation, and cultural infiltration from West Pakistan. So it 
was ‘hand-in-glove’ situation.88 An Indian scholar Professor S.D. Muni said it was a 
war for India’s sake. India fought its own war and the people of Bangladesh became 
independent out of the Indo-Pak eternal rivalry.89 
The Liberation war of Bangladesh in 1971 strained Indo-US relations, as President 
Nixon was positively disposed toward an integrated Pakistan. During this time, 
Islamabad extended help to the Nixon Administration’s efforts to normalise and 
improve relations with Beijing, even arranging Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to Beijing 
in 1971 via Pakistan. In the past, Pakistan’s efforts to develop closer relations with 
China had made the US seriously concerned, but now the Nixon Administration utilized 
and received benefit from Pakistan’s efforts. Although other ways existed for the US to 
communicate with China, the Pakistan channel proved the most successful and for this 
President Nixon became enormously grateful to Pakistan. On 7 August 1971, President 
Nixon sent a handwritten letter of gratitude to President Yahya, in which he said: 
‘Those who want a more peaceful world in the generations to come will forever be in 
your debt.’90 
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The Bangladesh crisis took place at a time when America was busy courting China, and 
its action during the crisis was reactive. The Bangladesh crisis was a secondary priority 
to the US, and its attempt to mediate the crisis with ‘preventive diplomacy’ proved 
unsuccessful.91 From the Chinese perspective, the independence of Bangladesh was a 
threat to the territorial integrity of its ally, Pakistan. The United States, like China, 
showed great concern for the territorial integrity of Pakistan. Nixon and Kissinger 
believed India was planning to defeat Pakistani forces and its military capability, 
permanently crippling the country and ensuring it could never again raise a hand against 
India.92 It extended oral support to Pakistan but failed to preserve Pakistan’s sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. Despite its support for an integrated Pakistan, it had to accept 
the inevitability of the emergence of Bangladesh by dismantling united Pakistan.93 
Since the US saw the inevitability of an independent Bangladesh, Nixon and Kissinger 
found no logic in being part of a civil war but they wanted to protect their ally, as a 
break up of Pakistan would have damaging consequences for the integrity of the US 
alliance.94 The Nixon/Kissinger/Chou Enlai approach involved checking Indian power 
and creating a Sino-American condominium in the region. They pursued the same 
policy even after Pakistan’s disintegration in 1971.95 While major powers in the world 
condemned West Pakistan for its repression of East Pakistanis, Nixon/Kissinger policy 
still tilted toward it. They clearly saw India as the major threat to the US policy of 
detente. When the crisis was deepening and the situation was deteriorating rapidly, 
President Nixon sent the US Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, badly damaging Indo-
US relations.96 
During the Bangladesh War in 1971, Indo-US relations deteriorated and reached a new 
low point. The Nixon/Kissinger policy of tilting toward Pakistan was influenced by 
Pakistan’s friendly relations with China, with the belief that defending Pakistan could 
improve US relations with China, which the US was treating as counterweight to its 
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only rival superpower, the Soviet Union. Whatever gains this policy brought for the US 
in a wider context, one consequence was to worsen relations with India.97 
The US attitude during the 1971 crisis left India somewhat melancholy. When the crisis 
was over, the United States wanted to repair the damaged relations and rebuild the 
normal contacts it had enjoyed with India during the period of the Indo-Chinese War.  
As part of the positive measures, President Nixon chose as ambassador to India the 
Harvard Professor Daniel P. Moynihan, who had publicly opposed US policy during the 
Bangladesh war.98 
Moynihan envisaged rightly that the long-term economic interests of India needed 
‘close and correct’ relations with the US, and, for this, he suggested building good 
relations with the US and minimising their political differences. He was popular 
amongst Indians due to his positive attitudes toward India. As stated earlier, the US lost 
interest in South Asia in the 1970s, resulting in less than one per cent of US overseas 
investments going to the region, in what Moynihan labelled ‘benign neglect’ of South 
Asia. Ambassador Moynihan persuaded the administration to cancel a significant 
amount of India’s debt owed to the US for foodstuffs.99 
In 1974, India tested nuclear bombs in Pokhran, which made India the world’s sixth 
nuclear power. The explosion indicated India’s reluctance to obey the nuclear policy of 
the superpowers,100 inciting the anger of members of the US Congress. The US State 
Department criticised the detonation as a breach of the principles of non-proliferation. 
India saw the NPT as ‘discriminatory’, imposing different sets of rules on the ‘haves’ 
and ‘have nots’, and consistently remained committed to its policy that ‘the country’s 
national security in a world of nuclear proliferation lies either in global disarmament or 
in exercise of the principle of equal and legitimate security for all’.101 
In an immediate reaction to the test, Pakistani Premier Bhutto declared that Pakistan 
was going to conduct its own, as he thought the aim of the test was to ‘employ nuclear 
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blackmail against Pakistan’.102 When Ambassador Moynihan saw Indira Gandhi to 
present the official reaction of the US to the test, he added some personal thoughts, 
telling the Prime Minister: 
India has made a huge mistake. Here you were the No. 1 hegemonic power in South Asia. 
Nobody was No. 2 and call Pakistan No. 3. Now in a decade’s time, some Pakistani general will 
call you up and say I have four nuclear weapons and I want Kashmir. If not, we will drop them 
on you and we will all meet in heaven. And then what will you do.103 
Ambassador Galbraith and Ambassador Moynihan had been very sympathetic to India 
and Indians. They utilised their capacities to promote India’s interests vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world. They tried to bring India closer to the United States when they were in 
India as ambassadors, and even after returning to the US they continued their support 
for India’s cause and maintained interactions until their deaths. They have been 
remembered and continued to be remembered by the people of India and by people who 
support India’s interests. 
2.5.6 The Ford Administration 
President Gerald Ford assumed office in August 1974 upon the resignation of President 
Nixon because of the Watergate Scandal. He assumed the presidency at a time when the 
US was about to lose in Vietnam and finally lost it within nine months of his office. 
President Ford nationally also faced the worst economic crisis in forty years of history, 
since the Great Depression in 1929.  
Despite Washington’s efforts to normalise its relation with New Delhi, most probably it 
was not possible to achieve the objective as long as President Nixon remained in office. 
As mentioned above, the US almost disengaged itself from South Asia in the early 
1970s, and the idea of balancing India and Pakistan was left out of the US agenda, but 
the nuclear test, conducted by India in 1974, drew the attention of the Ford 
Administration.104 Since the Ford Administration had limited experience in dealing with 
sub-continental affairs, he continued Nixon’s policy of providing economic and military 
aid to Islamabad.105 To ease Cold War tensions, he continued the policy of détente with 
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both the USSR and China. The rapprochement with China was reinforced by President 
Ford, who visited the country in December 1975.106  South Asia did not occupy 
important place in the foreign policy of Ford Administration so much as the détente 
with the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and Indo-China did. In late 1974, Kissinger 
visited India for three days to repair the damaged relations with New Delhi, but the 
outcome was not satisfactory 
Although there were few incentives for Washington to seek improved relations, 
American interests still put a limit on how bad things should get. The US felt that it 
could not afford to entirely ignore India, even if, during the two-year Ford presidency 
there was only a limited desire to find a modus vivendi. Indo-US relations received 
another jolt with the declaration of an emergency in India, when the High Court of India 
declared Indira Gandhi’s election null and void. An emergency was declared to save 
Indira Gandhi’s premiership.107 The United States government was angered by the 
growing authoritarianism and political suppression and President Ford refused to visit 
India as long the emergency was in place.108 The criticism by the United States of the 
declaration of emergency in India in June of that year was also seriously disliked by 
India. There was a sharp reaction from the Indian Government and from Mrs Gandhi, 
who objected to what she saw as interference in India’s internal affairs. The decision 
taken by the United States in 1975 to lift the ten-year-old lethal arms embargo on South 
Asia was another obstruction for Indo-US relations. This decision forced a very strong 
reaction from India and resulted in the cancellation of the scheduled visit of its foreign 
minister to the US.109 
2.5.7 The Carter Period and Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan 
President Carter assumed office in 1977 and during his term he faced continuing 
recession, energy crises, and inflation. The US people wanted Carter to be a trusted hero 
but he projected himself as a ‘redeemer president’ rather than a hero, and promised a 
new ‘openness of government, closeness between the president and the people 
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themselves’.110 He promised a stable, just, and peaceful world order. In his inaugural 
address he proclaimed: ‘We will not seek to dominate nor dictate to others’. He 
promised a defence spending cut of around five to seven billion dollars of the total 
defence budget, and announced his foreign policy would be ‘free of that inordinate fear 
of communism’.111  He followed a policy of what Brzezinski called ‘constructive global 
engagement’ which consisted of five basic principles. These were: first and foremost, a 
commitment to human rights as the fundamental root of all policy; second, the 
promotion of increased links and cooperation with other democracies; third, engaging 
with the Soviet Union in a joint effort to limit and then reduce their arsenals of strategic 
arms; fourth, to seek an enduring peace in the Middle East; and fifth; to address the 
threat of nuclear proliferation.112 
India was given a higher priority under the Carter Administration than under Nixon or 
Ford.  As a part of his presidential campaign for adopting a stronger attitude toward the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons, he asked for a major review of nuclear policy.  He 
criticised the Ford Administration for a soft and weak reaction to India’s nuclear 
explosion in 1974 and pondered how to respond to the enriched uranium at the Tarapur 
power plant.113 The issue became a prominent pivot on which future Indo-US relations 
would depend. In view of the Non-Proliferation Act passed by Congress in 1978, the 
Carter administration began to back out of its commitment to supply uranium, and 
started insisting on a fresh agreement which would provide for international inspection 
of all the nuclear energy plants in India.114 
The restoration of democracy under the Janata government was highly appreciated by 
President Carter. He, like Kennedy, considered India a key country in the subcontinent. 
Since there was no major conflict in the international arena, the atmosphere seemed 
very conducive for the Carter Administration to take favourable steps in improving US 
relations with India.115 
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Believing India to be a key country in South Asia, President Carter thought India should 
be brought back into the international community of nations in a way that would be 
advantageous to the US. To improve US relations with India, he visited India in January 
1978, signalling a policy shift to usher a new phase in Indo-US relations. As a part of 
this policy shift and normalizing relations with New Delhi, he discontinued aid to 
Pakistan. With his visit, the bilateral aid, suspended since 1971, was also resumed and a 
60 million dollar aid package was sanctioned by Congress, which also agreed to supply 
the fuel for the Tarapur Plant.116 Though President Carter’s warm welcome to India was 
a public relations triumph, and Carter was obviously inclined to look India as the leader 
of the region, the elation of the visit did not last long. 
The world was astonished when, on 25 December 1979, Soviet troops invaded 
Afghanistan. The invasion was recognised as one of the critical events of the Cold War 
history. The Soviet claimed it was not an invasion, as they had been invited by the 
Afghan leadership to help maintain Hafizullah Amin’s government. Within a few hours, 
the Amin’s regime had been toppled, Amin was killed, and Barbak Kamal was installed 
instead. The Soviets remained in Afghanistan for almost ten years.117 
Following the invasion, the Cold War again became the order of the day, and the Carter 
Administration essentially reverted to containment as its guiding principle. Carter felt a 
moral obligation to help the people of Afghanistan and also became concerned that it 
would endanger Pakistan’s integrity. He promised to defend Pakistan’s territorial 
integrity and provided all sorts of help including military equipment and food. Later, in 
March 1980, however, President Carter granted only $400 million in economic and 
military assistance to Pakistan over the subsequent two years, prompting a furious 
reaction from the Pakistani leadership, who rejected the offer as peanuts.118 General Zia 
of Pakistan wanted huge military aid to counter its enemy, India.119 
There were mixed reactions in India to the Soviet invasion. The Indian government 
showed its anger. In Kux’s view, it was just words as no firm stand was taken against 
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the invasion. On the other hand, a number of Indians were actually happy about the 
invasion. The main worry for them was not the Soviet presence in Afghanistan but the 
revival of US military assistance to Pakistan which would threaten India’s broader 
interests.120 
With the start of the Carter presidency, there were great hopes in India that the United 
States would be taking steps to build positive relations with India as the latter ended its 
emergency rule and posed a balanced attitude to non-alignment, especially as 
Washington was maintaining its distance from Islamabad and cutting military aid to 
Pakistan. In addition, the US also recognised India as the key country in the region and 
paid more attention to it, with an emphasis on democracy and human rights. India’s 
reaction to the Soviet invasion made Indo-US relations a little bitter. But at the end, 
however, Carter did his best to help India in getting clearance for two pending 
applications for uranium before leaving the White House.121 
2.5.8 The Reagan Administration 
When President Carter proved himself neither the hero nor the leader the United States 
required,122 President Reagan assumed office in 1981 on the crest of an emotional wave, 
promising a change in the direction of US foreign policy. He had been elected to reverse 
US decline (or, at least, the perception of decline).123 Reagan marked the restoration of 
the failing economy as the first priority in national policy, and the reassertion of 
American military power in foreign and defence policy as the number one priority in 
reaffirming its leadership of the world.124 He found, however, that he had difficulty in 
asserting an effective foreign policy at first due to a decline in US military capacity, for 
which he blamed Carter. He therefore increased the defence budget with the intention of 
reversing the US decline. Reagan was usually called a ‘hawk’ by the Soviets (though 
they did not consider Carter a ‘dove’) and there was a perception that his election to the 
presidency might lead to further deterioration of the US relationship with the USSR.125 
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As the final year of the Carter Administration left Indo-US relations in bitter state, 
President Reagan found US relations with India strained and stressed. New issues and 
conflicts brought to head the differences between the US and India, like the Afghan 
crisis and issues in the Indian Ocean. In particular, India’s soft criticism of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan made the Reagan Administration suspicious. President Reagan 
never took India’s non-alignment policy as genuine neutrality. His tougher policy 
toward the Soviet Union, and India’s tilt toward the USSR, impaired better Indo-US 
relations. However, the Reagan Administration aimed at a new shift in the substance 
and conduct of US policy to India.126 
Undoubtedly, the Soviet intervention and its prolonged presence in Afghanistan was 
considered a serious regional problem that challenged the US 1970s policy of keeping 
major rivals out of the region.127 President Reagan was determined to punish the Soviets 
as much as possible for its unlawful invasion. He provided huge amounts of cash and 
weapons to the Afghans for stiff resistance against the Soviets. He promised $3.2 billion 
in economic and military aid to Islamabad for six years and an option to sell 40 
advanced F-16 fighter jets to serve Pakistan in acting as  a frontline state in covert 
operations to ‘roll back’ what President Reagan named ‘the evil empire’.128 
Indo-US relations worsened with Reagan establishing Pakistan as a ‘frontline state’ 
against the USSR in Afghanistan, but, paradoxically, the heat of the second Cold War 
melted the coldness in their relations.129 The signs of improvement in Indo-US ties were 
discernible during Reagan’s second term, when, in December 1984, a month after Rajiv 
Gandhi assumed the premiership, India and the United States finalised a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) on technological cooperation which was eventually signed in 
May 1985.130 
Two terms of the Reagan Administration saw increased high-level contacts and 
dialogue between India and America. India’s two Prime Ministers over the time period, 
Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv Gandhi, visited the United States three times and from 
the US side the Vice-President, Secretary of State, two Secretaries of Defence and a 
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number of other cabinet ministers visited India. By the final year of the Reagan 
Administration, mutual understanding between them reached such a productive level, 
and, by that time, they had learned what they should or should not ask from each 
other.131 After eight years of the Reagan presidency, the US suppressed the differences 
with India that had arisen on various issues. In 1987, the Reagan Administration 
supported the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka, even agreeing to supply substantial high 
tech sales of jet engines for LCA aircraft and Cray supercomputers. From analysing the 
Reagan Administration’s attitude to India, it becomes clear that their relationship was 
sometimes good, sometimes bad; to use Dennis Kux’s phrase, it was ‘paradoxical’, 
though the good times predominated.132 
2.5.9 George H. W. Bush 
George H. W. Bush assumed the presidency in January 1989 when the 45 years of Cold 
War were coming to an end, and America’s only rival in superpower challenge, the 
Soviet Union, was in the process of disintegrating. Bush came to power on the crest of a 
popularity wave left behind by the Reagan Administration, just as Reagan had arrived 
on an emotional wave. During his presidential campaign, Bush made clear to his people 
that he saw no need to ‘remake society’ or take the country in ‘radical new 
directions’.133 He was determined to consolidate the achievements his predecessor had 
made. He was more reactive than assertive. He remained true to Reaganism throughout. 
In many aspects, President Bush emerged as ‘Reagan’s shadow’, best described by John 
Dumbrell as a ‘loyal disciple’ of Ronald Reagan.134 
George H.W. Bush is regarded as the last president of America with prior foreign policy 
experience. During his tenure, President Bush devoted most of his time to foreign 
affairs; his time as vice-president, together with his earlier service at the UN and his 
tenure as Director of CIA, gave him significant experience in international affairs. His 
presidency was marked by a remarkable run of successes in the international arena.He 
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left office with some extraordinary achievements, such as managing the peaceful 
collapse of the former USSR and the reunification of Germany.135 
President Bush did not make any basic changes in US foreign policy toward the 
subcontinent as there was significant uncertainty in international relations at the time. 
Policies like maintaining security relations with Pakistan, preventing the spread of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), improving security relations with India, and 
mediating the Kashmir conflict were maintained.136 
When, in 1988, Gorbachev indicated his wish to withdraw Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan, the CIA initially dismissed him by saying it was ‘just talk, just another… 
attempt to deceive us’.137 But later, when Moscow started to implement the decision to 
withdraw forces, Bush, as vice-president, said the Soviet policy of withdrawing was the 
result of ‘our strength’, and ‘our resolve’.138 With the withdrawal, the United States 
started to see South Asia through a different set of lenses, and not necessarily through 
the prism of the Cold War. No doubt, the withdrawal significantly reduced American 
interest in the region. The US continued providing military aid to Pakistan to pass onto 
Islamic forces, to match the on-going Soviet support to the Afghan government, but 
Pakistan lost its frontline state status.139 The irony is that, after pampering Pakistan’s 
leaderships at various times as an advantageous ally during the Cold War period, the US 
now started detaching itself from Islamabad.140 
US relations with Pakistan fluctuated on the basis of rise and fall of Pakistan’s strategic 
value. Soviet withdrawal of its troops from Afghanistan made Pakistan less important to 
the US strategic calculus. Although Islamabad lost its frontline status, Washington had 
to maintain close relationship with it to contain Soviet influence in Afghanistan and US 
military operation in the Gulf. Pakistan extended its support to America in its military 
operation in the Gulf War,141 and the Bush administration discounted Islamabad’s secret 
development of nuclear weapons as a quid pro quo. It continued commercial military 
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sales to Pakistan, contravening its own sanctions policy that had nonetheless reduced its 
influence in Pakistan. When finally the Soviet troops were withdrawn, the civil war in 
Afghanistan became the order of the day, the United States interest in Pakistan declined 
dramatically.  
It has been discussed above that the Cold War context hampered United States’ efforts 
to improve relations with India brought limited success because they were always 
subject to the strategic goal of containing Soviet communism and because New Delhi 
was not prepared to improve its relation with Washington at the cost of alienating 
Moscow. The end of the Cold War allowed both the US and India to view each other 
outside of the restrictive Cold War paradigm. One consequence was the development of 
improved security links. For the first time, under the Bush administration, in 1991, the 
navies of both countries mounted a joint exercise in the Indian Ocean called Malabar 
92.142 
President Bush Sr. was familiar, from his experience, with the issues in South Asia. 
Bush’s policy of building better relations with India was evident in the number of visits 
to India by US officials, such as the visit in December 1990 led by Henry Rowen, 
Assistant Secretary of Defence, which was followed by the visit to the US by an Indian 
delegation in August 1991. At the beginning of 1991, the Commanding General of the 
US Army in the Pacific went to New Delhi for a discussion with the Indian Naval Chief, 
where they cleared the ground for continuing ‘forces to forces’ level contacts, and 
discussed a range of other security issues.  It became clear that Bush Sr. wanted to 
involve India in the various issues that the international community faced, keeping in 
mind the need to serve the national security interests of both states.143 
In Kux’s view, despite the US success worldwide and changes in Indian economic 
policy, President Bush’s tendency toward a closer bilateral engagement was not 
successful. The problem of nuclear proliferation and competition and between India and 
Pakistan on the nuclear issue remained a high priority but the United States was not 
clear on how it would fit India into the changed global situation and into the ‘New 
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World Order’. The Indo-US bilateral relationship therefore, while seeming outwardly 
friendly remained deeply ambivalent below the surface.144 
2.6 Policy Shift under the Clinton Administration toward the Region 
The end of the Cold War changed dramatically the long-established rules in 
international relations, the global equations for all countries, and the US approach to 
international politics. When Clinton came to office in January 1993, the United States 
discovered itself in a position in international politics where there was no significant 
rival. Therefore, he was able to focus on US domestic concerns. His top priority was to 
get the economy moving again from recession to recovery.145 
The end of the Cold war facilitated the US in having a new kind of relationship with 
India with a new vision. Though their relationship in the past was not always cordial, 
the United States recognised the importance of India, due to its large population, 
geographical location, political system, world vision, outlook and other factors that 
provide the basis for a long-lasting strategic relationship with the US. 
Talbot takes the view that, when Clinton assumed the presidency, he was sincere in 
taking firm actions to move beyond the Cold War perspective. He was determined to 
alter the dictum of ‘you are either with us or against us’ which pushed many countries 
like India into Washington’s peripheral vision. Clinton was an optimist about 
revitalising US relations with India, but that enthusiasm took a long time to be 
translated into substantive action.146 At the outset of his presidency, President Clinton 
did not pay much attention to the South Asian region, though he established the new 
Bureau of South Asian Affairs. The early period of Clinton’s office witnessed a strained 
Indo-US relationship. For example, repeated comments by Robin Raphel, the new and 
first Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs, angered India by 
commenting, on 28 October 1993, that India’s rule over Kashmir was illegitimate. In 
September 1993, Clinton himself said in the General Assembly that New Delhi violated 
human rights in Kashmir. However, in the beginning of 1994 he changed his attitude 
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and adjusted his policy toward the region. He tried to calm India and Pakistan over the 
Kashmir dispute.147 
The years from 1991 to 2001 were a truly transformative decade in Indo-US bilateral 
relations. There were a number of factors that led President Clinton to improve 
Washington’s relations with New Delhi. Firstly, the end of the Cold War removed the 
US concern about India’s relationship with the USSR, and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union abolished India’s foreign policy foundation of non-alignment and disrupted its 
supply of defence equipment.  New Delhi also began to learn, somewhat painfully, that 
it could no longer disregard the only superpower in the world. Secondly, Islamabad lost 
its importance after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, while New Delhi rose in 
importance to Washington in its role of mediating peace and security in the region. 
Thirdly, in response to a growing domestic economic crisis, India launched a much-
belated exercise in 1991 to liberalise its economy, and began to ease rules of 
investment, tariffs and taxes, causing the US to view India as a huge potential market. 
Fourthly, the United States, as the world’s oldest democracy, had a closer affinity to the 
largest democracy, India, than it did to Pakistan. Lastly, the geopolitical and 
geostrategic location of India was a significant consideration in Clinton’s policy toward 
it.148 
Because of the above factors, the United States showed increasing indifference toward 
Pakistan and started to move closer to India, with President Clinton feeling that there 
was a serious need for the policies of past administrations toward India to be 
reformed.149 From 1994 onward, he took steps toward this, and started supporting New 
Delhi in its role as a regional power. In May 1994, Prime Minister Rao visited the 
United States and had talks with President Clinton on economic and trade cooperation, 
and deliberately avoided discussions of human rights or nuclear proliferation issues. In 
January 1995, William Perry, the US Defence Secretary, visited India and signed a 
security agreement which was regarded as a breakthrough in Indo-US bilateral 
relations.150 The US tilt toward India became clear after Vajpayee’s visit to Washington 
in 2000. Although the United States tried to maintain neutrality in its public stance, it 
had clearly distanced itself from Pakistan in choosing India as its primary ally. In the 
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latter years of the Clinton administration this tilt was reinforced by developments such 
as the nuclearisation of South Asia, the Talibanization of Afghanistan, and the rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism.  
India astonished the United States and the world in May 1998 by exploding nuclear 
weapons. Washington strongly condemned the explosion and tried, and failed, to stop 
Pakistan doing the same. Consequently, the United States imposed sanctions on both 
countries. Following the explosion, the Clinton Administration became engaged in the 
extended dialogue that took place before, during, and after the Kargil War in 1999.151 
There were nine rounds of talks between Strobe Talbot and Jaswant Singh.  Finally, 
President Clinton forcefully intervened in mid-1999 to get Islamabad to withdraw its 
forces that had been sent across the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. This was a 
welcome intervention for India, which had thought that the US would support 
Islamabad instead.152  This was the first time in history that the US unequivocally 
supported India against Pakistan. It has opened the door to the strategic realignment of 
the US toward India, and it was undoubtedly a political victory for India.153 
The final year of the 20th century shaped Indo-US relations at the start of the 21st 
century. President Clinton visited South Asia in March 2000 – the first visit by an 
American president for 22 years. He stayed five days in India and only five hours in 
Pakistan, giving momentum to Indo-US relations.  Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee 
visited United States in September of the same year and spoke to a joint session of the 
US Congress. These exchange visits from the apex of the respective leaderships was the 
opening of a new chapter in their relationship and indicated a major shift in their foreign 
policies.154 Washington took further substantial measures toward enhancing and 
improving relations with New Delhi, such as undertaking joint military exercises.155 
On the basis of Indo-US mutual interests and recognising their responsibilities toward 
ensuring regional stability and global security, President Clinton and Prime Minister 
Vajpayee signed a Vision Document and declared their ‘resolve to create a closer and 
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qualitatively new and fresh relationship between the United States and India’.156 
Clinton’s historic visit to India greatly increased Indo-US economic and military 
cooperation and paved the way for the Bush Administration to continue this framework 
of strategic relations.157 
After assuming office, President George W. Bush expressed his interest in continuing 
the rapprochement developed by his predecessor with India, which India itself eagerly 
reciprocated. During Jaswant Singh’s visit in Washington in April 2001, President Bush 
unveiled his nuclear missile defence proposals, and India responded to the proposals 
more positively than many American allies 
To sum up, New Delhi and Washington abandoned some of their past dogmatic and 
moralistic principles in favour of a new pragmatism during the transformative decade of 
1991-2001. The end of the Cold War made Pakistan less important, less useful, and less 
functional for the United States, which eventually helped to pave the way for a real 
improvement in Indo-US relations. Not only that, India’s commitment to democracy 
since its independence made relations between the US and India much easier and 
probably more sustainable than relations with Pakistan.158 
2.7 Realism and Shifts of India’s Policy in Post-Cold War Period 
As we have seen, the end of the Cold War created a new framework for international 
affairs. This changed scenario made Indian leaders, along with the leaders of many 
other countries, reassess their foreign policy. In the non-aligned years Indian policy had 
cultivated a moral tone in which ideals, as manifest in detachment from the agenda of 
either superpower, were claimed as the drivers of policy. We have shown that the 
claimed idealism was not always paramount and India played a classic game of 
maximising  its influence by playing the superpowers off against each other but tending 
to gravitate more to the USSR than the US. 1991 changed all that and made Indian 
leaders recognise that in a world with only a single superpower its national interest 
dictated better relations with the US.  This recognition was pragmatic, based on an 
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appreciation of where power lay in the post-Cold War world rather than on a strong 
correspondence of US and Indian ideals and values. 
Domestic economic imperatives created a congenial environment for India to become 
closer to the United States. Economic liberalisation and the introduction of market 
orientation to what had been a more mixed economy was necessary for domestic 
prosperity which in turn would underpin India’s capacity to take on a role in world and 
regional affairs that was commensurate with its potential. Economic reform led to the 
United States the biggest investor and the largest trading partner with India and on that 
basis increased security cooperation, particularly on maritime issues became possible. 
159 India’s potential role as a regional hegemonic power was a further basis for 
cooperation in this period, as it was consistent with a more widespread American 
tendency to seek client states who could maintain a form of regional stability consistent 
with a US led world order. India was the only candidate for such a role in South Asia 
and sought to adopt a stronger regional profile. There was therefore mutual interest in 
closer relations as a building bloc in a new world order. Beyond this India’s ‘Look East’ 
promised to extend India’s influence with East Asia in which the US had major 
concerns about stability.160 From a US perspective the division in policy terms between 
East and South Asia was becoming anachronistic and India could have constructive 
influence across the Indo-Pacific. 
In sum, where during the Cold war India had pursued a mixture of idealist and power 
politics, after that era pragmatism took precedence as ideological competition declined. 
The Indian response was neo-realist rather than realist because it was driven by changes 
in the international system still dominated by nation states rather than by existential 
threats.  These changes brought a new clarity of purpose to Indian policy that was 
matched by US recognition in the early post-Cold war years of the potential of India as 
a partner in advancing its national interest. This did not and could not, under neo-realist 
assumptions, eliminate the potential for competitions and policy divergence in some 
areas, but it did give a structural basis to the partnership that was stronger than what 
went before.  
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2.8 Conclusion 
With the historical background of Indo-US relations stretching over five decades, it is 
clear that India has always played a vital and decisive role in the formation of American 
policy in South Asia because of its geographical location, vast size, huge population, 
large market potential and increased global presence. Although, due to Cold War 
politics, New Delhi remained close to Moscow throughout the entire period of the Cold 
War, it has remained a desired ally of the United States, which sought a relationship 
sometimes openly and sometimes covertly.161 
In retrospect, the first half century of Indo-US relations was disappointing. The conflict 
of interests that began during World War II, when India and America differed on basic 
priorities, continued through the more than forty years of Cold War. India and the 
United States found themselves on opposite sides of major foreign and security policy 
issues despite their common adherence to a democratic political system. To explain this 
differences and capacity for conflict between the two democracies, an Indian analyst 
remarked in late 1980s, borrowing ideas from George Bernard Shaw, that if the UK and 
the USA are separated despite a common language, then India and the USA are 
separated despite a common political system.162 
US interests and actions in South Asia have fluctuated over time and across events. At 
times, the US stood by India and at other times against India, depending on the 
particular situation in the ground and global power dynamics. When there was conflict 
between India and Pakistan, the US supported Pakistan against India and when the 
question was between India and China, the US favoured India. Given the circumstances, 
45 years of Indo-US relations have been mostly uneven, often hostile, and sometimes 
friendly.163 
The Indian policy of non-alignment under Nehru annoyed the United States due to its 
contradiction with the American policy of containing the Soviet threat. Until the mid-
1960s, the US perceived India as a democratic alternative to Communist China. Since 
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then, they have shared some important security interests, though in a passive fashion. 
They have had little in common but their democratic political system.  
The 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars did not facilitate Indo-US relations, and their 
relations reached a low point. During the entire period of the Cold War, the United 
States always sought help from Pakistan, as India tilted toward the USSR. US relations 
with India improved a little in the late 1980s under President Reagan, and this upward 
trend in relations continued under George H. W Bush and Clinton, when the two 
countries engaged in a dialogue to redefine their strategic partnership.164 
In short, through various ups and downs, the Indo-US relationship reached a new stage 
at the beginning of the present century. It was shaped by events that took place in the 
final years of the 20th century. After the frostiness of the Cold War, and despite 
continuing tensions over the nuclear issue, the impact of the Soviet Union’s collapse, 
reforms within India, and globalisation, the 1990s laid the groundwork for an improved 
strategic relationship between India and the US.  
At the beginning of the Bush administration the relationship had been on an upward 
curve for a decade. The shock of 9/11 brought upheaval to international affairs.  
Whether the immediate effect of this upheaval would govern the relationship or other 
factors would be more important, whether, in other words, the post 9/11 world would 
see  further closeness or reverse the trend and drive the two countries apart under the 
Bush administration is the subject of the next two chapters.  
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CHAPTER – THREE 
Conceptual Thinking of the Bush Administration’s Foreign 
Policy in the Wake of 9/11 
3.1 Introduction 
George W. Bush assumed the presidency in 2001 with no notable foreign policy 
experience. He said that he was not going to aim to instigate regime changes, but rather 
would follow his father’s policy of designing a more careful foreign policy that could 
inspire respect from the rest of the world. He emphasized that the US would not become 
an arrogant nation. He further said: ‘I don’t want to be the world’s policeman, I want to 
be the world’s peacemaker’.1 During his campaign he was critical of Clinton’s foreign 
policy despite having very little knowledge of foreign policy of his own,2 and insisted 
on a restrained foreign policy, opposing the so-called notion of nation-building. The 
most important foreign policy initiative of President Bush was the creation of the 
‘missile shield’3 over parts of Europe, as a precaution in the event that North Korea or 
Iran should use their nuclear missiles.4 President Bush along with his entire team, 
including his Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defence, and National 
Security Adviser, all agreed to avoid the overly ambitious ideas of humanitarian 
interventions and nation-building pursued by Bill Clinton, in what could be known as a 
‘reluctant sheriff’ attitude. The United States was no longer in the business of global 
leadership as they perceived that most states in the world were capable to taking care of 
themselves, as the US was now taking care of itself. This was the policy pursued by the 
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Bush Administration in its first eight months.5 But 9/11 caused everybody within the 
Administration to change their tone. 
It is pertinent to mention here that President Bush’s campaign advisers constituted his 
foreign policy team when he came to office. The majority of his team, including 
Wolfowitz, Perle, were part of a conservative foreign policy bloc known for their neo-
conservatism. 9/11 was undoubtedly a defining moment in US history, altering the 
direction of US foreign policy and allowing neo-conservatives to promote their views.6 
Two critical aspects of their world view, later incorporated into the so-called Bush 
Doctrine, included waging preventive war and international democratization.7 
From the beginning, the Bush Administration was perceived as being highly religious. 
Although throughout history many US presidents have used religious rhetoric to gain 
support and unite people, particularly during national crises, President Bush was 
criticised on ground that his religious rhetoric was more pronounced and more political. 
He routinely used theological principles with references from the Bible. In his foreign 
policy speeches he used religious terms such ‘calling’ or ‘mission’ that has come from 
the ‘Maker of Heaven’ and ‘Author of Liberty’. He said the United States had a mission 
from God to transform the world and it represented good over evil.8 He used more 
religious rhetoric in his foreign policy speeches after the 9/11 attacks. President Bush’s 
automatic response to 9/11 was to launch a crusade, but he immediately corrected 
himself to avoid unnecessary tension with the Islamic world, and argued that the 
terrorists had to be defeated by the United States.9 
Until September 11, the Bush Administration showed minimum interest in the Middle 
East but after the incident the region became a central focus in the US foreign policy 
agenda.10 Before the attack, Iraq and Saddam Hussein were regarded as a problem but 
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not an immediate threat to the US or to world peace. Saddam’s WMDs were considered 
a threat to the Shia and Kurds, and to threaten neighbouring countries as Iraq tried to 
establish itself as the dominant power in the region.11 Although 9/11 was responsible for 
a great change in US foreign policy, many of the policy changes adopted after 9/11 were 
preconceived in neo-conservative’s12 minds. Toppling Saddam Hussein is the best 
example of this. The neo-cons wanted Saddam removed from power after the first Gulf 
War, and were unhappy that Saddam had not been removed. Even in January 1998, they 
wrote a letter to Clinton calling for Saddam’s removal.13 So they were, in effect, in an 
undeclared state of war with Saddam since the 1990s. The neo-cons therefore opened 
the door to the Iraq invasion, even though there was no evidence to connect Saddam and 
9/11.  
To the neo-cons, the United States invited the attacks by being too tolerant and open. 
Since the attack challenged the US, so it became essential for the US to show its 
strength in facing Islamist evils.14 Bush responded that ‘the United States can no longer 
solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past… We cannot let our enemies 
strike first’.15 President Bush not only followed up the 9/11 attacks by invading 
Afghanistan and Iraq, but also made fundamental changes in his foreign policy 
orientation. The thrust of this chapter is to show what changes his administration made 
in its relations with other countries, especially with India. 
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3.2 Bush’s Foreign Policy until the Events of September 11  
As stated in the introduction, President Bush himself had no foreign policy experience, 
and less interest in foreign affairs than in domestic issues. He was largely guided by his 
foreign policy advisory team, which played an enormous role in foreign affairs.16 
Initially, national affairs occupied his presidency, but it was inevitable that foreign 
affairs should become more dominant. 
President Bush’s foreign policy advisors were extremely critical of Clinton’s policies 
and rejected many of his policies and legacies. This attitude was given a name: 
‘Anything But Clinton – ABC’.17 National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice wrote 
that Clinton’s humanitarian interventionism had overtaken US national interest, and she 
blamed the Clinton Administration for over using and under resourcing the US armed 
forces and for sending forces abroad on missions that jeopardised the national interest of 
the United States.18 The Bush Administration regarded Clinton’s foreign policy 
approach as immature. 
Until 9/11, the main focus of the Bush Administration was to give special attention to 
China, overlooking Russia in the process. Pakistan was subordinated to India, and 
Afghanistan and East Africa were out of agenda.19 Low priority was given to the Middle 
East, but there were some discussions on how to deal with rogue states like Iraq, Iran, 
and North Korea.20 There was an attempt to minimise US multilateral obligations and to 
push for the development of an antimissile defence system to counter rogue states. 
During the initial eight months of the Bush Administration, Bush did not introduce any 
new initiatives in foreign policy. Neither the president himself, nor any of his advisors, 
talked about the spreading of democracy outside the US.21 There was no substantial 
discussion or debate on US grand strategy for the new century.  Though President Bush 
was committed to pursuing a humble foreign policy, it subsequently became clear that 
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under this disguise, there was a pre-occupation with a neo-con agenda, irrespective of 
whether it was appropriate for the situation or not. This agenda stemmed from the 
intellectual roots of the neo-cons in the ‘Project for the New American Century’. Top of 
their agenda was to fight Iraq, where they had an undisclosed intention to invade and 
topple Saddam, though the situation was not an immediate priority, as Iraq seemed 
under control.22 
The Bush Administration did not consider terrorism a major priority before September 
11. In fact, Clinton’s second administration placed a far greater focus on Al Qaeda than 
the Bush Administration did before 9/11.23  The 9/11 Commission Report mentioned a 
meeting in December 2000 between President Clinton and then President-Elect George 
W. Bush, in which Clinton had said to Bush: ‘I think you will find that by far your 
biggest threat is Bin Laden and Al Qaeda’. Bush response was that ‘he felt sure 
President Clinton had mentioned terrorism, but did not remember much being said 
about Al Qaeda’.24 Not only that, US intelligence also informed the Bush 
Administration about the possible threat of terror attacks  on American soil that Al 
Qaeda was preparing to strike, which would be a catastrophe and might result in huge 
casualties. The Administration did not dismiss this possibility out of hand, but despite, 
their prior knowledge of the possibility of attacks, they failed to take any adequate 
safeguards, something that was acknowledged by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz with great 
remorse. Responding to the attack, Condoleezza Rice said:  ‘9/I1 crystallized our 
vulnerability’ and Colin Powell said ‘A new reality was born’.25 
Although the Bush Administration was not seriously concerned about terrorism and 
possible terror attacks on US soil, the attacks changed US policy significantly and 
dramatically. The incident provided the Bush Administration with a great opportunity to 
materialise its pre-developed neo-con agenda. The entire world stood with the 
leadership; even Tehran expressed its readiness to extend assistance.26 But, as stated 
above, the neo-cons had been  intent on toppling Saddam since early 1990s and 
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9/11gave them the opportunity to pursue that goal even as it risked alienating much of 
the support from other nations that the US had received in the  aftermath of the attack.  
3.3 Basic Principles of Bush Foreign Policy – Enunciation of a New National 
Security Strategy 
Undoubtedly, 9/11 created a paradigm shift, which essentially changed the nature of the 
international system.27 This single horrendous incident forced the US to reorient and 
reformulate its policies to the rest of the world. As noted above, the Bush 
Administration took advantage and exploited this terrorist attack to promote its pre-
conceived neo-con agenda. President Bush responded to the attacks with the declaration 
of a War on Terror and later the enunciation of a ‘New National Security Strategy’ in 
2002 that came to be known as the Bush Doctrine.  
On 29 January 2002, President Bush in his first State of the Union address elaborated on 
the Bush Doctrine, which he did further in his book Decision Points. There were three 
main elements in the Doctrine. First, the United States will make no distinction between 
the terrorists and the countries that indulge them, and would aim to bring them to 
justice. Second, the US would challenge any threats before they fully materialise and 
would take pre-emptive action against adversaries before they attack the US. Finally, 
the US will face the enemy’s ideology of repression and fear, by advancing liberty and 
hope.28 President Bush said those who harbour the terrorists and seek WMDs were the 
real danger to the peace and security of the world, and he called them the ‘axis of evil’. 
He also said that the war in Afghanistan was just the beginning of the War on Terror.29 
There were many other elements in the Bush Doctrine but three of them made it 
significant to Asia: the axis of evil (isolating Iran, Iraq, and North Korea), pre-emptive 
strikes, and the US approach of balancing bilateral and multilateral security in the 
regional order.30 
The Bush Doctrine became the cardinal principle of US foreign policy from the moment 
of its declaration. It redefined US relations with countries around the world.  It helped in 
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reviving and strengthening US relations with major countries, including Russia, China, 
and India, as each of these states faced terrorism and insurgency.31 
After the attacks, President Bush’s message to the world was: ‘Either you are with us, or 
you are with the terrorists. Either you stand with civilization and good [us], or with 
barbarism and evil [them]. And to those nations that choose wrongly, beware’.32 Such 
an approach left no space for honest disagreement.33 
Whereas Europe displayed a rather lukewarm reaction to this approach, China opposed 
it, as, in their perception this strategic plan was oriented to preventing Chinese military 
growth. Interestingly, however, India was very much more supportive of the Bush 
Doctrine, for which a number of explanations are possible. These include India wanting 
the US to lift the sanctions imposed on it after the nuclear test in 1998, its desire for US 
support for securing a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, its desire to increase 
economic ties with the US, and, most importantly, its desire to replace Pakistan as an 
American strategic partner in the region.34 
 3.3.1 The Policy of Pre-emption 
The essential part of the Bush Doctrine was pre-emptive action to deter another 
potential attack on the US, and this ultimately became the basis of Bush’s foreign policy 
after 9/11. It was argued that the New Strategy of the Bush Doctrine was the outcome of 
the hawkish minds of the neo-cons (such as Paul Wolfowitz) who had been professing 
ideas of US military hegemony, unilateralism, and pre-emption since the early 1990s.35 
President Bush promised to fight the axis of evil before they could take action against 
the US. He said: ‘We’ll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on 
events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and closer. The 
United States of America will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to 
threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons’.36 The Iraq invasion in 2003 by 
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the Bush Administration was the best example of this policy of pre-emption.37Although 
during the presidential campaign and even after assuming power, President Bush 
pledged to use military power only to abolish potential threats to the US, the Bush 
Doctrine reformulated his foreign policy to allow him to use pre-emptive armed force 
against US enemies, and to remove leaders and networks who threatened the US.38 
The idea of pre-emptive action was not introduced for the first time by the Bush 
Administration. It has existed from the ancient period39 and is recognized as a reality of 
international security. In the early 1960s, this policy was vital to Kennedy’s 
Administration in managing the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Reagan’s pre-emptive 
action in Grenada was another example of this policy. And even in 1994, President 
Clinton was ready to attack North Korea pre-emptively. So the essence of the Bush 
Doctrine was that the US would remain ready to act pre-emptively as needed against 
those who harbour terrorists and pursue WMDs.40 
There is an obvious distinction between pre-emption and aggression. President Bush 
said: ‘The United States will not use force in all cases to pre-empt emerging threats, nor 
should nations use pre-emption as a pretext for aggression’.41 Pre-emption indicates that 
the potential or emerging threat could be treated as legitimate grounds for using force 
against those who posed it. Hence this policy of pre-emption pursued in fighting 
terrorism significantly expands the definition of self-defence and the grounds on which 
the state has the right to use force when confronted by potential threats.42 
 3.3.2 American Unilateralism 
US foreign policy under the Bush Administration has been characterised as unilateralist 
– an essential element of the Bush Doctrine. It contains an element of American 
                                                        
37 Jeffery W. Knopf, ‘Wrestling with Deterrence: Bush Administration Strategy after 9/11’, 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2008, p. 229. 
38 Patricia, L. Dunmire, ‘9/11 Changed Everything’: An Intertextual Analysis of the Bush Doctrine’, 
Discourse & Society, Vol. 20., No. 2., p. 196. 
39 The Peloponnesian War of the ancient Greek period between Sparta and Athens was the best example 
of pre-emptive war in the ancient period, where Sparta concluded that it had to act before being 
overwhelmed by the rising power and ambition of Athens. 
40 Antony Anghie and Charles Hill, ‘The Bush Administration Preemption Doctrine and the United 
Nations’, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law), Vol. 98, March-
April, 2004, p. 329. 
41President Bush, ‘US National Security Strategy: Prevent Our Enemies From Threatening Us, Our 
Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction’, New York, June 1, 2002, available at 
http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15425.htm , accessed 8 March 2016. 
42 Antony Anghie and Charles Hill, ‘The Bush Administration Preemption Doctrine and the United 
Nations’, p. 326. 
78 
 
exceptionalism, and the desire to avoid the entanglement of international institutions. 
This approach of unilateralism was exposed even before of September 11, as evidenced 
by the US withdrawal (along with Australia) from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001.43 
US unilateralism essentially means that the US will first announce its decision to act in 
a particular situation, and then expect other countries to support and join US under its 
terms and conditions. President Bush favoured unilateralism, which was a clear 
distinction from his predecessors. When George Bush announced the ‘coalition of the 
willing’ on the War on Terror and the intention to remove Saddam, many American 
allies did not join this coalition.44 Leadership requires not only the power to destroy but 
the ability to persuade; President Bush failed to observe this distinction. Instead of 
following the standard actions of strategic diplomacy he wanted to reorder the world 
through his policy of unilateralism.45 
Multilateralism in Bush’s view was a process directed toward convincing people that 
the US president was not going to execute decisions alone, violating the common 
wisdom of the global community. To implement the US decision to invade Iraq, 
President Bush emphasised the importance of increasing the number of countries that 
supported his decision, no matter whether the country was large, tiny, strong, near, far 
or even able to make any noticeable contribution. Attacking the Taliban in Afghanistan 
brought huge support worldwide and Bush accepted troop contributions from twenty 
states.46 Nevertheless Bush’s so-called multilateralism post-9/11 refers to a means or 
process only.47 And it was in clear disregard of multilateralism in a true sense. The 
rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, opposition to the ICC, and abrogation of the ABM 
Treaty were other examples of this.  
The United States was expecting India like many other countries to join its pre-emptive 
initiative in the wake of the Iraq invasion in April 2003. Jaswant Singh, External Affairs 
Minister of India, declared in the Indian Parliament that ‘India had a much better case to 
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go for pre-emptive action against Pakistan than the US has in Iraq’. But New Delhi later 
toned down its stance on the pre-emption policy.48 
 3.3.3 The War on Terror 
The Bush Administration was committed not to engage in humanitarian intervention 
and  avoid the idea of nation-building and democracy promotion, but just nine days after 
the 9/11 incident, President Bush shifted the orientation of US foreign policy, making 
the War on Terror his main focus and committing to fight to the end with all the US’s 
resources. He said in an address to a joint session of Congress: ‘We will direct every 
resource at our command – every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every 
instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon 
of war – to the destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network’.49 Terrorism 
therefore ranked at the top of the US foreign policy agenda in the post-9/11 period.50 
The terminology of the War on Terror was not a fresh one conceived of by George W. 
Bush; he merely revived it in the aftermath of 9/11. The terminology was first used by 
anarchists to assassinate political leaders in the 19th century. Later in the 1940s, Great 
Britain used it in their colonial campaigns, and President Reagan similarly used it 
during the 1980s.51 The phrase has been used to fight Al Qaeda since September 11, but 
President Bush maintained that ‘Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not 
end there’.52 
The phrase was a label utilised by the Bush Administration, but promoted by the 
influential neo-cons in the administration. This slogan provided the opportunity to 
materialise and justify their decade-old policy of pre-emptive war, first in Afghanistan 
and ultimately in laying the foundation for the invasion of Iraq.53 
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The Bush Administration regarded terrorism as the ‘mother of all threats’54 and it 
further declared that modern terrorists are ‘the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of 
the 20th century’55, omnipresent in the world and always prepared to attack our 
civilization. So it was not a surprise that as a consequence of the 9/11 attacks 
‘everything has changed’ in US policy if not in the whole world.56 Finally the phrase 
could be described as a continuous effort at reimagining the security of the US and the 
international community by the Bush Administration. President Bush’s idea of waging 
the War on Terror unified US domestic opinion, bridging the differences between the 
Democrats and Republicans for a considerable period, and also received support and 
sympathy from the international community until the Iraq invasion.57 
3.4  9/11 and the US Policy Focus on South Asia 
There can be no denying that the September 11 attacks shook the South Asian 
landscape. In an interview with Professor Stephen P. Cohen conducted for this thesis, he 
said no part of the globe was affected by 9/11 as much as South Asia.58 The Bush 
Administration declaration that ‘everything has changed’ certainly had a great influence 
on the region. Before 9/11, the US global strategic priority was to face the ‘China 
threat’, but in response to 9/11, priority shifted to the war against global terrorism and 
South Asia became a focal point of US foreign policy. As the events had rapidly altered 
the global security environment, President Bush said: ‘All of this was brought upon us 
in a single day, and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under 
attack’.59 The events made South Asia the first and primary theatre of US policy on the 
War on Terror, causing the US to revive and redefine its relations with countries in the 
region. The War on Terror facilitated the US military presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
                                                        
54 Dirk Nabers, ‘Identity Construction in US Foreign Policy during the Bush Years’ in David B. 
MacDonald, Dirk Nabers and Robert G. Patman (Ed.), The Bush Leadership, the Power of Ideas, and the 
War on Terror, p. 63. 
55George W. Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, The White House, 
20 September 2001, available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html , accessed 8 March 8, 2016. 
56 Dirk Nabers, op.cit., p. 55. 
57 Simon S.C. Tay, op. cit, p. 115. 
58Interview with Stephen P. Cohen in Washington DC, December 7, 2012. 
59President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, September 20, 2001, 
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ accessed 29 September 2015. 
81 
 
and even neighbouring central Asian countries for the first time. US ties with India were 
also facilitated by the war, especially in military-to-military relations.60 
Although India provided unconditional support to the US global war against terrorism 
immediately, it could not offer what Pakistan had61, and this disparity led to the revival 
Cold War mentality. The United States treated Pakistan as a frontline state facing 
Afghanistan and the Taliban, as it had faced Russians during the Cold War. Pakistan 
steadily re-emerged as a key regional player, because the situation again made it a vital 
ally to the US. One indication of this renewed importance was that Pakistan was given 
the status of a non-NATO ally.62 Over time this situation changed, however, and 
Pakistan gradually lost ground as India gained increased importance in US eyes. I will 
delineate below how far US policy changed in the region and what the main factors 
behind this were. 
3.4.1 Recognising India as a Natural Ally, and the Strategic Partnership 
Its democratic political system, freedom of speech, liberty, tolerance, multi-culturalism, 
multi-religiosity, and freedom of press made India eligible to be a natural ally to US. 
The mightiest and most populous democracies in the world had not been close for at 
least five decades. President Clinton took India seriously and President Bush continued 
Clinton’s policy, and thus relations between the US and India improved significantly.63 
After Bush’s election victory, there had been a lot of speculation about US relations 
with India, and particularly about whether the US relationship with India would 
continue the upward trend that was begun during Clinton term. The sky became clear 
after early speeches by the President and Secretary of State. The policy adopted by the 
administration toward the region until 9/11 suggested an obvious tilt toward India and 
the downgrading of US traditional links with Pakistan.64 From the beginning, the Bush 
Administration recognised India’s rise and pre-eminence in South Asia, and President 
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Bush stated in the meeting of the Republican National Committee that the US should 
engage with India as the most populous democracy of the world.65 
Secretary Powell told a Senate panel: ‘India has to be a high priority for foreign policy 
activities of the US’66, which made clear the US intention to bring its relations with 
India onto a higher plane. Thus, it granted India a more vital role in American foreign 
policy in Asia, which was reflected in the ‘new global strategy framework’ of May 
2001.67 At that time, when Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, went to India 
to seek Indian support for President Bush’s ideas on a new strategic framework for 
international security, India responded positively. General Powell made some other very 
important statements: ‘…India has the potential to keep the peace in the vast Indian 
Ocean area and its periphery. We need to work harder and more consistently to assist 
India in this endeavour, while not neglecting our friends in Pakistan’.68 Therefore, the 
Bush Administration’s interest was revealed in continuing and intensifying the 
rapprochement started during the final year of the Clinton Administration. Initially then 
Bush pursued a more proactive pattern of cooperation in developing US relations with 
India. 
Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee mentioned in his speech to the Indian parliament, 
following President Clinton’s speech, that the US and India ‘have all the potential to 
become natural allies’.69 The Bush Administration regarded India in the same way as a 
natural ally. President Bush called the Indo-US relationship a ‘strategic partnership’.70 
A number of factors contributed to shared strategic interests; these included the 
nuclearisation of South Asia, the Talibanisation of the region and the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism71In addition, Indian and the US’ views on economic liberalization and 
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Asian democratization were similar.72 As soon as President Bush declared the 
developing of the National Missile Defence, India became the first to support it.  
President Bush was very impressed with India’s genuine democratic values, and his 
foreign policy team considered India to be an emerging great power and a new strategic 
partner. They therefore sought to involve India in a variety of issues, including 
terrorism, trade, and military and scientific cooperation. To this end, Robert Blackwill – 
strategy analyst, and expert on China and nuclear proliferation – was appointed as 
ambassador to India. The Bush Administration also perceived that US relations with 
India would be very useful if relations were to go wrong with the Chinese.73 While the 
Clinton administration considered India a source of instability in the non-proliferation 
issue, President Bush kept the issue on the backburner, and leaned toward incorporating 
India as a constructive and positive player in overall Asian security.74 
The Bush Administration emphasised three aspects in relation to India: that India should 
no longer be perceived as being of less value than China, but rather a counterweight 
against it, that the US would facilitate India’s desire of attaining global status, and that 
India should become a strategic partner of the US. In the words of Dr. Limaye, the 
United States did not want to see India as standing against China, but as a rising global 
power in the Indian Ocean and as a regional balancer.75 The United States not only 
received India’s complete support for the War on Terror but found India a partner with 
which it could achieve its goal of ‘creating a strategically stable Asia’.76 
After outlining the US perspectives and policies toward India, it is now important to 
discuss how India responded to US policies and reacted to the 9/11 attacks. India 
offered its military bases and facilities to the United States, offered intelligence on terror 
networks, and port facilities in Mumbai for US naval vessels. Although the US showed 
its gratitude, it declined and chose to use Pakistani facilities instead, which were more 
convenient for fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.77 Accepting 
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Pakistan’s military government’s offer and designating it as a US main ally in the War 
on Terror, and giving Pakistan the status of a non-NATO ally, made Indo-US relations 
somewhat bitter. Terrorism brought India and the US closer together. India has been 
facing terrorism since its inception. Three of India’s leaders died in terrorist attacks, 
though each case was for a different reason.  Immediately before 9/11, India 
experienced two significant terror instances. One was the attack on the Red Fort in 
Delhi in December 2000, and other was the hijacking of flight 814 to Kandahar in 
December 1999. And few weeks after 9/11, India witnessed another terrible attack on its 
parliament, allegedly by terror networks based in Pakistan. Though India extended its 
unconditional support for the US fight against terrorism, the US failed to condemn 
Pakistan for its possible involvement in the attacks, a fact that annoyed India greatly. At 
the same time, the Bush Administration’s decision to completely lift the sanctions from 
both India and Pakistan, annoyed India further as it disapproved of this equal treatment 
for (what it perceived as) unequal states.78 
In sum, while India supported the war on terror the net early effect of 9/11 was to shift 
US strategic considerations away from India. This went against its long term 
perspective of India as an emerging global and regional partner. US policy in response 
to 9/11 favoured largely Pakistan and saw US-India relations take a step backward but 
the longer term strategic significance of India gradually took precedence over the short 
term value of Pakistan to the US  and led the Bush administration to seek to  overcome 
the estrangement of the immediate post 9/11 period. This policy gathered force and 
achieved some success in the second Bush Administration. 
3.4.2 The Policy of De-hyphenation: No Special Relations with Pakistan  
Due to Cold War politics, US special relations with Pakistan had always been a 
hindrance to having better relations with India. Toward the end of his presidency, 
Clinton perceived that the US no longer needed a special relationship with Pakistan, and 
India was given greater priority.  President Bush had the same perception and decided 
not to balance US relations with the permanent adversaries, but to follow the separate 
tracks on their own.79  Colin Powell made it clear, as mentioned above, that the US 
should work consistently hard to help India in its endeavour to become a balancer in the 
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Indian Ocean region and in gaining status as a global power without neglecting the US 
friendship with Pakistan. Rather than supporting one country or the other, the Bush 
Administration followed a policy centred on ‘a decoupling of India and Pakistan in 
American calculations’.80 His team decided on a path defined by what came to be 
known as the ‘de-hyphenation strategy’.81 
The policy of de-hyphenation between India and Pakistan started under the Clinton 
Administration and continued under Bush. The US aspiration was to work with India as 
an economic partner but security relations were also important to the extent that there 
was a convergence of terrorism concerns. Although the understanding about this issue 
was far from perfect, it was sufficient for New Delhi and Washington to find a common 
language.82 The United States has one set of interests in India and with the Indian 
government, and a different set of interests in Pakistan and with the Pakistani 
government, which require distinct policies.83 After 9/11, Islamic terrorism directed US 
foreign policy toward Pakistan, not toward India, while the rise of China directed US 
policy toward India, not toward Pakistan. US relations with Pakistan were therefore 
carried out under the auspices of the US in Afghanistan, while US relations with India 
were carried out under the auspices of other interests. But de-hyphenation was never 
able to deal with the India-Pakistan conflict itself.84 
The NSS of 2006 stated that, ‘America’s relationship with Pakistan will not be a mirror 
image of our relationship with India.’85 It also said that the Indo-US relation had made 
substantial progress despite Washington having improved relations with Islamabad at 
the same time. It had been widely felt that that good relation with both countries was 
mutually exclusive, but the Bush Administration  demonstrated that simultaneously 
good relation with each was possible, which could help both to achieve a lasting peace 
between them.86 
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3.4.3 Balancing China 
The post-Cold-War era witnessed a debate in the international political system between 
the United States, India, and China, and the post-9/11 war against global terrorism 
provided them with a common platform for deliberation on issues of strategic 
importance.87 President Bush said: ‘In this moment of opportunity, a common danger is 
erasing old rivalries. America is working with Russia and China and India, in ways we 
have never before, to achieve peace and prosperity’.88 The rise of China posed a great 
challenge to India in the 21st century and, therefore, undoubtedly the China factor 
played an increasingly significant role in the Indo-US strategic partnership under the 
Bush Administration. Not only that, Japan also considered this giant economic power as 
a danger to South Asia, and Australia wanted to strengthen its relations with the US in 
response to Chinese rise in East Asia.89 There were views amongst US analysts that the 
US was helping India to become a global power to act as a counterweight against China. 
Indian analysts differed here, arguing that India was attempting to improve its relations 
with China and trying to end their border dispute with the Chinese.90  China also started 
to accept the reality of India’s emergence as a global power, with its immense economic 
potential, military capacity, and strategic aspiration.91 
Increasing Indo-US cooperation was not motivated only by India’s own potential but by 
the US fear that China’s rise might lead to global instability. Realist theorist John J. 
Mearsheimer envisaged that a rising China and the United States would be engaged in 
an intense security competition with huge potential for war, and that an increasingly 
powerful China would try to push the US military out of Asia to make itself a regional 
hegemon.92 President Bush endorsed that perception and considered China a potential 
challenger to the US at least in the Asia-Pacific, if not in the world, and he called China 
a ‘strategic competitor’ rather ‘strategic partner’ as President Clinton had done.93 
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Condoleezza Rice regarded China as the main strategic rival to the US, and emphasised 
the importance of establishing a stronger relationship with India as a counterweight to 
China in view of the continued Sino-Indian border dispute and the war they had fought 
in 1962 over Himalayan border.94 Ashley Tellis was also of the opinion that India, with 
its huge potential, would not only be a partner of the US but could be a geopolitical 
balancer to China.95 It was a common speculation in the triangular dynamic that an 
Indo-US alignment would be useful against the rise of China, but, at the same time, 
there has also been speculation that Sino-Indian cooperation might stand against the 
unipolar international system led by the United States.96 
Scholars whom I have interviewed such as Ambassador Anthony Quainton, Dr. Satu 
Limaye, and Professor Deepa Ollapally believed that US policy toward India was not 
driven by fear of China at all; rather India was treated very much on its own terms. The 
United States wanted India and China to succeed as they are major markets and it was 
in US interest to maintain security and regional order through mutual prosperity.97 On 
the other hand, scholars like Ambassador Howard B. Schaffer and Stephen P. Cohen 
maintained that Indo-US relations were partly driven by a fear of China, but that that 
was not the main element. The main element was the recognition of India’s rise to the 
status of a global power. Schaffer stated: ‘I certainly and strongly agree that the rise of 
China has made the US more interested in India than we would have been otherwise’.98 
Stephen P. Cohen expressed his views this way:  
There is a complex policy, not a single issue. Different Americans regard India for different 
reasons. People of different groups have got different interests in India. The military has one 
interest, nuclear people have another interest, and business people have another kind of interest. 
But they can agree on very basic policies and be supportive of India. Policy is not to contain 
China necessarily; this may be the Pentagon view, but the White House may have different view. 
There is no single voice in US. It is to balance China. To contain China will make China more 
hostile.99 
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India as a great democracy is a counterweight to China ideologically,100 but that is not 
the only element or aspect of Indo-US relations.101 
 3.5 Conclusion 
That 9/11 has ‘changed everything’ has become a fashionable phrase to use in recent 
years. No doubt due to 9/11, many things have changed but many others remain the 
same. 9/11 altered and reshaped many aspects of the Bush Administration’s thinking on 
its foreign policy.102 Prominent US scholar Noam Chomsky argued that the ‘belief that 
9/11 signalled a sharp change in the course of history…seems questionable’.103 
The post-9/11 policy of the Bush Administration was largely shaped by his predecessors 
and President Bush even owed a debt to his father for this transformative change. His 
branding of the ‘axis of evil’ reflected the challenges posed by North Korea in making 
Northeast Asia unstable, Iran’s desire to be unchallenged in the Persian Gulf, and the 
unfinished campaign against Saddam in 1990s.104 President Bush himself immediately 
described the events as the US’ new Pearl Harbour and Dr. Rice repeatedly made the 
same statement bringing it into greater historical context.105 Although President Bush 
was initially determined to follow Kissinger-like ‘realpolitik’106 policies, the events of 
9/11 caused him to shift to an extensive ‘Wilsonianism’107 influenced by neo-cons.108 
                                                        
100 Interview with Ambassador Anthony Quainton in Washington DC, 4 December 2012. 
101Interview with Thomas Farr in Washington DC, 6 December 2012. 
102 Christopher Layne, ‘Offshore Balancing Revisited’, The Washington Quarterly, Spring, 2002, p.233. 
103 Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance, Penguin, London, 
2004, p. 191. 
104Zbigniew Brzezinkski, The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership, Basic Books, New York, 
2004, p. 27. 
105 Timothy Garton Ash, Free World: Why a Crisis of the West Reveals the Opportunity of Our Time, 
Penguin, 2005, London, p. 117. 
106The term ‘realpolitik’ denotes the practice of diplomacy based on material and practical factors rather 
than ideals or moral or ethical values. The term was first used by a German writer and politician, Ludwig 
von Rochau, in 1853, became associated with the politics of Bismarck and was later popularized by 
Henry Kissinger. Its hallmark is an approach to diplomacy in which influence is maximised by a 
pragmatic response to given circumstances, in particular the balances of power in a given situation, as 
opposed to the pursuit of moral objectives. This amoral quality leads to an association with a 
Machiavellian approach to international politics. 
107Wilsonianism is a foreign policy ideology refers to idealistic principles of American President 
Woodrow Wilson, based on the fourteen points he laid out as a guide for negotiations at the end of World 
War I. Wilson introduced his points not only to bring an end of the First World War but with the aim of 
establishing principles that would achieve a world without fear and war. This approach has characterised 
the idealistic aspect of much of US foreign policy in the 20th century and its more recent guise has been 
that of liberal internationalism, which has favoured interventionism to promote capitalism, democracy 
and national self-determination. 
108Andrea K. Riemer, U.S. foreign policy from Bush to Bush: Enduring parameters and policy options 
Part 3: The Bush43 presidencies – Policy options, AARMS Security, Vol. 7, No. 1, 2008, p. 119 
89 
 
As 9/11 impacted and affected South Asia more than any other region, and the region 
became a theatre of the global War on Terror, so the United States changed its policy 
drastically toward it. US policy toward South Asia in the aftermath of 9/11 (after a short 
drift) seems to indicate a tilt toward India. This tilt and the subsequent Indo-US strategic 
partnership, was not a sudden move but the result of a gradual convergence of interests 
which began with the collapse of the Soviet Union and India’s own policy of economic 
liberalisation.109 Indo-US cooperation against the global War on Terror therefore paved 
the way for strategic cooperation. 
Indo-US relations for almost six decades can be characterised as a combination of 
estrangement and engagement. Neither were they totally estranged and nor did they 
enjoy the same deep engagement that both enjoy with other states, India’s relations with 
Soviets being an example, as have been US relations with the UK. With the changes to 
international political calculations, Indo-US relations also shifted from estrangement to 
a greater engagement and cooperation.110 The transformation of Indo-US relations 
started during the Clinton Administration, were accelerated by President Bush, and then 
continued to take an upward trajectory based on ideas about US strategic interests that 
were forged in the aftermath of 9/11. If President Clinton’s visit was a turning point, 
then President Bush’s initiative was a tipping point in Indo-US relations. 
It is important to note that in second term of the Bush Administration, there has not seen 
any major change of basic principles of US foreign policy. All the main elements of 
Bush conceptual apparatus were in place in the 2002 NSS. US policy in supporting 
democratic movement, freedom, human dignity, rule of law, strengthening alliance in 
fighting terrorism, working to prevent from the danger of attacks and developing 
WMDs, working with others in resolving regional conflicts, and developing cooperative 
relations with global power centres to meet the challenges of the present century 
remained more or less the same and were reasserted in the NSS of 2006. 
Likewise 2002 NSS, 2006 NSS mentioned that the goal of the US for the whole of 
South Asian region would be a democratic, prosperous, and peaceful region. In 
comparing to NSS of 2002 with that of 2006 NSS, it can safely be said that although 
Bush policy toward many international issues had evolved, his attitude to India has not 
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changed all that much, or rather it evolved organically. In 2006 NSS President Bush 
said: ‘We have set aside decades of mistrust and put relations with India, the world’s 
most populous democracy, on a new and fruitful path’.111 If the principles guiding the 
foreign policy of the Bush administration, and those affecting its relations with India, 
had become clear by 2002, the unfolding momentous events following 9/11 would 
inevitably affect the implementation of those principles. It is therefore important to trace 
the implementation of those principles in order to establish the extent to which 
principles were effectively turned into action. 
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CHAPTER – FOUR 
The Bush Administration – Implementation of Policies 
toward India 
4.1 Introduction 
It is a well-known phenomenon in American politics that incoming presidents tend to 
disparage the foreign policies of the previous presidents, either by saying that the last 
administration did too little or too much. President Bush was not an exception, and 
followed the same style, criticising the Clinton Administration in two opposite ways. As 
has been discussed in the last chapter, although President Bush did not have a great deal 
of foreign policy experience, even he criticised his predecessor’s foreign policy. 
Initially, before 9/11, he criticised President Clinton for doing too much and later after 
the terrorist incident he criticized him for doing too little in foreign affairs.1 
The importance of Asian countries was increasing in US foreign policy at the beginning 
of the 21st century and the strategic significance of the region continued to rise during 
the entire period of the Bush Administration. 9/11 drew the US’s focus onto South Asia, 
and brought the region onto the front burner. The purpose of this chapter is to 
demonstrate how the principles on which Bush’s foreign policy were based were 
translated into practical action in the region, and particularly toward India. 
The first Bush Administration’s policy was dominated by the effect of 9/11, the 
invasion of Afghanistan and preparing for the invasion of Iraq. But by 2004 Indo-US 
ties had improved remarkably, especially in defence cooperation, and Bush took steps in 
the first year of his second administration to leave some lasting marks on Indo-US 
relations. A number of economic and security-related initiatives were taken to tighten 
their relationship. They signed a ten-year defence framework agreement, an open sky 
agreement, initiated the civilian nuclear cooperation, civilian space cooperation, 
increased high-technology trade, military-to-military relations, arms sales, missile 
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defense, and economic cooperation which tripled bilateral trade between 2004 and 
2008.2 
Assessing the Bush Administration’s policies toward India as it was drawing to a close, 
Henry Kissinger said: ‘The relationship with India is one of the very positive things that 
is happening. We can cooperate with them both on ideological grounds and on strategic 
grounds. It’s one of the positive legacies that the new administration will inherit’.3 With 
this background, I will discuss below in detail the practical changes made by the Bush 
Administration toward India.  
4.2 Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership - NSSP: A New Approach 
After assuming the US presidency, George W. Bush set about furthering the Indo-US 
relationship that Clinton had begun to strengthen. The strategic engagement between 
them was one of the significant features of the Indo-US relations in the last decade. The 
first tangible step on this path of engagement occurred when President Bush and Prime 
Minister Singh met in November 2001 in Washington, and agreed to enhance 
cooperation first in security issues, civilian nuclear energy, space and scientific 
technology, and second in expanding economic relations.4 
As a part of their commitment made in Washington in 2001, the two countries worked 
in a number of different areas to strengthen their bilateral relation and cooperation and, 
on 12 January 2004, they announced the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership – NSSP - in 
implementing their shared vision. The NSSP initiative encompassed a number of major 
issues in Indo-US relations. India had been pressing the US to soften its restrictions on 
exports to India related to dual-use high-technology, to increase civilian nuclear 
cooperation, and to increase civilian space cooperation. These three issues were known 
as the ‘trinity’, though they later became the quartet with the inclusion of missile 
defence cooperation. In a joint statement, the US and India also declared their 
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relationship as partners in the War on Terror and in controlling the proliferation of 
WMDs, transforming their vision of bilateral strategic partnership into a reality.5 
This NSSP initiative opened a strategic dialogue between the US and India, with India 
accepting the needs to better control its export regime, while at the same time expecting 
access to US technology in return.6 The unveiling of the NSSP provided the earliest sign 
of a sea change in Indo-US relations, in which President Bush chose strategic 
engagement with India. This fundamental transformation in Indo-US relations was 
possible because both countries treated each other with an entirely different approach, 
outside of the Cold War prism. They found each other genuine in their desire to build a 
strategic partnership7 and this paved the way for greater energy security, strategic, and 
economic cooperation. 
Since January 2004, the two countries have been working together through a number of 
cumulative steps8 to materialise the first phase of the NSSP. On 17 September 2004, 
New Delhi and Washington announced that there had been progress on the NSSP 
initiative, and mentioned in a joint statement that the implementation of the NSSP 
would bring substantial economic benefits as well as bringing enhanced regional and 
global security.  The statement also said that the US and India would continue to go 
forward under the NSSP.9 On 18 July 2005, the US State Department announced that 
the US and India had successfully completed the NSSP and considered it a ‘milestone’ 
in the Indo-US strategic relationship.10 The NSSP should be considered a pivotal 
moment in developing Indo-US relationship toward a greater cooperation and strategic 
partnership. 
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4.3 Initiatives and Agreements between the US and India under the Bush 
Administration beyond the NSSP 
In accordance with the US pursuit of its strategic objectives in South Asia, Washington 
needed to maintain a close strategic partnership with New Delhi. Indo-US solidarity 
against transnational terrorism paved the way for cooperation. America acknowledged 
the importance of India’s emerging role in the international arena and its place in the 
reconstruction of international institutions. There were frequent discussions in the US 
about making India a fully-fledged partner in managing international order. But at the 
same time, the US also had to make sure that it was capable of retaining a long-term 
partnership with Pakistan as well, which became a dilemma after 9/11. So India became 
a partner in strategy and Pakistan a partner in necessity.11 
Now I will discuss below some of the important initiatives and agreements that took 
place during the Bush Administration between the United States and India. 
4.3.1 Ten Years of Defence Relations 
During a nine-day visit to Washington in June 2005, the Indian Defence Minister 
Pranab Mukherji signed a ten-year US-India Defence Agreement with US Defence 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. The agreement was titled ‘New Framework for the US-
India Defence Relationship’. The NFDR gave credibility to the Bush Administration’s 
promise to help India become a major power in the international sphere in the 21st 
century.12 The agreement focused on four main aspects of strengthening military 
cooperation and building a greater understanding between the defence establishments of 
the two countries. They were: maintaining security and stability, combating terrorism 
and religious extremism, preventing the proliferation of WMDs and the means to 
deliver them, data and technology, and protecting the free flow of trade through land, 
sea and air routes.13 It was massively ambitious in size and scope, vastly expansive, and 
brought the US and India together in collaborating in multinational operations in their 
common interest.14 
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It is important to mention here that although this agreement was not a defence pact, 
being only a ‘Framework for Defence Relationship’, it was the first time ever that such 
an agreement had been signed between India and the US. An agreement of this kind 
between two big countries signified collateral implications in every sphere and it was to 
become an element of broader Indo-US strategic partnership.15 The expansion of 
defence trade and expanding collaboration in missile defence were also major parts of 
the framework agreement.16 Consequently, in July of that year, Prime Minister Singh 
and President Bush issued a joint statement agreeing ‘to transform the relationship 
between them and establish a global partnership’.17 
Under the framework, high military personnel and political leaders from both sides 
started visiting each other’s country repeatedly with a special focus on institutional 
dialogue on defence cooperation, on boosting other security initiatives, and on high-tech 
cooperation, energy cooperation, defence procurement, and military research.18 
From this agreement, it is clear how the Bush Administration had re-evaluated its 
security partnership with India. As discussed earlier, with the rise of China and Islamic 
fundamentalism, the Bush Administration redefined the strategic significance of India 
as a prospective and potential partner in the region in providing peace, security, and 
stability in the Indian Ocean and in shaping the Asian balance of power. By this point, 
Indo-US relations had started coming out of the frostiness caused by strong US-Pakistan 
ties. Both New Delhi and Washington adjusted their bilateral relations, recognizing their 
susceptibility to the same global threats of terrorism and climate change. Evidence of 
this can be seen in the US’s acceptance of India’s offer of full cooperation after 9/11, 
and its support for the Bush Administration’s proposed missile system. No country can 
uphold its values and achieve its national interests without the help of friends and allies. 
The Indo-US redefined strategic partnership was the result of such thinking and the 
changed international political scenario. Considering this fact, Ambassador Blackwill 
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said that ‘President Bush has a global approach to US-India relations, consistent with 
the rise of India as a world power’.19 
4.3.2 The Open Sky Agreement 
An open sky agreement exists to liberalize commercial international air travel between 
two countries. The aim of such an agreement is to provide and ensure reasonable, 
suitable, and efficient services to the passengers, removing the interference by the 
government authority in the prices and routes of commercial airlines. It not only aims to 
expand trade thereby provide substantial economic growth and benefits but it opens the 
numerous doors to new cultural links worldwide. The United States has open sky 
agreements with more than 100 countries, including India.20 
The US Open Sky Agreement with India signed in April 2005 was another example of 
increased cooperation between the two countries. It was a landmark agreement signed 
by Praful Patel, the Minister of State for Civil Aviation, and Norman Y. Mineta, the 
visiting US Transportation Secretary, allowing any number of airlines to operate any 
number of flights to any part of the other’s country. It replaced the 50year-old ‘Air 
Services Agreement’ of 1956. This agreement was intended to make possible greater 
trade and economic cooperation between India and the United States. Before the 
agreement, Indian airlines were limited to flying to only a few American cities – New 
York, Newark, Los Angeles, and Chicago. After this agreement, they were able to fly 
directly to those cities and other regional hubs like Houston and Minneapolis. In the 
meantime, US airlines were permitted to fly non-stop to Indian major cities and the 
agreement also eliminated restrictive requirements on cargo flights.21 
After signing the agreement, Secretary Mineta said: ‘As Secretary of State Rice noted 
during her visit to India last month, the Bush Administration’s position is clear: 
America is committed to helping India become a major world power in the 21st Century. 
A strong Indian aviation system is a core component of reaching that goal’.22 Although 
the agreement came six years after the US-Pakistan Open Sky Agreement of 1999, the 
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number of passengers and cargo services increased after the US and India signed the 
accord. Prices fell23 and consumers benefited, which in turn, boosted the economy and 
business of both countries. This agreement with India was not anything special, but it 
was in part a goodwill gesture helping to develop US relations with India.  
4.3.3 Energy, Environment, and Public Health 
There was another set of areas where Indo-US cooperation became pertinent to building 
the state capacity. It was clear that energy was a critical component of state power, as 
without sufficient, secure, clean, reliable, and affordable energy, strengthening the 
economic growth of any country was impossible. Therefore, the Bush administration 
pledged to help India in promoting a stable and efficient energy market, and, to this, the 
‘US-India Energy Dialogue’ was initiated in May 2005 for bilateral energy 
cooperation.24 It was aimed at promoting increased trade and investment in the energy 
sector. This high-level dialogue consisted of five working groups i) Oil and Gas; and ii) 
Coal; iii) Power and Energy Efficiency; iv) New Technologies and Renewable Energy; 
v) Civil Nuclear Cooperation.25 
During Manomohon Singh’s visit to Washington in July 2005, the leaders of the both 
countries declared a joint statement to establish a global partnership between them 
through increased cooperation on global common issues like energy, environment, 
climate change, democracy, security, high-technology, and space development, where, 
under the heading of ‘Energy and Environment’, it declared it would ‘strengthen energy 
security and promote the development of stable and efficient energy markets in India 
...’26 The statement also said that Indo-US relations would be taken to a higher plane. 
The State Department declared it a ‘milestone’ in the Indo-US strategic partnership.27 
To meet growing demand from India, Washington and New Delhi agreed to closely 
work together to produce clean, secure, reliable and affordable energy. They believed 
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that Indo-US cooperation could strengthen efforts to manage greenhouse gas emissions 
and reduce air pollution harmful for the environment without hindering economic 
growth and development. Under the agreement both the US and India would promote 
the commercial deployment of clean coal technologies which worked to create zero-sum 
emissions. The US and India together with China, Australia, Japan, South Korea would 
work to improve energy security and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in ways 
contributing to economic growth, which was known as the ‘Asia-Pacific Partnership on 
Clean Development and Climate’.28 
Indo-US cooperation on public health has a long and productive history. This 
cooperation continued through the entire period of the Bush Administration, as 
evidenced by an increasing number of grants, bilateral agreements, programmes, and 
technical assistance initiatives. Over the years, the United States and India have 
established a robust collaboration in public health, covering issues from HIV to malaria 
and polio, from reproductive to maternal and child health, from TB to tobacco control, 
vaccine development, environmental and occupational health, and from avian influenza 
to emerging infectious diseases. In a joint statement of 2005, the two leaders, President 
Bush and Prime Minister Singh committed to strengthen their collaboration and 
establish a corporate fund for the fight against HIV/AIDS and institutions of both 
countries were working in vaccine development.29 
In 2003, the Bush Administration declared the President’s ‘Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief’. It was the biggest international health initiative ever by a single country to 
address a single disease.  The US increased funding in FY2006 to 29.3 million dollars. 
Through this plan, the United States and its partners have been working with India to 
support the third ‘National AIDS Control Plan (2006-2011)’. In FY2007 India received 
29.9 million dollars to support an integrated HIV/AIDS prevention, treatment, and care 
programme. The United States also accepted drugs developed in India for use in AIDS 
treatment worldwide.30 
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The United States and India also expanded their bilateral collaboration in fighting and 
preventing avian influenza. The Bush Administration promised 629 million US dollars 
to combat avian influenza to NGOs, and international organizations. India received 4.7 
million US dollar in FY2007 for Indo-US collaborative programmes on seasonal 
influenza, avian influenza, and pandemic preparedness. They agreed to extend their 
programme to the private sector and develop strategies of regional communications, and 
planned in-region response exercises.31 
The United States also committed to eliminate polio from India and for this it provided 
technical and financial support. For preventing and treating TB, USAID provided 4.17 
million dollars to the World Health Organization during the Bush Administration. TB 
caused more than 300,000 deaths every year in India. The US Department of Health and 
Human Services had a long relationship of collaboration with the Indian Council of 
Medical Research and the National Institute of Cholera and Enteric Diseases for many 
years.32 
The initiatives and agreements regarding energy, environment and public health 
undertaken by Washington and New Delhi was a step looking forward for a leading role 
by the US and India in international sphere. Through their Energy Dialogue they 
developed cooperation in a number of fields including oil, gas, and renewable energy. 
Civil nuclear cooperation was prominent and this later paved the way for signing Indo-
US Nuclear Deal. The Indo-US strategic and global partnership was broad in nature and 
scope, with the two nations working hand-in-hand on global energy security, clean 
environment, climate change, public health, trade, and education. With the help and 
cooperation from the USAID grant, India has been able to fighting successfully the 
diseases that caused huge deaths in the past.  
4.3.4 US-India High Technology Cooperation 
Indo-US high-technology cooperation and commerce came to light only after the joint 
statement issued in November 2001 by US President George Bush and Indian Prime 
Minister Vajpayee, in which they decided to transform the Indo-US relations into a 
partnership. Science and technology have always been a significant element of this 
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partnership.  Both countries agreed they should discuss the ways and means to boost 
bilateral high-technology cooperation and should initiate a bilateral dialogue analysing 
the processes of transferring dual-use and military apparatus in order to ensure greater 
transparency. They also agreed to begin discussions on civil space cooperation as both 
sides have mutual interests in space.33 
Since 2001, India and the US have undertaken various initiatives for high-technology 
cooperation. First among other initiatives was the ‘India-US High Technology 
Cooperation Group’ (the HTCG) announced through a joint statement in 2002 by the 
then Under Secretary of the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), Kenneth I. 
Juster, during his visit to New Delhi. It was aimed at promoting high-technology 
trade.34 In February 2003, 14 guiding principles were set for the HTCG, known as the 
‘Statement of Principles for US-India High Technology Commerce’ for removing the 
barriers to such trade.35 July 2003 saw the inauguration session of the HTCG where 
officials discussed a wide range of issues regarding the expansion of bilateral high 
technology trade. They recognized four areas of priority focus for Indo-US bilateral 
commerce in advanced technology. The areas were a) defense and strategic trade, b) 
biotechnology, c) information technology, and d) nanotechnology. Since the 
establishment of the HTCG meeting were held annually.36 In 2005 they established a 
High Technology Defence Working Group. India was formally designated as an eligible 
country for the ‘Validated End User’ programme in October 2007. In 2007, a meeting 
of the Joint Working Group on civilian space cooperation was held in Washington 
where both sides expressed their satisfactions with increasing bilateral relations in this 
field.37 The sixth meeting was held in New Delhi on 28-29 February 2008. 
India and the US agreed to work together in supporting the creation of dynamic, 
innovative and knowledge-based economies. Condoleezza Rice and Indian Science & 
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Technology Minister Kapil Sibal signed an agreement on science and technology 
cooperation between the two countries in October 2005.The purpose of the agreement 
was to boost cooperation in areas of mutual benefit, ranging from health to space 
technology. The agreement was not only designed to strengthen and promote science 
and the technology capabilities of both countries but also to expand the relations 
between the communities involved in these fields.38 
Other features of the agreements were: 
1. To establish Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protocols, as it was critical to 
promote a creative and technologically advanced economy. In order to 
strengthen the enforcement of the patent examination, the United States is 
funding the IPR training programme.39 
2. To provide a framework for a vigorous public-private partnership, a bi-national 
and Joint Science and Technology Commission was to be created. 
3. To generate a cooperative partnership Washington and New Delhi created a fund 
of $30 million and established a bi-national Science and Technology 
Commission. 
4. Both nations agreed to continue further cooperation in civilian space which 
would include space exploration, satellite navigation, and earth science.40 
5. To remove certain Indian organisations from the Entity List of the US 
Department of Commerce, as embarked on by the NSSP.41 
In March 2006, due to the expanding role of science and technology, the United States 
and India established two important bodies, namely the ‘Bi-National Science and 
Technology Commission’ and a ‘Joint Science and Technology Endowment Fund’ 
focusing on innovation, entrepreneurship, and commercialization. 
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With the emergence of India’s information technology capacities and biotechnology, 
life sciences and nanotechnology sectors, its economy had changed dramatically; the 
formation of US-India Technology Cooperation facilitated Indo-US trade in high 
technology items and demonstrated how  both the US and India were working together 
in building a better future. 
4.4 Expanding Defence Cooperation 
In international relations, defence relationships between the countries are known as the 
last mile of cooperation.42 In light of his conceptual thinking, Bush was committed to 
having a long-term strategic partnership with India, and regarded it not only as an 
emerging global power but also a regional security provider. Professor Stephen Cohen 
argued that Indo-US relations until the end of the 20th century could generally be seen as 
indifferent but he called the 2005 initiative of NFDR a positive milestone.  Since then, 
both countries have been reviewing the prospect of their long-term defence relationship, 
and, although they have different motives, their strategic visions have been converging 
day by day.43 
In fact, the major shift in the Indo-US defence relationship started just after September 
2001 when the US lifted sanctions against India,44 and defence cooperation between 
them made further substantial progress during the second term of the Bush 
Administration. The defence protocol of 2005 became one of the pillars of the defence 
relationship, which also included joint exercises, exchanges of personnel, the purchase 
of equipment and the joint development of new weapon systems. Before that, in January 
2004, the US and India announced that, in order to form a strategic partnership between 
them they had agreed to expand mutual cooperation in three main areas: non-military or 
civilian nuclear activities, space programmes, and high-technology commerce. 
Subsequently, in March 2006, President Bush visited India and agreed to strategically 
strengthen Indo-US relations, which led to the historic civil nuclear deal which I will 
discuss in full length later in the chapter in a separate section.  
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At the end of the Bush Administration, Indo-US defence ties became strong and were 
still growing. The policies of the Administration were designed to build the foundation 
for a long-term strategic partnership, so now I will discuss below what steps and efforts 
were taken in realising the intended goals.  
4.4.1 Military Exercises 
The US conducted more joint military exercises with India than with any other country 
in the world during the Bush Administration. Indo-US joint military exercises grew 
dramatically not only in terms of size, number but in sophistication also. Since 2002, 
they have had frequent and regular exercises, including all wings of their respective 
militaries, in order to deepen their defence relationship. During this period, the defence 
relationship between them was quite encouraging and they had more than 60 joint 
military exercises.45 
Special Forces from both sides were also the part of joint exercises programme. A 
number of soldiers from the US Special Forces have attended India’s Counter-
Insurgency Jungle Warfare School. In the joint exercises, the Indian military was 
exposed to US sophisticated military hardware, which increased the Indian interest in 
US equipment. Joint exercises included heliborne operations, counter-terrorism training 
in tackling guerrilla and clandestine warfare, mountain warfare, jungle warfare, and 
close-quarter combat. In 2004, for the first time since 1963, fighter aircrafts from both 
countries participated in air combat training. India also conducted its largest strategic 
deployment of combat aircraft outside its boundary, in Alaska in the same year.46 
Indo-US Naval cooperation laid the foundation for military-to-military cooperation. The 
US and Indian Navies conducted joint naval exercise Malabar 07-1 off the coast of 
Okinawa in April 2007 and Malabar 07-2 off the coast of the Bay of Bengal in 
September of the same year. The Malabar 07-2 exercises involved anti-air, anti-
submarine, and anti-surfaces warfare. It is important to note here that Malabar is the 
primary bilateral exercise among four exercises, which are the Habu Nag, Spitting 
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Cobra, and Salvex.47 Malabar maritime exercise is conducted in order to strengthen the 
maritime procedures, tactics and techniques of the countries involved.  
4.4.2 Arms Sales 
US arms sales to India was an essential element in expanding the defence relationship 
between the US and India when the respective political leaders met in Washington in 
November 2001. Later, the ‘quartet’, the NSSP and the framework of 2005, all led and 
broadened the opportunities for arms sales for US companies to India. The Indo-US 
strategic partnership was intended not only to assist India in nuclear technology but also 
facilitate the selling of highly sophisticated arms to India, including missiles, supersonic 
fighter jets, and other military equipment.  This arms sale widened the persistent gap 
and made Indo-Pak relations more hostile, but this time reversing the traditional balance 
of power.48 This offer of arms sales was to mitigate India’s unhappiness about the US 
announcement of releasing $1 billion dollars of arms to Pakistan. 
The Bush Administration remained committed to being a reliable arms supplier to India 
and US arms sales occupied a higher place during his two terms. After 2002, the US 
started a number of government-to-government arms sale to India, and India signed 
more than 20 foreign military sales cases which included C-17 and C-130J aircraft, and 
an ambitious transport dock along with six associated helicopters, TPQ-37 radars, 
Raytheon Firefinder artillery radars, self-protection suites for a VVIP aircraft, General 
Electric GE-F404 engines for India’s light combat aircraft, GE-LM-2500 gas turbines 
for Indian naval ships, Harpoon Block II missiles, specialised tactical equipment, 
Hercules transport aircraft, Sensor–Fuzed weapons, and carrier flight and Boeing P-8 
Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.49 Between 2001 and 2004, US arms sales to India 
reached $400 million and from 2005-2008 it increased substantially to more than $3 
billion. The United States became India’s third largest defence supplier after Russia and 
Israel. So arms sales to India were considered a major component of US strategic 
relations with India.50 
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The Bush Administration’s decision to sell arms to India had three implications. Firstly, 
the US took India as a serious strategic partner, cherishing the same strategic views and 
concerns; secondly, the US recognised India’s strategic role to be played in the region 
and in the international sphere; finally, and most obviously, arms sales and technology 
transfer to India demonstrated the fact that the US considered India as a preferred 
friend. Indian policy-makers saw this arms sale as a way of gaining influence.51 
4.4.3 Civil Space Cooperation and Missile Defence 
India sought access to US space technology for a long time in order to benefit its 
defence missile programmes. Both the US and India heavily relied on space 
technologies, and, on the technical level, India possessed considerable knowledge, 
skills, and experience. With US cooperation, India could advance its scientific 
endeavours. Indo-US space cooperation dated back to the 1960s when scientists from 
India were trained in the US, and in 1963 when the US launched a sounding rocket from 
India’s Thumba rocket facility. Indo-US space cooperation during that time was 
restricted by the possible reactions from across the rest of Asia, but was getting traction, 
with prompting and support from both sides.52 
During the Bush Administration, India made remarkable progress in space technology. 
The NSSP of 2004 and the 2005 initiative called for enhanced Indo-US cooperation on 
the peaceful use of space technology and a closer relation in satellite navigation, space 
exploration, and also in the commercial space arena. In 2004 and 2005, conferences on 
Indo-US space science and commerce were held in the Indian city of Bangalore. In 
2006, during President Bush’s visit to India, both nations committed to go further with 
the agreements, permitting the launch of US satellites by Indian space launch vehicles, 
including two US scientific instruments on India’s planned Chandrayaan lunar mission. 
In the following year, the US-India Joint Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation 
was held in Washington, and reviewed the progress and ties in the field of aerospace.  
On 22 October 2008, India launched the Chandrayaan-1 to orbit the moon and closely 
examine its surface, and this marked India as an important player in space exploration.53 
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4.5 Counterterrorism Cooperation and Intelligence 
Counterterrorism cooperation between the US and India has become one of the pillars 
of their partnership since 9/11. Both countries have experienced terrorist attacks against 
their land and interests, which bound them to work together in the War on Terror. It was 
not only after the 9/11 terrorist attack but also before that they started working together 
closely to counter terrorism. This dated back to 1999 when the India–US Joint Working 
Group on Counterterrorism was established. So the Indo-US counterterrorism 
cooperation has had a longer record than the US’s cooperation with many of its other 
allies. This joint working group has been meeting regularly since its inception and by 
the end of the Bush Administration it had met 10 times.54 
One month after the 9/11 attacks, Secretary Powell visited India on 16-17 October and 
the two nations signed the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty to facilitate cooperation on 
law enforcement and counterterrorism.55 After the 9/11 attacks, India immediately took 
the decisive and unprecedented decision of offering the US its full support and 
cooperation and the use of its bases for counterterrorism cooperation, in clear 
contradiction of India’s traditional neutral policy.56 
The United States and India57 are probably two nations in the world that have recently 
faced the most serious terrorist threats. India became the world’s ‘most terrorism-
afflicted’ country in 2008. India experienced over 2500 deaths in 2007 alone. In 2008, 
the Mumbai attacks, now known as 26/11 happened at the end of the Bush 
Administration, which I will discuss in the next chapter, stimulated more vocal and 
stronger calls for deepening Indo-US counterterrorism cooperation. 
Counterterrorism needs high level of intelligence to locate the threats and to neutralise 
them. Terror threats are not like traditional wars in which enemies are easy to  locate, 
identify and even predict; they are rather quite unpredictable, with enemies that are 
difficult to locate because they are mobile, highly flexible and spread all over the 
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world.58 Because of these characteristics, after 9/11 intelligence sharing became the 
cornerstone of the counterterrorist effort to meet this new kind of threat.  
4.6 Trade and Economic Cooperation 
Due to ideological and political differences, the US economic relationship with India 
was not at the level it should have been until the end of the 20th century. At the time of 
independence, India as one of the poorest economies and backward countries followed 
the policy of having a centrally planned socialist economic model instead of adopting 
liberal capitalism. One consequence was an absence of meaningful economic 
cooperation with the United States. India then had the Soviet Union and third world 
countries as its trade and economic partners.59 After Clinton’s visit to India, the US 
economic cooperation with New Delhi increased and the Bush Administration 
continued and expanded the cooperation. 
As noted earlier, since 2004 India and the US have been pursuing a ‘strategic 
partnership’ and trade and economic cooperation between them has been a major aspect 
of this kind of engagement. They established an ‘Economic Dialogue’ in 2005 to 
enhance trade and economic cooperation. An important element of the Economic 
Dialogue was the ‘US-India Trade Policy Forum’, responsible for cooperating efforts to 
address policy priorities in trade, services, investment, tariff and non-tariff barriers, 
intellectual property rights, and agriculture.60 At the same time, President Bush regarded 
India as a new economic competitor and said in an address to the 109th Congress on 31 
January 2006: ‘In a dynamic world economy, we are seeing new competitors like China 
and India, and this creates uncertainty, which makes it easier to feed people’s fears’.61 
Figures indicate that the US and India made a significant progress in trade and 
economic cooperation. Bilateral trade in 1990 had increased by 700% by 2008, and 
during the eight years of the Bush Administration it increased almost four times. The 
United States was the largest customer for Indian exports and the second largest source 
of its imports after China. America was also the dominant market for Indian outsourcing 
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services. The balance of trade was in India’s favour. Since India’s population was rising 
and in the next 20-25 years India would be fifth largest consumer market, the US has 
been increasingly interested in investing in India. Foreign investment was not one-way. 
Indians were also investing in the United States. In 2008, Indian investment in the 
United States was over $4.5bn, which was four times the value of Chinese investment.62 
In 2008, the value of US imports from India was $26.1 billion, the value of exports to 
India was $19.2 billion, and trade in private commercial services was more than $13 
billion. About one-seventh of FDI in India came from the US and the major US-based 
companies Microsoft, IBM, Oracle, and Dell have made multibillion-dollar investments 
in India. The increase in trade and economic cooperation was the real manifestation of 
the bond between the United States and India.63 
Every country has trade and economic relationship with other countries and India/US 
trade is not an exception. Although trade relations were not as important as those on 
security, trade did grow steadily during the Bush Administration.  The two countries 
walked extra miles to bring the economic cooperation to the level that it should be 
between the two great economies and intensified their interactions in trade and 
economic cooperation, through economic dialogue. 
4.7 The Nuclear Deal – Background  
The Indo-US Nuclear Pact, signed in 2008 was one of the most important and widely 
debated and deliberated aspects of the US relations with India in the 21st century. The 
United States had a fundamental difference with India on nuclear issues which left a 
bitter legacy in the bilateral relationship over the years.64 Until the end of the Cold War, 
their relationship had never been friendly, and in the post-Cold-War period, India’s 
second nuclear test of 1998, and subsequent US sanctions on India, was a major 
hindrance to improving Indo-US relations.65But in international politics, it is firmly 
believed that ‘friends and enemies are born out of circumstances’, as stated by India’s 
most esteemed strategic guru Kautilya (350-283 BCE) in his famous book Arthashasra. 
This became very much pertinent to the changed Indo-US relations in the present 
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century and the historic nuclear deal. India, the nuclear pariah, and America, the self-
acclaimed global nuclear watchdog, joined hands together. This deal could be regarded 
as a tectonic shift of the foreign policy of the two major democratic powers, one which 
made them strategic partners rather than political adversaries.66 Nicholas Burns, whose 
role and contribution in making the deal was profound, depicted the deal ‘a most 
important progress forward for the US and the high-water mark of US-India dealings 
since 1947’.67 
When Secretary Rice visited India in March 2005, she said: ‘This is my first step as 
Secretary of State in Asia. The President has personally put a lot of time and energy into 
the relationship. The United States has determined that this is going to be a very 
important relationship going forward and we are going to put whatever time we need 
into it’. The intention was to take the Indo-US ties ‘to another level’68 and the nuclear 
deal was the best example of it. 
President Bush and Prime Minister Singh conceived the idea for the deal on 18 July 
2005 in Washington, when they first announced their intentions to enter into a nuclear 
agreement. Their joint statement provided a roadmap for a future strategic partnership 
between them. In fact, this statement was clearly intended as a way of making India a 
global power. India agreed to separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and put 
all of its nuclear facilities and programmes under IAEA safeguards in a phased manner, 
and the US agreed to work and extend full civil nuclear cooperation with India. Indian 
Prime Minister assured the world that his country would assume the same kind of 
responsibilities and practices as any other recognised nuclear state, and promised India’s 
suspension of nuclear testing. The agreement permitted India to gain civil nuclear 
technology from the US and other members of the NSGs, and thus declared India a de 
facto nuclear weapon state.69 It ended India’s nuclear isolation and met its 30-year-long 
cherished dream to be recognised as a nuclear weapon state.70 
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It has been mentioned above that the nuclear issue was the principal obstacle to better 
Indo-US relations. Although previous US administrations had attempted to improve 
relations with India, none was ready to give the ‘go ahead’ on the nuclear issue. Due to 
the changed international scenario and India’s growing potential the Bush 
Administration wanted to take India into its confidence as a global partner,71 and 
therefore broke the deadlock on the nuclear issue and agreed to amend the ‘US laws and 
policies’ to work with friends and allies to facilitate full civil nuclear cooperation with 
India.72 
The Bush administration was successful in this attempt to cultivate friendship with 
India. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Centre in 2005 revealed that President 
Bush was unpopular in many countries in the world but was popular in India and among 
Indians. The survey revealed that 54% of the Indians had faith or confidence that Bush 
will do the right things for the world when in dealing with world affairs.73 Much of this 
sentiment was the result of the fact that the Bush administration consistently followed 
the policy of de-hyphenation while dealing with India.Some US ambassadors, including 
Robert Blackwill, requested and emphasised increased ties with New Delhi and a policy 
of de-hyphenation.  Professor Stephen P. Cohen was also of the opinion that the United 
States should follow distinct policies toward India and Pakistan, rather than just an 
‘India-Pakistan’ policy.74 The Indo-US nuclear deal was the result of the policy of de-
hyphenation. The deal was also considered a beneficial step in setting up India as a 
possible counterweight to the growing Chinese influence and a potential client and job 
creator for the United States in the days ahead.75 The signing of the deal removed the 
major barriers to Indo-US relations, and with this deal they chose to give up their 
mutual distrust in the past, and became strategic partners in the 21st century. 
4.7.1 Implications of the Deal – Benefits for the US and India 
Although the nuclear issue was one of the major obstacles to friendly Indo-US relations, 
the course of the deal was not easy, either in India or in the US. They had to ponder 
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over the deal for a longtime, face opposition at home and criticism abroad. Being 
democratic, both nations had to go through several messy and long processes and the 
deal involved strong diplomatic bargaining. It was anticipated that, after the deal, Indo-
US ties would remain much stronger, as extensive diplomatic efforts had been spent in 
making the deal a reality.76 
Ambassador Quinton said the nuclear deal was created out of a clear understanding on 
the US side that India would never sign the NPT, and that the sanctions imposed on 
India in the past brought no result. The deal was designed to lead India toward greater 
transparency in its nuclear sector, which ultimately would reduce the risk of 
proliferation and nuclear accidents. The US anti-China strategy also played an important 
role in making the deal. It was also thought that it would not escalate the tensions 
between New Delhi and Islamabad.77 
The nuclear deal became the centrepiece of the transformed Indo-US relationship that 
also highlighted other issues, such as military and strategic relations, economic 
cooperation, fighting terrorism, and intelligence sharing, which have been discussed 
above.  The deal did not require New Delhi to give up its nuclear programme, but 
stipulated that further nuclear testing would necessarily lead to Washington stopping 
nuclear trade with India in accordance with US laws.  Richard Lugar, a Republican 
senator, saw this deal as a good incentive and motivation for India to restrain itself from 
future nuclear testing.78 
The deal undoubtedly had global and regional implications. It was obvious that the US 
would no longer treat the two South Asian rivals equally. The deal allowed India to 
purchase five billion dollars of conventional weapons from the United States and 
allowed for the transfer of a PAC-3 to India. The anticipated risk was that Islamabad, 
which was also looking for the same kind of anti-missile system for itself, would be 
unwilling to participate in nuclear confidence-building talks, and thus the deal could 
precipitate an anti-missile race in South Asia. The most vital implication of the deal was 
                                                        
76 Harsh V. Pant, The US-India Nuclear Pact: Policy, Process and Great Power Politics, op. cit., p.3. 
77 Interview with Ambassador Anthony Quainton in Washington DC, 4 December 2012. 
78 ‘Lugar floor statement on the US-India peaceful atomic energy and US-IAEA additional protocol 
implementation act of 2006’, 15 November 2006, http://lugar.senate.gov. 
112 
 
that it was, in an indirect way, pressure on India to carry out a quantitative appraisal of 
how big a nuclear force it actually wished to have.79 
The deal was beneficial for both the countries. The United States needed India and was 
motivated by realpolitik, while for India it ended its 30 years quest for such recognition. 
It provided the opportunity for India to reduce its energy deficit and made Indo-US 
relations more cordial than ever.80 There were a large number of economic, political and 
strategic benefits to the US from the deal. India placed 14 of its 22 nuclear reactors 
under the supervision of the IAEA, and the US companies hoped to receive multi-
billion dollar contracts for reactor building.81 This also meant opening the door to 
thousands of jobs for US citizens.82 
Ensuring the safety and security of the sea-lanes in the Indian Ocean was very important 
to the United States, and India was considered a strategic partner to achieve that. The 
US also needed India on her side to moderate its image as an arrogant power after the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and India could also have a considerable role in 
preventing further sliding the Middle East into anarchy. On top of that, from the 
beginning of the presidential campaign in 2000, the US had the intention to change the 
terms of Indo-US engagement,83 and this nuclear deal was the culmination of that 
intention. 
Militarily, the US benefited greatly from its relations with India. Sea-lanes in the Indian 
Ocean route were for 40% of the world’s oil and commerce and to keep this route 
protected and free, India’s assistance as a major military would be helpful.84 Without 
signing nuclear deal with India, it would not be easy for the US to have India’s 
assistance in protecting sea-lanes routes.  
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Apart from the above benefits, President Bush himself stated the following major gains 
for the US: 
1. The agreement would help strengthen cooperation between India and the US on 
energy, ‘one of the most important challenges of the 21st century’. 
2. The agreement would help promote economic growth and open up an important 
market for American businesses ‘by paving the way for investment in India’s 
civilian nuclear industry for the first time ever’85. 
3. The deal would make it possible for India to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases and improve its environment: ‘By sharing advanced civilian nuclear 
technology, we will help our friend, India, meet its growing demand for energy 
and lower emissions at the same time’. 
4. The pact would keep the United States safe by paving the way for India to join 
the global effort to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.86 
Like the United States, India also received immense benefits from the deal. First and 
foremost was the de facto recognition as a nuclear power state; India was also coming 
close to de jure recognition, without having actually signed the NPT.87 Political benefits 
may also have been significant considerations for India from this deal, as New Delhi 
had been facing sanctions for about 30 years. No sort of nuclear cooperation had been 
possible with India and a number of India’s nuclear scientists were not permitted to 
travel to a number of European countries. The nuclear pact ended these 30 years of 
nuclear isolation for India. After many years of isolation, India now have had the chance 
to contribute to world forums including the UN, WTO, the IMF, and other international 
organisations. This had not been the case since independence. The nuclear deal was 
rejecting the past and unlocking the hidden potential of the future. On top of that, it was 
hoped that Pakistan might take the signal and start a new way of thinking in its policies 
toward India.88 
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Secondly, the deal increased the possibility that India might get a permanent seat on the 
UNSC in the future. India had been trying for a seat in the last few years but had not 
succeeded, and it was not likely to happen in the next 10 years.89 But scholars in 
Washington saw it differently. They argued that when the UN reform movement has 
gained strength, and debate for restructuring takes place, India will qualify for a seat in 
the reformed UNSC in part90 because the deal made India a responsible nuclear state 
and a major world power. 
The economic benefit for India was huge. India was in urgent need of finances to build 
its infrastructure and the source of capital could be United States and Europe. Although 
the US and Europe were pleased to send capital to China, the US avoided exporting 
manufacturing technology or high-technology capital goods to China and trade with 
India in these areas was made possible by the deal.91 
India also received significant benefits in the technological field. Before the deal, due to 
the sanctions, India was not allowed to buy supercomputers for weather forecasting. 
When sanctions were lifted completely, India was able to make such purchases, and 
Indian scientists travelled freely and participated in international conferences where 
they were denied before.  In short, the deal contributed in a substantive way to India’s 
overall growth.92 
4.7.2 Debate in India and in the US 
There were a wide range of debates and reactions to the nuclear deal in India, with some 
in favour and some against. Debate existed amongst political leaders, parties, strategists 
and even within the scientific communities. Opposition political leaders in India 
considered the deal not in India’s national interests. They argued that the deal posed a 
serious threat to maintaining the country’s independent foreign policy and even argued 
that the independence and sovereignty of India had been sold out. Noted political leader, 
Yaswant Singh, believed that the agreement made India subservient and submissive to 
the US as the deal required India to follow US domestic law, the Hyde Act, which was 
                                                        
89Hari Sud, ‘India-US Nuclear Deal – The Benefits’, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 1740, 20 
March , 2006.  
90Interview with Ambassador Anthony Quainton, Dr.Satu Limaye, Professor Deepa Ollapally in 
Washington DC, 4, 3, 6 (respectively) December 2012. 
91 Interview with Stephen P. Cohen in Washington DC, 7 December 2012. 
92Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Implications for Non-Proliferation’, South Asian Strategic 
Stability Institute Research Report 10, February 2008, p. 14. 
115 
 
humiliating for India93 and humiliating for any sovereign country. Some analysts 
believed that the condition of placing India’s nuclear reactor under IAEA safeguards 
was an attack on India’s sovereignty. A prominent communist leader, the chief of a 
leading communist party, Prakash Karat, said that, as a result of the pact, ‘India would 
be locked into a strategic tie-up which would have a long-lasting impact on India’s 
foreign policy and strategic autonomy’.94  Not only the opposition leaders but some of 
the top leaders of the ruling party were dubious of the pact. Despite strong opposition 
within and outside the government, India went for the deal so as to end its long-time 
nuclear isolation.95 
Many believed that the United States had its own agenda behind the deal and it wanted 
to gain certain strategic goals in the name of helping India.  Firstly, the US wanted to 
get India on its side to carry out regional and global non-proliferation goals. Secondly, 
America wanted to make its presence felt in the Asian theatre, and finally and probably 
most important target was to rejuvenate US moribund nuclear industry and make huge 
economic gains96 through the creation of new jobs. A Member of Parliament in India 
said that: 
Since 1979, after an accident in Pennsylvania, the US power industry has been paralysed. In 
order to rejuvenate the power sector there, they had made a calculation. The calculation is that 
over the years they would be getting an opportunity to exploit at least 40 percent of the nuclear 
energy sector here in India. It will create employment to the extent of 2,70,000 and there will be 
to the extent 20 billion dollars of trade.97 
There were also debates on technical issues. The Department of Atomic Energy (DEA) 
was deeply concerned about India’s technological independence, and expressed its 
concern that India might lose its independent technological research to such a nuclear 
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bargain. So the deal was a serious threat in eroding the autonomy of India’s own 
research authorities, which ultimately put India in vulnerable situation.98 
Condoleezza Rice once said that those reactions and negative thoughts from both sides, 
especially from India, almost caused the deal to fail.99 On the other hand, many others 
regarded the deal as a very welcome change in Indo-US relations and to the benefit of 
both nations. A group of intelligentsia considered the deal a great strategic gain for 
India, given that it ended India’s nuclear isolation era, gave India a long-awaited 
acknowledgement as a de facto nuclear state, offered a new energy source, and gave 
potential opportunities for international cooperation in advanced technology.100 
K. Subrahmanyam, the modern strategic guru of India, enthusiastically advocated the 
deal, arguing that India should grasp the deal to ‘demolish the technology apartheid 
erected around India’. He even viewed the deal as a welcome ‘acceptance of India’ 
within the broader nuclear non-proliferation regime, though not within the NPT.101 The 
deal could be considered the finest example of how the US was trying to incorporate 
India into the international non-proliferation framework although India was not made a 
member of the NSG in spite of US’ efforts to make it happen.102 
In the United States, the deal was considered in a mainly positive light. Scholars and 
analysts in Washington believed that the Bush Administration’s strategy was to 
cultivate a strategic partnership with India to take it to a higher plane vis-à-vis China.103 
Analysts also saw the deal in relation to the non-proliferation regime. There were two 
distinct group of analysts, those optimistic and those pessimistic. The optimists believed 
the deal strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime, while the pessimists 
believed that the deal would have a negative impact. Others within the optimists, known 
as the ‘cautious optimists’, viewed the deal as a positive development but wished to 
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develop some sort of criterion so there was no ‘domino effect’ in relation to China and 
Pakistan.104 
The US denied that its partnership with India was directed against any specific country 
or region, although a number of scholars believed that the US was developing its 
strategic relationship with India because it had China in mind and that India had the 
similar objective.105 The US was still following the policy of looking for allies and 
friends that could be helpful in promoting its interests, and viewed India as an emerging 
international partner in dealing with a future Chinese threat.106 
Many politicians in the US criticised the deal, saying that signing the deal meant 
punching a gaping hole into the non-proliferation regime. The nuclear lobby group had 
opposed any deal since the 2005 framework, and tried hard to resist it. When they failed 
to stop the move, they changed their strategy and campaigned against the deal within 
Congress. Only the very strong negotiation by the very capable negotiator Nicholas 
Burns saved the deal. But the nuclear lobby group tried their best to foil the agreement 
until it took its final shape in Congress. With the whole-hearted support, and the efforts 
made, by President Bush and Condoleezza Rice, the deal was finally signed but still 
awaited implementation.107 
It became crystal clear from the discussion that the deal was not only about nuclear 
energy for India, but it had a number of other motivations behind it. Firstly, since the 
21st century was going to be an Asian century, where India would be one of the major 
powers along with China, Russia and Japan, it was strategically imperative for the US to 
have strengthened a partnership with India. Secondly, since the United States wished to 
take the Indo-US relationship to a higher plane, the deal was vital as the continuing 
technology controls placed on India would be a major stumbling block to achieving this 
goal.108 
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4.7.3 Critical Assessment of the Nuclear Deal 
The Indo-US nuclear deal was the reality of the time as India needed to secure its 
energy and the US wanted to develop a strategic partnership with India. The deal 
benefited both nations. Observers in different corners of the world, however, evaluated 
the deal in different ways.  No doubt this deal, like many others, has its negative and 
positive impacts on the international and regional sphere. The agreement helped the 
countries meet their energy demands in an efficient way but there always remained the 
danger that a future Indian administration would divert or redirect the civilian facilities 
to nuclear weapons development.  Such innate danger could pose a potential threat to 
regional and international peace and security.109 
The US was subject to severe criticism because of the nuclear deal with India. Firstly, it 
was argued that the US was enacting a double-standard with regards to the NPT and its 
decision to favour India. The deal breached the obligations provided by the NPT, in that 
the US would transfer nuclear materials to India which was neither a signatory to the 
NPT nor an officially recognised nuclear state.110 Many critics criticised the US for 
getting India into the international nuclear regime through the back door, though this 
criticism itself was also the subject of criticism because Indian policy was always found 
to be consistent with the NPT. Iran was believed to have a nuclear weapons programme 
despite being a signatory to the NPT, while North Korea withdrew from the treaty when 
it decided to develop a nuclear weapons programme, but India remained consistent in 
regard to the NPT. India since the beginning refused to sign the NPT, saying it was 
discriminatory. 
Secondly, the deal set a precedent for other countries such as Pakistan, Iran, Israel, and 
North Korea to ask for similar deals. Thirdly, there would be a demand from the Islamic 
world to have a similar deal with Pakistan as it was the only country in the Muslim 
world that possessed nuclear bombs. It would also naturally lead to a nuclear arms race 
in the South Asian region. Israel was believed to have cited the Indo-US deal in seeking 
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changes to the NSG rules and regulations and in seeking help in constructing its first 
nuclear power plant in the Negev desert.111 
There is no denying that the deal opened new windows on to Indo-US cooperation, but 
simultaneously it posed a critical challenge to India’s non-aligned character and its 
leadership in the NAM. It has perhaps undermined India’s strong stance on the forum as 
a leading and founding member and probably caused India to lose its prominence within 
the movement.112 Many political leaders (including former Prime Minsiter Atal Bihari 
Bajpayee, former Deputy Prime Minsiter L.K. Advani, former External Affairs Minister 
Yashwant Sinha, Bharat Karnad, Arun Shourie, and a number of parliamentarians113) 
claimed that the deal made India subservient to the United States by becoming a 
political pawn and losing its strategic sovereignty. The Hyde Act114 rules imposed on 
India also weakened India’s strong position in the international arena as a large country. 
There was the possibility that the deal would escalate tensions between India and 
Pakistan significantly but this has not happened.115 
The deal was very significant to India, as India fully understood that it could not play its 
expected role in the region and in the international sphere without having the US on its 
side. India believed that only the US could restrain Pakistan’s adventurism and contain 
the increasing Chinese influence in the region.116 A strong bilateral tie was as important 
for the US as it was for India. Richard Boucher said: ‘Our landmark nuclear deal 
expanding defence ties, and our consultations on developments in South Asia all testify 
to this’.117 
Theoretically, the deal was not just between India and the United States but between 
India and NSG countries, and thus when the deal was approved by the US Congress, 
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India signed nuclear cooperation deals with Russia, Canada and France as well.118 In 
fact, the deal was the logical conclusion of desired Indo-US relations as framed by 
President Bush and Prime Minister Singh. It was a great opportunity for India to come 
out from a regional theatre to the high-table as a major world power, and thereby shape 
the Asian security contour and play its role in international sphere.119 Finally, this deal 
was a lasting incentive for India to refrain from any future nuclear tests, and to work 
with the US in stopping proliferation.  
4.8 Conclusion 
President George W. Bush left office as one of the most controversial presidents in US 
modern history. He was known as the ‘war president’ and was highly divisive.120 He left 
a number of legacies for his successor, including the Iraq and Afghan wars, which I will 
discuss in the next chapters. During his two terms, the United States lost legitimacy in 
the international sphere because of unilateral actions.121 Bush was not interested in 
consensus in the international agenda and became very unpopular at home and abroad. 
Although the United States under the Bush Administration failed to earn a strong 
reputation in the international arena, it made a success story in developing Indo-US 
relations. No one could have imagined that the Bush Administration was destined to 
have such a strong impact on Indo-US relations, though Condoleezza Rice had said it 
was the US’s intention to develop a new kind of relationship with India and change the 
terms of Indo-US engagement. The Bush Administration introduced the policy of de-
hyphenation and successfully delinked India and Pakistan in its foreign policy.122 
In fact, the Indo-US relationship was positive right from India’s second nuclear test in 
1998, though the US imposed sanction immediately after the test. Simultaneously, the 
US was seeking a strategic partnership with India which was subject to severe criticism 
in India, with critics arguing that a close relationship with the US was impossible while 
the US was imposing sanctions on India. The Bush Administration in his first term gave 
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up this kind of approach and took an entirely opposite policy by the end his second 
term, lifting restrictions on nuclear trade and finally making the unprecedented nuclear 
deal with India.123This time, the US was subject to criticism, and India was dubious 
about real US intentions until the nuclear deal was finally signed. Gopalkrisnan, the ex-
Chairman of the Indian Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, said that ‘Americans cannot 
be trusted’ and labelled his colleagues who went along with them as ‘stupid analysts’.124 
Indo-US relations under the Bush Administration reached at an all-time high. The two 
countries became engaged on greater levels of cooperation in a wide range of fields 
including the economy, strategy,  diplomatic spheres, defence supplies, agriculture, 
people-to-people contact, student exchanges and of course the nuclear deal.125 Bilateral 
relations between them appeared to be promising particularly after the 2005 decision of 
the Bush Administration to pursue an energy deal with India, facilitating and easing 
improved Indo-US relations.126 President Bush summed up the Indo-US relationship in 
this way, ‘India and the United States are separated by half the globe. Yet, today our 
two nations are closer than ever before’.127 
Although the Indo-US relations improved in many different areas, the nuclear 
agreement was the centrepiece of their relationships. It provided a fundamentally 
different base for improving the relationship. This deal rewrote the rules and regulations 
of the global nuclear regime and the Bush Administration modified the previous US 
policy by acknowledging India as a responsible nuclear state.128 The deal was a 
‘sweetheart’ deal for India.  It was a paradigm shift in US policy toward India which 
ended 60 years of resentment and misunderstanding.129 It benefitted both states 
immensely, and put Indo-US relations in a unique position. 
Progress was undeniable in the Bush years but continuing progress could never be 
guaranteed and the question remained, as ever with a change of administration, whether  
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a new president would seek, as so many before had done, to reverse his predecessor’s 
policies.  The specifics of the US relationship with India would depend not only on 
factors relating to the two countries’ characteristics but also on the broader evolution of 
the international system and the grand strategy of the new president in adapting the US 
role in the world to it. An understanding of the conceptual thinking of the new Obama 
administration is therefore essential precursor to consideration of development of the 
bilateral relationship and the following chapter addresses that thinking. 
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CHAPTER – FIVE 
The Obama Administration: Conceptual Thinking behind the 
Policy 
5.1 Introduction 
Barack Obama took office in 2009 with a promise of change and to be different from his 
predecessors, something that almost all presidents promise do. The distinctiveness of 
Obama lay in his desire to imbue ‘hope’ into his idea of ‘change’.1 It was widely 
perceived in peoples’ mind at home and abroad from Obama’s speeches and messages 
during his campaign that his messages of hope and optimism would replace the politics 
of fear that had guided American foreign policy since the horrific assaults of September 
11. The election of Obama as the US president provided an opportunity to reshape the 
US’s controversial, unsettled, and unpopular policies pursued by the Bush 
Administration. The sense of anticipation was strong and was heard by other countries 
as Obama was greeted by a wave of great enthusiasm worldwide.2  
Before taking the presidency, Obama had little time to concentrate on international 
affairs and hardly made any comments on international issues except the Iraq war.3 But 
after assuming office he initiated a highly ambitious drive to redefine US views on the 
changed world of the 21st century, and attempted to reconnect US policy the unfolding 
contemporary context.4 Obama assumed office at a difficult time, facing intimidating 
domestic and foreign crises and he tried to set a new course in meeting the crises and 
map a new picture in his foreign policy. He once said: ‘I am inheriting a world that 
could blow up any minute in half a dozen ways, and I will have some powerful but 
limited and perhaps even dubious tools to keep it from happening’.5 
The most important goal of Obama’s foreign policy was to restore US moral supremacy 
and legitimacy, which President Bush had lacked. During Obama’s presidential 
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campaign, he repeatedly said that he would put immense emphasis on multilateralism in 
his foreign policy, in contrast to his predecessor.6 Obama wanted to reshape the 
government, and declared as much, with political slogans such as ‘Change We Can 
Believe In’ and ‘Yes, We Can!’7 His promise to shut the Guantanamo Bay, investigate 
the interrogation methods undertaken by the CIA, and stop the torture during the 
interrogations were a few steps in meeting the hopes of national and international public 
opinion.8 
President Obama set out his vision through his rhetoric and actions, which drew a clear 
contrast between realism and pragmatism and inspired the reappearance of a more 
enlightened America on the world stage.9 The purpose of the current chapter is to depict 
Obama’s conceptual thinking on foreign policy and how he tried to be different from his 
predecessor in shaping the world with his ideas and principles, starting with an analysis 
of the challenges Obama faced on the eve of taking the presidency. 
5.2 The Environment/Challenges Facing Obama in 2008  
During Obama’s presidential campaign, and as president-elect in 2008, the US faced the 
deepest economic recession since the great depression of the 1930s. It is clear from US 
history that almost no president entered into office without inheriting a conflict, and 
Obama was no exception. The challenge he faced that the US was waging two major 
wars – Iraq and Afghanistan. Other major challenges posed were the ongoing War on 
Terror, issues surrounding Iran, North Korea, future relations with Russia, policy 
toward China, the peace process in the Middle East, climate change, energy, and 
disease.10 
The American people had become exhausted with the two terms of the Bush 
Administration, and expected that Obama would transform US policy. Obama’s 
campaign rhetoric excited the US public, and gave hope at home and abroad. During 
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campaign, Obama said: ‘I truly believe that the day I’m inaugurated, not only will the 
country look at itself differently, but the world will look at America differently’.11 For 
Obama, President Bush was not able to realise how the changed international political 
scenario and globalisation had remade and reset global political systems. He understood 
how international political power was not concentrated on any particular centre or 
group, but rather it has become diffused, generating many new kinds of problems. To 
address such problems, the US could not do it alone; it needed allies, partners and 
friends to achieve its goals and interests.12 
5.2.1 Bush’s Legacy: Obama’s War (Afghan and Iraq) 
The incoming Obama Administration faced difficult challenges, some of which were 
unimaginable at the time of President Bush’s inauguration in 2001. As noted above, 
throughout US history the incumbent executive has almost always inherited a conflict 
from their predecessor, a phenomenon that has become more evident after World War II 
with the increasing US involvement in international affairs. In line with this long 
historical legacy, Barack Obama inherited two inconclusive wars – Afghan and Iraq. 
Historically, presidents who assume office in the middle of a conflict become either 
successors or innovators, depending on their role in the conflict. A successor is someone 
who continues the same policies and military strategy of his predecessor, while an 
innovator is someone who tries to adopt new policies and make a dramatic change in 
tactics and strategies. With regard to the Iraq war, Obama became a successor, 
following his predecessor’s approach, while in the Afghan war, he generally became an 
innovator, though with some elements of being a successor.13 
On 29 November 2009, the National Security Adviser released a ‘Memorandum of 
Principles’ regarding the Afghanistan and Pakistan strategy. The document said that the 
US goal in Afghanistan was to deny safe haven to Al Qaeda, and the US, along with the 
people of Afghanistan and other international partners, would endeavour to defeat the 
Taliban insurgency, and build Afghan capacities to secure their country and govern 
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themselves, thus creating the condition for the US to reduce its forces starting by July 
2011.14 
From the very beginning, Obama viewed the two wars differently, seeing the Afghan 
war as a war of necessity and the Iraq war as a war of choice. During his senate 
campaign debate against Alan Keyes Obama made the following statement on October 
12, 2004: ‘I have always thought that we did the right thing in Afghanistan. My only 
concern with respect to Afghanistan was that we diverted our attention from 
Afghanistan in terms of moving into Iraq and I think we would have done a better job 
stabilizing that country than we have in providing assistance to the Afghani people’.15 
On 3 June 2007, in another debate at Saint Anselm College, Obama expressed the 
importance of the war in Afghanistan to defeating and eliminating the future threats of 
terror against the US. He emphasised the importance of focusing on the Afghan war to 
root out Al Qaeda, and argued that failing to do so would be inviting another terror 
attack on US soil. On 4 May 2008, in an interview with NBC, Obama said the US 
needed more troops in Afghanistan and needed to concentrate on reconstructing 
Afghanistan, as Al Qaeda had become stronger since 9/11, and was growing in 
capability. He also said that his administration would be more focussed on Afghanistan 
once he was elected as president.16 His emphasis on Afghanistan became clearer when 
he visited Afghanistan in July 2008 in his first foreign tour as candidate. During the 
visit, he described the situation as urgent, and argued it needed to be a central focus of 
US policy. He did not hesitate to go further, and argue the biggest mistake of the US 
was not to finish the job in Afghanistan.  
When Obama came to power, he said that Afghanistan would be given priority as he 
had promised during his campaign.17 His administration undertook a reassessment of 
US policy toward Afghanistan twice. The first time was in March 2009, when additional 
troops were sent, and the second was in autumn of the same year. At the same time, 
however, Obama realised that military efforts alone were not going to be enough, and 
no political solution was possible without the Taliban. The Obama Administration 
should also be credited with the fact that, from the beginning, they understood that the 
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fates of Afghanistan and Pakistan were interrelated18 and therefore he said: ‘I want to 
get Afghanistan and Pakistan right’.19 
Obama had opposed the Iraq war from the beginning and called it a war of choice. 
During his campaign he reiterated his strong opposition to the war, which by then had 
turned into a bloody civil war. Obama consistently maintained that the Iraq war was a 
distraction from the main concern of Afghanistan, and must be brought to an end. In an 
article for Foreign Affairs titled ‘To Renew American leadership in the World,’ Obama 
wrote that since the Iraq war was a diversion from the fight against the perpetrators who 
were responsible for 9/11, it must be brought to a responsible end so the US can refocus 
attention on the broader Middle East. He also said that the US should not impose a 
military solution on an on-going civil war between two religious sects, but rather the US 
military should leave the country, put pressure on the conflicting groups to reach a 
lasting political solution, and declare openly that the US does not seek a permanent base 
on their soil.20 
After coming into office, President Obama requested a thorough assessment of US 
policy in Iraq and less than a month later, he announced its conclusions, demonstrating 
a realist assessment. The Obama Administration clearly showed its reluctance to expand 
US involvement, and declared the need for a total withdrawal by December 2011,21 
although the actual withdrawal was delayed as it required a series of consultations with 
military personnel and had to consider Iraqi security questions and political issues.22 
Obama’s approach to Iraq War was not directed by a single factor. It was the result of a 
combination of his principles of multilateralism, his view on Islam and the need to 
mitigate the anger of the Muslim world. The US relative decline of power which meant 
that the US was not in a position to win the war was a motivating factor of Obama’s 
approach to the Iraq War. 
Apart from the economic recession and two major wars, President Obama inherited a 
number of other legacies. He inherited persistent and extremely important conflicts in 
the Middle East – specifically the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – on which there had been 
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very little progress, nuclear conflicts with Iran and North Korea, the increasingly hostile 
attitude of the Muslim world toward the US, and an ambiguous relationship with 
Russia. These were coupled with the distrust many Americans felt toward most 
multilateral initiatives which the country had committed to, such as on climate change 
and disarmament.23 
5.2.2 US Decline 
US decline has been widely discussed, though the idea is not a new phenomenon, 
indeed it has been an abiding concern and a source of recurrent academic discussion at 
intervals since the early days of the Cold War. At the beginning of the Century Michael 
Cox was moved to ask why we need to discuss decline again. His answer was derived, 
first, from international relations theory, which suggested that every imperial or 
hegemonic system had built in contradictions that gave it a limited lifespan.24 Paul 
Kennedy’s concept of ‘Imperial Overstretch’ had articulated this perspective in the 
1970s. The other factor was the factual evidence that the dominance the US had enjoyed 
at the end of the 20th century was being reduced, whether measured by military power, 
economic prosperity, moral legitimacy or more nebulous factors such as will to power. 
This left open the question of whether decline was absolute or relative.  The latter was 
easier to demonstrate because the bar was lower in that US power, strengths and 
capacities only had to decrease relative to other powers whose capacities across the 
spectrum of international capability were rising. 
Military defeat of the dominant power or some other apocalyptic incident was not 
necessary for the decline thesis to hold.  It was more likely to be a gradual process, 
imperceptible for a time until some incident or event made it evident. It is more likely to 
occur when other players in the international system start using the rules of the 
international order set by the hegemon more effectively than their creator, or,  in more 
extreme cases, another power supplants the hegemon by developing a new set of rules 
for international engagement and becoming dominant itself.25 
By the time Obama’s presidency was imminent Cox’s view was that, although the US 
was  in trouble, due to failures in Iraq and Afghanistan abroad and slow economic 
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growth at home  it was not about to fall from its hegemonic perch.26 America’s position 
was not remotely as weak as Britain’s after the World War II. Like many others, he 
accepted that the idea of relative decline was compatible with continuing vitality in 
economic size, military strength, and soft power.27 The key was not some inherent 
weakness in the US but what Zakaria in 2009, at the beginning of the Obama era and at 
a time when the decline debate was again getting into full swing, termed, ‘the rise of the 
rest’.28 Leaving aside  whether decline was a useful or misleading29 word to describe 
what was happening, the idea that there was a power shift in the international system 
away from the West continued to gain currency  in Obama’s first term.30 Adam Quinn 
quoted Mahbubani in the latter’s article in Foreign Affairs saying that power was 
moving from West to East, not because of the result of the weakness of the West but the 
increasingly growing capacities of the countries of Asia. Mahbubhani argued that the 
US was losing some of its power to influence or affect others and this will continue in 
the future, and so its influence will be less in the years to come than it enjoyed in the 
past.31 
Joseph Nye later countered this by arguing that ‘decline’ was a psychological notion 
whose greatest risk was that it might become self-fulfilling. This anxiety was cyclical: 
when in 1957 the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, people started saying that America 
was finished; in 1973, during the oil embargo, people again said that it was the end of 
America, as they did when the lessons of defeat in Vietnam were absorbed; in the 
1980s, during the Reagan period when America went through an economic transition, 
people saw America fading before the economic challenge of Japan;  and, in 1985 when 
the dollar was facing challenges and the European Union was emerging as a potential 
superpower, talk of American decline raised its head yet again . Interestingly, in early 
2000, many people believed that America could do anything anywhere in the world, but 
by 2008 with the financial crisis in full swing people started saying again the end of 
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American hegemony had arrived. Nye firmly believes that the US is not in absolute 
decline but its hegemony is simply a decrease relative to the rise of others.32 But by  end 
of Obama’s first term Cox was arguing that, although relative, this time the decline was  
‘real’, not just a psychological, anxiety-driven construct.33 
Returning to the period of Obama’s election, Robert Kagan argued that the world was 
still ‘unipolar’, with the US remaining the only superpower but that a struggle for power  
and influence had returned as key characteristics in the international system34. It was 
also important not to juxtapose this position with a view of the past that exaggerated US 
influence. Losing China to communism, invasion of South Korea by North Korea, 
testing of Hydrogen bomb by the USSR, defeat in Vietnam were examples in the second 
half of the 20thcentury where the United States could not manage events.35 Wallerstein 
argued that America had been a declining hegemonic power since the 970s, and its 
response to the terrorist attacks on US soil has simply accelerated this decline. He 
argued that the main objective of US foreign policy, from Nixon to Clinton, was to slow 
down its decline, and for this, they all followed the policy of ‘soft multilateralism’.36 
For him, it should not be a question whether the United States was declining, rather it 
should be whether it can adopt policies to manage the speed of its descent leaving 
minimum damage to itself and to the world.37 
Although Wallerstein was writing from a critical left wing stance his perspective was 
shared by the neo-conservative intellectual driving force behind the Bush administration 
who called for a break with soft multilateralism. For them American decline did not 
emanate from structural change in the international system but from weak leadership. 
They favoured ‘unilateral’ stand to restore US hegemonic power through an 
unrestrained demonstration of military strength.38 This idea that a foreign policy based 
on multilateralism was nothing more a mechanism for the management of US Decline 
was an accusation that would be raised again and be levied at Obama, as we shall see.  
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We should also note that the US’s own intelligence assessment predicted that America 
will be less dominant by 2025.39 Whether it would be replaced by another hegemonic 
power, presumably China was an open question, since China faced many challenges 
itself, as was the length of time such a transition would take.40 The question of 
American decline increasingly took on a Chinese focus and reassessments of the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of the US and China.41 If the argument is that fundamental 
strength comes from the internal organisation  of society and democracy, the rule of 
law, liberty, equality, freedom of expression, and popular sovereignty, are the strongest 
basis, then China will be found wanting.42 But perhaps the most important sign of the 
continuing strength of the US is that people across the world still want to be American 
and very few aspire to become Chinese. Brooks and Wohlforth, like many analysts who 
believed US was not in an absolute decline, argued that America will not be ‘replaced as 
the sole superpower for a very long time’ and they were confident of sustainability of 
the US lead for many more years.43 
The Obama Administration pointed to the real difference between the American 
position in international sphere with that it occupied in the mid-1990s when talking 
about US decline in the 1990s sounded slightly an absurd. The rise of China 
economically and militarily, and its aspiration and potential to fight for its interests in 
the international arena, challenged US hegemony. US economic leadership is being 
challenged by key BRIC rivals and economically strong states like Germany are 
overtaking the US as an industrial exporter.44 
Whatever the niceties of the academic debate Obama came to power when the rise of 
China was beginning to challenge US hegemony, its economic ascendancy was being 
threatened by rapid growth in the BRIC countries and other emerging powers, and by 
allies like Germany. President Bush came to recognise these trends and President 
Obama recognised even more clearly that America had limited resources to meet the 
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requirements of the sole superpower status.45 It therefore became his task to reformulate 
US global leadership in a world of US relative decline. His path was evident from many 
early policy choices. He avoided confrontation in dealings with major powers like 
China and Russia believing in particular that Chinese power and influence was 
something to be managed not confronted. He sought to de-escalate the US confrontation 
with Iran and sought constructive ties both with it and with the Muslim world at large. 
In addition the decision was made to try and to encourage others countries to step up 
and share the burdens of global governance.46 Consequently, Obama became a leading 
advocate of replacing the G8 with the G20, and of increasing the presence of rising 
economies in the multilateral economic forum.47 
Facing a context of relative decline, Obama judged that the United States either had to 
adjust to the changed new post hegemonic world where it would remain no longer the 
pre-eminent power, or to resist these trends and risk faster decline by confronting the 
inevitable.48 He was well suited a policy of what his critics termed ‘managed decline’ 
but which he saw as maximising US influence in a changed world by minimising 
conflicts and avoiding confrontations, or as one commentator put it, mastering  the art 
of declining politely.49 
One implication was clear: if Obama’s strategy was to work, emerging powers would 
have to be seen as potential partners in maintaining the liberal international order, rather 
than enemies seeking to overthrow it. As the leader of that order it was incumbent on 
the US create partnerships and of the candidates among the emerging powers who were 
best suited for this role, India was at the head of the queue50. 
5.3 Obama’s Foreign Policy - Views and Vision 
Since Obama did not develop clear guidelines on foreign policy that could warrant the 
name of an ‘Obama Doctrine’, unlike most of his predecessors, it is not easy to define 
his foreign policy precisely. Professor Stephen Cohen praised Obama for not having 
developed a doctrine, whereas others have considered it evidence of his lack of foreign 
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policy vision. As a non-doctrinaire kind of president, Obama had the opportunity to be 
flexible in dealing with new issues.51 
Upon taking the presidency, Obama ushered in a new global order and based his foreign 
policy on three pillars, the first of which was the need for a changed relationship with 
emerging powers in Asia and particularly China. The second pillar was nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation, and third was a transformed relationship between 
the United States and the Muslim world, turning Islamic countries into positive partners 
and replacing conflict with cooperation.52 
The United States was being blamed for the global financial crisis by the people of the 
most economically developed countries, especially in Western Europe53, and was 
severely criticised for the Iraq war conducted in the name of the War on Terror. So it 
became an important objective of the Obama Administration to regain and refurbish the 
US image abroad. Another important aspect of Obama’s foreign policy focus was his 
emphasis on diplomacy, and his use of soft power over military power. During his 
campaign, he made it clear that he would look to open a dialogue with those countries 
generally hostile to US policy. He said: ‘I do think that it’s important for the US not just 
to talk to its friends, but also to talk to its enemies’.54 In his inaugural address, he 
showed a significantly different approach from that of his predecessor to international 
affairs. He said: ‘to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the 
grandest capitals to the small village where my father was born: know that America is a 
friend of each nation and every man, woman, and child who seeks a future of peace and 
dignity, and that we are ready to lead once more’.55 
Obama’s foreign policy objective was not regime change in the name of democracy-
promotion abroad.56 His new approach to foreign policy was not based on a kind of 
abstract moral principle or on an absolute military force but was based on building a 
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real kind of relationship with other nations based on shared and common interests.57 
With this in mind I will now look in more detail at the main principles of Obama’s 
foreign policy. 
5.3.1 Multilateralism 
Multilateralism means adopting a collective, coordinated and a unified approach or 
action to any international problem. It refers to a collective response among three or 
more states to a particular situation of conflict or confrontation, instead of acting alone. 
Ikenberry defined multilateralism as it ‘involves the coordination of relations among 
three or more states according to a set of rules or principles’.58 In other words, it is a 
commitment to acting in consultation with others where international institutions are 
regarded as vehicles in pursuing the goal. It is quite contrary to unilateralism, which 
refers to acting one country alone, no matter whether it is out of necessity or choice.  
Multilateralism and unilateralism are two opposite ends of a spectrum.59 
Multilateralism in US foreign policy has been a defining strategy since the Second 
World War, and was followed by every administration, whether Democrat or 
Republican. The US multilateral approach has been seen in many areas of international, 
either from NATO in military security or the WTO in trade policy.  The Bush 
Administration proved an exception, and brought huge damage to the US on the 
international scene.60 It is also important to note here that the Bush Administration did 
not simply abandon multilateralism,61 but rather was inclined to prefer ‘minilateralism’ 
over multilateralism, meaning he preferred to make a multilateral moves that were not 
necessarily authorised by international organisations. It is an operation under the direct 
guidance of a single country where participating countries have hardly any say or role in 
defining the priorities or objectives of the operation. It was a mix of unilateralism and 
multilateralism which could be regarded as more unilateral. In some cases, the Bush 
Administration pursued strategic multilateralism, not an ideological multilateralism, or 
not multilateralism in its real sense.   
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Obama’s multilateral approach, however, was more in line with real multilateralism, 
meaning an operation must be authorised by an international institution or community, 
where each member has a clear and loud voice in determining and defining objectives 
and strategies in achieving the defined objectives.62 Obama said repeatedly during his 
campaign that his foreign policy would be characterised by a multilateral approach, and 
promised a re-engagement of the US with the world. Multilateralism, partnership in 
international relations, and common security interests became part and parcel of his 
pragmatic and realistic foreign policy.63 Obama was of the opinion that diplomacy, not 
fear, was the only means with which to build such partnership and alliances. Obama 
said that ‘We can neither retreat from the world nor try to bully it into submission. We 
must lead the world, by deed and example’.64 
On assuming the presidency, Obama actively tried to counter the negative image of the 
previous administration’s unilateral actions. Obama’s commitment to multilateralism 
was demonstrated further in his address to a joint Congressional session in 2009. He 
said: ‘a new era of engagement has begun. For we know that America cannot meet the 
threats of this century alone, but the world cannot meet them without America’.65 
Obama also said that there was a time, though those days are now over, that Roosevelt, 
Churchill, and Stalin could shape the world in one meeting. Addressing the UN General 
Assembly, President Obama said: ‘Those who used to chastise America for acting alone 
in the world cannot now stand by and wait for America to solve the world’s problems 
alone’.66 
Obama’s strong stance on multilateralism was the result of the US invasion in Iraq in 
2003 which was a ‘coalition of the willing’. The main purpose of this multilateral 
approach was to make use of international institutions and involve the international 
community. When Obama came to office, the question was which institutions would 
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Obama prioritise, and with which powers would he work closely? The administration 
advocated a stronger United Nations, a global NATO, and network diplomacy.67 
Obama championed multilateralism for a number of reasons. The first and main reason 
was that Obama wanted to reverse the unilateralist policy of the Bush Administration 
which reduced US popularity in the world. The people of the United States wanted a 
clear change in foreign policy. Citizens were in favour of a fundamental redirection of 
US foreign policy from that of President Bush’s unilateralism to multilateralism. The 
rise of China and India suggested a shift in the international system – a shift from 
unipolarity to multipolarity.68 Obama also wanted to minimise the risk for the US when 
attempting to solve international problems. Finally, he firmly believed that 
multilateralism was key to the success of every president including Roosevelt, Truman, 
and Kennedy. They all were successful both in protecting their citizens and in 
expanding opportunity for the generations to come.69 
5.3.2 Non-proliferation – Tenets of Obama’s Nuclear Policy 
Barack Obama believed that the world should abolish nuclear weapons to make the 
world a safe and secure place to live. He sought to strengthen the NPT for this purpose. 
This was a combination of idealism and pragmatism based on American strategic 
considerations. Obama became the first US president since the Second World War who 
took the issue of nuclear elimination seriously and formulated US policy to reduce its 
reliance on nuclear weapons.70 
Unlike George Bush, ‘rogue states’ was not considered the foremost security threat by 
Obama, who instead considered the biggest security threat to be the risk that terrorists 
might acquire a crude nuclear device. Al Qaeda, for example, made clear that it would 
bring ‘Hiroshima’ to the US. Obama considered this a serious and urgent threat to the 
security not only of the US but of the entire world. The spread of nuclear devices, 
materials and technology to the hands of terrorists could bring more catastrophe than 
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9/11. Obama therefore recognised that the United States must confront this with its 
utmost consideration to renew its leadership in the world.71 
Obama used different platforms to articulate his policy of nuclear non-proliferation. The 
official stance of the Obama Administration toward US nuclear policy was spelt out in 
his Prague speech in April 2009. He said that, the existence of thousands of nuclear 
weapons was the legacy of five decades of the Cold War. Although the Cold War was 
over, those weapons still existed and this increased the risk of nuclear attack, as more 
countries possessed those dangerous weapons and testing continued. He further said the 
chances of spreading the technology in making those weapons were very high; terrorists 
were committed to have one either by stealing or purchasing from the black market. In 
the speech, he declared that his aim was to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials, break 
up nuclear black markets, and detect and seize materials in transit across the borders. He 
said that the US was firmly committed to ensuring a secure and peaceful world without 
nuclear weapons. He also said that this lofty goal might not be achieved in his 
lifetime.72 
He criticised those who believed that the spreading of those weapons cannot be stopped 
or checked. If we were to bound to live in a world where spreading of nuclear weapons 
were regarded as inevitable, then one day we will admit that the use of such weapons 
would be inevitable. Obama said that the United States – the only nuclear power to have 
used a nuclear weapon – has a moral responsibility to act and take the initiative toward 
building a nuclear-free world, starting the initiative by reducing its existing nuclear 
stockpiles. He also said that ‘We cannot succeed in this endeavour alone, but we can 
lead it, we can start it’.73 
He also put forward the steps how to achieve that goal. Firstly, all countries including 
America should give up their reliance on nuclear weapons in their national security 
strategies. Secondly, to reduce nuclear stockpiles, the US would negotiate a new 
START with Russia. The reduction process was heralded by aiming to bring down the 
number of nuclear arsenals to 1500 to 1675 approximately on each side.74 Thirdly, to 
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stop testing, the Obama Administration would pursue US ratification of the CTBT. 
Fourthly, all nations together should strengthen the NPT as a basis for cooperation. And 
finally, in strengthening the cooperation in gaining the desired goal, rules must be 
binding, and those that leave the treaty and violate the rules must be punished.75 
President Obama’s bold stance and steps were recognised and rewarded by the Nobel 
Peace Prize. 
Obama said that we should also ensure that nations cannot build nuclear weapons 
programme under the name of developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. No 
doubt, Iran and North Korea were at the forefront of his mind. Obama was able to 
strengthen the commitment of the international community to his agenda of a nuclear-
free world and countries pursuing nuclear weapons have faced growing isolation.76 
5.3.3 Counterterrorism 
Obama treated terrorism in a different way to George Bush, who had damaged US 
image in, and its relations with, the Islamic world. Since the time of the campaign his 
argument was that Bush’s approach to terrorism brought more harm than good to the 
US, and damaged US relations not only with the countries of the Muslim world but with 
its Western allies.77 Obama argued that terrorism should be treated ‘like a law 
enforcement problem’ and the terrorists must be treated as common criminals who pose 
a particularly alarming threat.78 So when he became president, Obama followed a 
strategy of countering terrorism that was quite opposite to the previous administration. 
Firstly, the Obama Administration stopped using the phrase ‘War on Terror’, used and 
popularised by the Bush Administration.79 The main purpose of abandoning this phrase 
was his desire to manage terrorism politically rather than ideologically. Obama 
preferred to refer to Al Qaeda instead of the War on Terror in fighting terrorism. He 
said: ‘The United States is at war. We are at war against Al Qaeda and its terrorist 
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affiliates’.80 John Brennan, an advisor to President Obama for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, explained ‘Nor do we describe our enemy as ‘’jihadist’’ or 
‘’Islamists’’ because jihad is a holy struggle, a legitimate tenet of Islam, meaning to 
purify oneself or one’s community, and there is nothing holy or legitimate or Islamic 
about murdering innocent men, women, and children. Indeed, characterising our 
adversaries this way would actually be counterproductive’.81 
The Obama Administration made it clear that the United States was not at war with 
Islam or Muslims but only with those radicals who terrorise and kill innocent people in 
the name of Islam.82 These so-called Islamists even killed thousands of Muslims. They 
could simply be called murderers. As it was Obama’s view that the United States was at 
war with Al Qaeda, it was his first strategic decision to shift priority from Iraq to 
Afghanistan.83 He said that the US must refocus and concentrate its efforts on 
Afghanistan and Pakistan so that the US was fighting terrorists where they originated 
and had the deepest roots. 
Obama also said that, since terrorists operate globally, they must be faced globally. 
Rigorous efforts would be undertaken in South and Central Asia now. He promised to 
defeat Al Qaeda and uproot its base, arguing that there should not be any safe haven 
anywhere for those who kill Americans and innocent people. He further said: ‘I will 
build a twenty-first-century military and twenty-first-century partnerships as strong as 
the anti-Communist alliance that won the Cold War to stay on the offense everywhere 
from Djibouti to Kandahar’.84 He emphasised an integrated and comprehensive strategy 
to defeat the terrorists wherever they are, and that the US would utilise its utmost 
power.85 
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5.3.4 Relations with the Islamic World 
Obama came to office at a time when the US was in the midst of two major wars with 
countries of the Islamic world, with a high troop presence in Iraq and a substantial 
number in Afghanistan. Israel had just invaded southern Lebanon, there was a massive 
deployment of Israeli forces in Gaza, and Israel had restarted the building of settlements 
in the West Bank.86 It was one of major objectives of Obama’s foreign policy to regain 
the US’s damaged image and heal the rift that had emerged between the US and the 
Muslim world. 
During his campaign, Obama made a number of statements about the beginning of a 
new era in US relations with the Islamic world, and tried to make clear before the world 
that he intended to reach a Middle East peace agreement and bring about an amicable 
settlement between Israel and Palestine. Obama pledged negotiations with Iran and a 
number of other states, without preconditions, though he later changed the language of 
his statements due to criticism that he was naïve. After assuming office, Obama shifted 
his foreign policy priorities away from the Middle East and toward the Pacific region.87 
Within a few months, however, Obama realised that the world was watching and 
waiting for him to make good on his campaign promises, so he had to do something to 
refurbish US relations with the Islamic world relatively quickly. Within five months of 
his presidency, therefore, he decided to deliver a speech about US relations with the 
Muslim world and chose the venue of Cairo University, which the White House 
stressed, was the heart of the Muslim world.88 
In his historic Cairo speech, Obama sincerely praised Islam, and recognised the 
contribution of Islam and Muslims to the development of civilisation and knowledge in 
various fields. He praised the basic tenets of Islam and the Holy Quran and said that 
Islam was not part of the problem in combating violence and extremism, but an 
important part of promoting peace.89 The contents and messages of the speech had far-
reaching implications. President Obama tried to articulate the basic beliefs and values of 
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the United States and explained that those were not in contrast with the values and 
beliefs of the rest of the world, nor even the Muslim world. He stressed very much that 
his administration would seek to spread those values without imposing them, as had 
been done by his predecessor, but would seek to pursue a new foreign policy. He very 
clearly said that: ‘I’ve come here to Cairo to seek a new beginning between the United 
States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect 
and one based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive and need not be 
in competition. Instead, they overlap and share common principles, principles of justice 
and progress, tolerance and the dignity of all human beings’.90 Obama considered it a 
defining moment to re-engage with the Islamic world.   
Obama recognized the evolving mistrust between the US and the Islamic world, and 
said it would not go away overnight. To bridge the gaps, Obama argued, the West and 
the Islamic world need to listen each other, learn from each other, and respect each 
other. He also said that Islam was a part of America in many ways and he recalled that 
Morocco, an Islamic country, was the first recognized the US. He also reminded in his 
Ankara speech that: ‘America is not, and never will be, at war with Islam’.  Regarding 
the Afghan and Iraq wars, he was very clear that the US was fighting in Afghanistan out 
of necessity and the US would not keep its troops there once Al Qaeda was defeated, 
and that the Iraq war was out of choice but that he had made it clear to the Iraqi people 
that the US would not pursue any base in Iraq and the US would withdraw all troops 
from Iraq by the end of 2012. He also said the US would support a united Iraq as a 
partner.91 
Regarding Palestine, Obama said that: ‘America will not turn our backs on the 
legitimate Palestinian aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own’. He 
also asserted, however, that the Palestinians should abandon the use of violence, which 
would never bring a solution or peace. At the same time, he also made it clear that Israel 
should freeze all settlement activities. In his speech, it was clear that the United States 
was ready to discuss any issue with Iran without any precondition except the nuclear 
issue, on which the US had a decisive point: Iran could pursue peaceful nuclear power 
only if it complied with its responsibilities under the NPT.92 
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President Obama made a clear distinction between the terrorists and Islamists. He 
believed those who attacked the US and killed innocent people were simply terrorists 
whether their names were Muslim or whether they came from an Islamic background. 
Islam is a religion of peace that never allows killing innocent men, women, and 
children. Quran says: ‘whoever kills an innocent’ –‘it is as if he has killed all mankind’ 
and it also says: ‘whoever saves a person; it is as if he has saved all mankind’. Obama 
believed that terrorists (in the name of Islam) killed more Muslims than all other faiths 
combined. So he considered his duty as President of the United States to fight against 
negative stereotypes of Islam wherever they appear.93 
5.3.5 Relations with Rising Powers  
Obama’s attitude to the other rising powers was set by his view of America’s 
limitations, echoing, but not endorsing, the theme of decline.  As I discussed above, 
Obama acknowledged US relative decline and acted accordingly, looking for friends 
and allies. In an interview with Fareed Zakaria, Obama was asked to describe the 
‘Obama Doctrine’, and he replied ‘[Mine is] an American leadership that recognizes the 
rise of countries like China, India and Brazil. It’s a US leadership that recognizes our 
limits in terms of resources and capacity.’94 Maintaining and improving good relations 
with other powers was not only directed by the fact that the United States needed trade 
with them but it was a policy of adaptation with the changed world, where countries 
were rising in terms of resources and capacities. 
Professor Nye firmly believed that the decline of the United States would not be an easy 
process because its power is not based on colonies or empire, but rather on alliances and 
partnership and on informal networks, which cannot be diminished overnight, and are 
never a burden like colonies.95 In line with Nye’s view, Obama said the American 
moment was not over but must be seized anew. He believed that, in facing security 
threats and enhancing security, it was necessary to build alliances and partnerships. He 
criticised US policies for sending wrong signals to its international partners. Having 
realised American relative decline, Obama insisted that he would rebuild and strengthen 
American relations and partnership with its allies in Europe, Asia, and throughout the 
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Americas and Africa.96 He even vowed to negotiate and engage with America’s 
enemies, a plan that was out right rejected by his predecessor George Bush. He said, 
quoting Kennedy that ‘we should never negotiate out of fear, but we should never fear 
to negotiate’.97 
Obama argued that, as the United States strengthened NATO, it should also emphasise 
making new alliances and partnerships in other parts of the globe. He believed, since 
China was rising, that South Korea and Japan were asserting themselves, and he would 
work to build an effective framework in Asia beyond bilateral agreements. The Six 
Party Talks on North Korea could be one such effort. He argued that US relations with 
rising China could be done two ways – competing with China in some areas and 
cooperating in others. He further said the US must orchestrate a fruitful cooperation and 
collaboration on important issues of global concern among major power states, 
including rising powers such as India, Brazil, South Africa, and even Nigeria. The 
United States should give them a stake in order to uphold international order and to that 
end, the UN would require reform.98 
As a candidate for president, Obama delivered a speech before a huge crowd in Berlin 
in July 2008, in which he acknowledged the mistakes made by the previous 
administration and promised that in the world of interdependence he would renew the 
US ties that had been damaged by the Bush Administration. He pledged to make 
cooperative and collaborative relations with Europe, tackling challenges of all kinds 
ranging from transnational terrorism to global climate change. After eight years of the 
Bush Administration, the Europeans were ready for a change in their relationship with 
the US, and European leaders welcomed Obama and became very eager to deal with the 
new administration.99 
The Obama Administration continued to give priority to its main allies in Asia such as 
Japan, South Korea and Australia, over other Asian powers such as China, India, and 
North Korea. Hillary Clinton’s first visit and her first four stops to East Asia in 
February 2009 and Obama’s meetings with Asian leaders, gave a clear indication that 
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US relations with these rising nations would take a prominent place in Obama’s foreign 
policy.100 
It is a fact that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been an issue in every 
presidential election in the US. In 2008 Democrats blamed the Bush administration for 
endangering US security by antagonising Putin without any clear reason. The Obama 
Administration announced a new policy in February 2009 at the Munich Security 
Conference where Vice-President Joe Biden said: ‘It’s time to press the reset button and 
to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia’.101 
Although the United States and Russia were not natural economic partners, the Obama 
Administration sought closer economic ties with Russia. The Russian president insisted 
that he would be willing to work with the US, and described President Obama as ‘an 
honest person who really wants to change much for the better’.102 Putin also said that 
the cooperation on Afghanistan would continue and he also warned that the US should 
not withdraw from Afghanistan prematurely.103 
5.4 Obama’s Pivot to Asia: India’s Place in the Setting  
At the end of the third year of Obama’s first term, the US government issued a series of 
statements which indicated a shift in the US strategic focus.  President Obama 
addressed the Australian Parliament on 17 November 2011, where he indicated a 
broader shift in US foreign policy to Asia popularly known as the ‘pivot to Asia,’ which 
was subsequently described as a rebalance. This policy of rebalancing involved a big 
change to the US military and diplomatic engagement with the Asia-Pacific.104 
Although President Obama is not generally considered to have developed any kind of 
doctrine, this pivot to Asia could qualify as the Obama Doctrine. Although this policy 
was declared in 2011, its seeds were sown during his presidential campaign. The Obama 
Administration saw the region as the fastest growing in the world and home of more 
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than half of the world’s economy, which had to be considered a high priority in creating 
and ensuring jobs for Americans.105 
Besides the economic gains and possibility of creating job opportunities, strengthening 
US alliances with the region was regarded by analysts as the foundation of such 
engagement. In building strategic partnership with its allies, the US was looking to 
create a stable security order which would ultimately lead to closer ties with each 
other.106 
Robert Hathaway was of the opinion that this pivot on the US part was aimed at 
reassuring its friends about US capacity, and was intended to build confidence among 
them in its strong leadership in the Asia-Pacific (something about which some Asian 
countries had become concerned about) and at the same time to warn competitors that 
the US still retained the determination and capability to lead.107 This policy might also 
be thought mainly as an attempt to face the China challenge in what many call the 
‘China dilemma’.108 
Though looking for new partners and multilateral cooperation in Asia was on the 
foreign policy agenda of the Obama Administration, critics in the US said Obama was 
not committed to the Asia-Pacific. The pivot was not a strategic change, but a useful 
tactic to demonstrate to US citizens and the international community the US 
international resolve at a time when it was retreating from two wars.109 But it became 
clear that maintaining strategic dominance and preventing China from rising and 
outweighing American influence in the region was the core US objective of this pivot. 
Hathaway said such a pivot was not a new idea but had been in development since the 
1990s with the end of the Cold War. He even quoted the Indian ambassador to US who 
mentioned that the concept of a pivot was hardly a new one. The Ambassador said 
Nehru used this term to characterise India even before India gained independence, 
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saying ‘We are of Asia. . . . [India] is the pivot of Western, Southern, and Southeast 
Asia’.110 
Whether the concept of the pivot was new or not, the point of discussion here is to ask: 
what did the US pivot toward Asia mean for India? Secretary Clinton, when explaining 
the pivot, defined the Asia-Pacific as reaching ‘from the Indian subcontinent to the 
Western shores of the Americas’. Since one aim of the pivot was directed to the 
maritime balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, the Indian strategists argued that it 
would not gain as much traction in China as it gained both in the Pacific and the Indian 
Ocean. 111 The US plan for this pivot was to continue providing global security, which 
required a long-term partnership with India to maintain a healthy balance of power in 
maritime Asia.  
This pivot policy was often seen as a reflection of increasing concern in the US about a 
constantly rising China which was, to many analysts, as an oversimplification. No 
doubt, the pivot revealed US uneasiness at China’s future course. However, despite 
India’s view of China as its long-term threat, the priorities of India and the US varied 
toward China. The Indian navy has been seeking a bigger role in the region and showed 
some unwillingness to increase coordination with American forces in the Indian Ocean 
and beyond. India appeared not to be willing to take part in any Sino-American rivalry 
or to be treated as a junior partner to the US in a cold war with China.112 
5.4.1 Obama’s Af-Pak Approach 
For Obama, the Afghan war was not given due priority during the entire two terms of 
the Bush administration. He intended to put the war at the front of security agenda. In 
the first year of his first year in administration, Obama announced a new US policy 
toward Afghanistan and Pakistan at West Point military academy. The policy was the 
outcome of a careful and deliberate interagency review.  Obama’s Af-Pak policy, as it 
became known, became its top priority superseding the Iraqi theatre.113 The central goal 
of this policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan was ‘to disrupt, dismantle, and eventually 
destroy extremists and their safe havens within both nations.’ To implement this new 
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policy, Obama pledged extra 30,000 US forces to Afghanistan, and the gradual 
withdrawal of US and NATO forces from the country, which  would be started in the 
mid of 2011.114 To achieving his goal of keeping citizens safe from the threat of Al-
Qaeda Obama adopted a three point strategy which included a partnership with 
Islamabad.115 Despite the interagency review revealing that Pakistan acted as host to 
terrorists,116 Washington continued to emphasise Pakistan’s potential role in combating 
terrorism in the region, bringing stability and building the state capacity in Afghanistan 
by fostering reconciliation with moderate Taliban elements.  
Initially, because the Obama administration expressed its intention to facilitate 
reconciliation of the Indo-Pak conflict over Kashmir with its Af-Pak policy, Pakistan 
welcomed the stance, Correspondingly, India became worried, and Indians thought 
Obama might be jeopardizing the achievements of the Bush administration. Although, 
as we have seen Indo-US bilateral relations were robust at the start of the Obama period 
the policy of addressing the Kashmir conflict made relations strained. However, Af-Pak 
policy was not the only component of Indo-US bilateral relations117 and the important 
point was to maintain good relations with India by decoupling India policy from the Af-
Pak policy review. The consequence was that when Richard Holbrooke was made 
special envoy for Pakistan policy, Kashmir was excluded from his mandate118 and 
without this bone of contention souring relationships US cultivation of India could 
continue in parallel with the Af-Pak strategy. 
5.4.2 India as a Counterweight to China – Commitment to Supporting India’s Rise  
As a candidate, Obama deliberately avoided criticising China on economic and other 
grounds. After assuming office, Obama sought an enduring and positive US relationship 
with China. He paid a visit to Beijing at the earliest possible opportunity once in office, 
and expressed his intention to establish closer relations with China.119 China’s 
expanding power has been regarded as the most important development, not only to the 
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United States but India as well. Both nations saw China as a major strategic challenge 
but interestingly neither wanted to be part of any anti-China alliance, but rather stressed 
the importance of engagement with Beijing.120 
The US has regarded China as a ‘black box’ for a long time, and its strategic relations 
with China have been characterised by distrust and uncertainty. The US saw the rise of 
China as both an opportunity and threat and Obama pursued a two-pronged approach to 
China. One approach was to reaffirm, engage, and strengthen cooperative relations. The 
second approach was to establish a strong and credible US presence across Asia to 
prevent Chinese regional hegemony, and it was this that led to the announcement of 
Obama’s ‘pivot to Asia’.121 But the pivot was not only about China and Obama 
recognised that the stress that Bush had placed on India as a counterweight to rising 
Chinese power was demeaning to India which had to be treated a as a major power in its 
own right. 
New Delhi s been branded with various names as great power, would be great power, 
regional power, global power, major power, emerging power or rising power and so on 
but whatever the label the fact that India was rising on all front was indisputable. And it 
was in the US interest to welcome this fact and to support India’s rise to the global 
power status. Stephen Cohen was of the opinion that treating India as a rising power 
meant New Delhi should be regarded as one of the capitals that were consulted on major 
issues just as London, Moscow, Beijing, Berlin or Tokyo were. For issues having global 
impact, higher echelons of the administration in Washington should visit, discuss and or 
at least telephone those capitals. India may have different views on global issues but it 
is not necessarily hostile to US. India has got its own style of responding to global 
development, but through a regular consultation Washington may alter what has often 
been seen as an uncompromising Indian style.  Cohen argued that New Delhi was not a 
great power that could challenge US military capacity or economic strength. But India’s 
resources and growing strengths in various sectors in a transformed international order 
made New Delhi more vital to a wide range of US interests than any time in the last five 
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decades. It may not be wise or even safe for the United States to ignore India in future 
as has past.122 
India has been able to draw much attention from the international community because 
of its rapid economic growth, its military capacity, its nuclear capacity and its changed 
approach to the United States.123 But as Amrita Narlikar argues this did not necessarily 
make it a great power. Great power status  comes with great responsibilities and  India 
has been reluctant to supply global public goods on issues including climate change 
migration, free trade, international security, non-proliferation and responsibility to 
protect.124 It is reasonable to assume that as it rises India’s increasing integration in the 
global economy will lead to a gradual convergence of interests with other great powers 
which will ultimately create a sense of co-ownership within the international order and 
so increase India’s willingness to accept the burdens of being a major power.125 
Compared to, for example, Brazil and China, India’s rise is distinctive by virtue of its 
democratic political system, English Language and English culture among Indian elites 
and demographic advantage that trumps China’s ageing population.126 These factors 
mean that India’s rise is well grounded and is the product of a long term incremental 
process however sudden or dramatic it may seem from the West.127 
To the US then, India, as a stable democracy, could be seen as an important 
counterweight to authoritarian China. Although the United States believed that India 
would not be part of any military alliance, a strong India, which has an uneasy relation 
with China on their borders, might pull Beijing into the region.128 The emergence of 
China-centric Asia could push India to play an important role in supporting the US 
pivot. New Delhi generally welcomed the US policy of rebalancing Asia, but leaders in 
India remained sensitive and cautious about publicly embracing the initiative. Privately, 
however, they seemed to have encouraged greater US commitment to the Asia-
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Pacific.129 India was never enthusiastic about an anti-China partnership with the US, but 
rather sought to ease long-standing tensions on border issues and improve the overall 
bilateral relationship. New Delhi was happy to develop relations with Washington, but 
maintained a certain distance and was never likely to meet US aspirations for a formal 
alliance.130 
By the time Obama came to office the United States had a number of reasons to support 
the rise of India. Its rise would not weaken the US position in the global power balance; 
it would give India a stake in the international order; it would allow Washington to 
shape New Delhi’s choices without the need for a formal alliance; it would facilitate 
American access to the South Asian region and assist the US in creating a favourable 
power balance in the East Asian region; and finally it would make China more 
accommodating.131 It is not surprising then that Obama asserted that ‘India’s rise is in 
the interest of the United States, regional and global stability, and global economic 
growth,’ and that America was committed to being India’s ‘partner...in this 
transformation.’132 
President Obama, like President Bush, supported the rise of India as an emerging power 
and the expectation had risen that India would be the next to join the club of the major 
economic and strategic powers in the world. With this expectation, President Bush 
accorded India de facto133  nuclear status. Similarly, President Obama, apart from some 
slight initial hesitations, has continued to recognise India ‘as a valuable strategic 
partner’, in spite of concentrating on Pakistan as the key ally in the War on Terror.134 
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The Obama Administration supported the emergence of India and its ‘Look East’ policy 
not only to encourage India to play a role as a counterweight, but to encourage India to 
become a pro-Western power, and to prolong the US presence in the region. The US 
also supported India’s rise in order to gain more and more access to India’s markets.135 
Hillary Clinton made the US preference very clear during her visit to Chennai in 2011, 
when she said that the US supported India’s ‘Look East’ policy and ‘we encourage 
India not just to look East, but to engage East and act East as well’.136 
The United States wanted India to be a counterweight to China.137 In terms of protecting 
trade and transit along sea-lines of communication, air lines of communication, and 
space, the US hoped that China would evolve in that direction but was concerned as to 
whether it would do so. India was already philosophically aligned with these principles, 
which is why America saw India as a correct choice to be a regionally ascendant power 
and a logical choice as a counterweight to China.138 
The United States wants to see an Asia not dominated by China and this is one reason 
the Obama Administration stationed troops in Darwin, Australia, and renewed ties with 
the Philippines to station its troops139. If China becomes a more difficult player in the 
region, the US relationship with India could become much stronger, but there will not 
be an Indo-US alliance against China.140 Obama saw India as a balancer but he knew 
India did not want to be a balancer and so he developed an Asian multilateral alliance 
similar to NATO, composed of India, Japan, Australia, and the United States. In this 
framework India could be a strong partner with a shared interest in keeping China in 
check.141 
5.4.3 Obama’s Policy toward India and Legacies of Gandhism 
Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King are two esteemed heroes for Barack Obama. 
In his Nobel Peace Prize receiving ceremony in December 2009, Obama said ‘as 
someone who stands here as a direct consequence of Dr. King’s life work, I am living 
testimony to the moral force of non-violence. I know there’s nothing weak - nothing 
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passive - nothing naïve - in the creed and lives of Gandhi and King’. Obama expressed 
his passion to Gandhi saying ‘He is a hero not just to India, but to the world’. In his 
opinion Gandhi’s life has provided inspiration to the Americans and African 
Americans.142 Martin Luther King was largely inspired by Gandhi. Obama is a self-
confessed hero of Gandhi and in his various speeches he often mentioned Gandhi that 
he (Gandhi) has great influence on him. Obama also said, ‘It was Gandhi's 
understanding of India’s stories and traditions, his attention to the marginalised voices 
in Africa, that helped him gather a movement that drove out the world’s most successful 
empire’.143 
Undoubtedly, Obama showed deep respect for Gandhian non-violent philosophy in 
facing any forces threatening the peace in the modern world. This stance has become 
questionable when any one critically analyzes Obama’s firm belief in his concept of 
‘just war’ which accepts  that sometimes the use of force have proved to have been 
necessary and justified. Obama’s respect  to Gandhian philosophy of non-violence and 
his strong belief of using force as a mean to reach the end, peace, became paradoxical as 
Gandhian philosophy requires full commitment that violence and use of forces  should 
be avoided at any time and every time.144 Analyzing Obama’s stance on using force and 
waging necessary war clearly indicates that his references to Gandhian philosophy have 
really nothing to do with Gandhism. Obama’s reference to Gandhi is not just 
paradoxical; it is contradictory. Despite this, Obama persistently used Gandhi’s as a 
reference because of the link to Martin Luther King and his praise for Gandhian 
philosophy.145 It was, in other words, a rhetorical device more rather than a statement of 
followership. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Obama assumed the presidency at time when the US faced difficult problems including 
deepest recession, two inconclusive major wars, a war on terror and a damaged image 
worldwide. Obama took those challenges as opportunities and adopted a series of 
policies to meet these challenges. He sought to minimise conflict and avoided 
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confrontations through a policy of multilateralism. His stance on nuclear policy 
including gradual reduction of nuclear stockpiles, and thus achieving a world free of 
nuclear weapons brought a Nobel Peace Prize. His policy toward terrorism helped the 
United States to move beyond the image of a country waging a war against Islam. He 
gave priority to the Afghan war, and developed an Af-Pak policy that was a deliberate 
initiative to destroy the extremists and their safe havens within this two countries. 
Finally, realising that the importance of Asian strategic development could not be 
overlooked, Obama sought to enhance the US relationship with the Asian states that had 
been flawed under the previous administration. 
On relations with India he continued the assessment of the Bush administration post 
9/11 that India should become a strategic partner of the US. Obama even changed the 
terminology describing the US’s relationship with India, using the term ‘indispensable 
partnership’ over ‘natural partnership’. US interests in South Asia demanded a stable 
region, requiring that there be no escalation between India and Pakistan.146 He believed 
that it would be better for the US to work with Islamabad by providing assistance for a 
more effective performance in the War on Terror. But this ran in parallel with support 
for India, evidenced by the lack of pressure placed on the Kashmir issue.147 And finally 
India’s role as a counterweight to China’s rise remained vital to the US. Although there 
would be no formal anti-China alliance a partnership with India would materially 
enhance America’s strategic influence in the region. 
Obama’s assessment of America’s place in the world when he took office was governed 
by a very different approach to his predecessor.  He developed a set of principles 
through which he would seek to restore  the US position while recognising embracing  
and adapting to the  fundamental shifts that were taking place in the international 
system whether the US wanted them to or not. Guided by these principles the 
administration sought to put them into practice, including in relation to India.  Given the 
magnitude of the challenges he faced and the inexperience of a new administration, it 
was never likely that the process of implementation would run smoothly and it did not. 
In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to illustrate how, and how far, the Obama 
                                                        
146 David Rothkopf, National Insecurity: American Leadership in an Age of Fear, Public Affairs, New 
York, 2014, p. 157. 
147 Interview with Ambassador Anthony Quinton in Washington DC, December 4, 2012. 
154 
 
Administration managed to meet these challenges and to implement its policies towards 
India. 
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CHAPTER – SIX 
Implementation of Obama’s Policies toward India 
 
6.1 Introduction 
It has been discussed in the previous chapter that President Obama dreamed of and 
promised change, investing efforts to meet ambitious promises, and undertaking 
attempts to redefine an altered US world view with the evolving historical context of the 
current century. The thrust of this chapter is to explore how far he has been successful 
in fulfilling his promises and particularly how much change he has brought to the realm 
of US foreign policy, and, most importantly, the changes made in his policy toward 
India.  
Although under the Obama Administration the strategic importance of India to the US 
remained high, Indo-US relations initially lost the momentum they had gained during 
the Bush Administration. US relations with India in first year of the Obama 
Administration were not seen to be as cordial as in the previous administration. But 
after this hiatus the Obama Administration took steps to improve relations. 
US relations with India during Obama’s presidency were initially hindered by factors 
such as the nuclear issue, the US’s Afghan-Pakistan policy, the Kashmir conflict, and 
the administration’s early focus on China, which to an extent marginalised India. This  
chapter will describe  the missteps taken by the administration and the initiatives and 
actions that subsequently led to improving ties, including US commitment to support 
India’s rise as a global player, its support for India’s seat in the reformed UNSC, 
introducing and continuing strategic dialogue and the decision to advance the Indo-US 
nuclear deal signed by the Bush Administration. The chapter will also elucidate the 
winding down the Afghan war, and how it impacted on Indo-US relations. The chapter 
will also critically discuss how the United States wanted to see India playing its role in 
counterbalancing China.  
Despite the initial US strain relations with India, the administration proved by its 
subsequent steps that India was a natural ally to US and that there was a strategic 
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partnership based on common interests. In spite of the ups and downs Indo-US relations 
followed an upward trajectory in the first Obama administration.  
6.2 Initial Technical Mistakes Made by Obama – Rookie Mistakes1 led to Strained 
Relations with India 
After eight years of good relations between the United States and India under President 
Bush, when President Obama came to power there developed a suspicion in India over 
whether the new Democratic Administration would halt further improvement in Indo-
US relations. Such suspicion was justified by some initial steps taken by the Obama 
Administration. 
The first mistake came when President-Elect Obama made a number of introductory 
calls to world leaders that included Pakistani President Zardari but did not include 
Indian Premier, Mr Singh. Not only that, but immediately after assuming the 
presidency, the Obama team made a public list of US foreign policy goals in which 
India did not feature,  making India suspicious of US interests and intentions toward the 
region.2 Likewise, when President Obama paid his first visit to the Asia-Pacific in 
November 2009, he not only bypassed India but skipped any mention of it in a speech 
outlining the vision and goals of his administration in the region3 in which he pledged to 
‘strengthen old alliances and build new partnerships with the nations of this region’.4 
During Obama’s visit to Beijing, he delivered a communiqué that further ignored India 
but conferred a major role on China in maintaining security affairs in the region, thereby 
worsening the Indo-US drift.5  All these mistakes were made at a time when the Indian 
Premier was about to visit the US for a state visit, and it was interesting because Mr. 
Singh was given the symbolic honour of being the first official guest at the White House 
under the Obama Administration. When Prime Minister Singh arrived, President Obama 
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said that he regarded the Indian premier, and India itself, as very much part of his own 
family.6 
Another noticeable stance of President Obama which led to strain relations with India 
was his reluctance to complete the Indo-US nuclear pact. As a senator, Obama took a 
negative position on the pact, which recognised India as a responsible nuclear power, 
though he finally voted in favour.7 
During his first few months in office he continued to place less importance on India 
than it deserved. The harsh reality was that President Obama hardly mentioned India in 
public after he assumed the presidency. If one looks at the number of foreign trips made 
by the President and Secretary Clinton, it becomes clear that India was not given 
priority by the Obama Administration. Secretary Clinton visited India in July 2009, but 
before that president and secretary had visited 27 countries in the first seven months of 
the Administration.8 Secretary Clinton was able to mitigate some of the worries 
prevailing in India, although her visit in July 2009 did not leave a clear avenue to an 
improved Indo-US relationship.9 
Indo-US relations had also been strained over Obama’s approach to handling the 
Taliban and his linking of the Kashmir issue to the instability in the region, especially in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Obama’s remarks about intervening in the Kashmir dispute 
even before assuming the presidency caused disappointment in India. When President 
Obama appointed Richard Holbrooke as the president’s special envoy for Afghanistan 
and Pakistan, and considered whether to extend his brief to include Kashmir, this raised 
the possibility of confrontation with India and dismay in New Delhi. The confrontation 
was avoided when the Obama Administration decided not to include any part of India in 
Holbrooke’s brief.10 The Obama administration was criticised on the grounds that, in 
South Asia, India could play a vital role in rebuilding war-torn Afghanistan. Indian 
scholars criticised Obama as ‘barking up the wrong tree’. Analysing the Obama 
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Administration’s initial attitudes toward India, Harsh Pant concluded that Washington 
had very little time for New Delhi.11 
Lisa Curtis argued that the strained Indo-US relationship during the initial period of the 
Obama Administration was not only because of missteps taken by the Administration, 
but because of US domestic politics, economic recession, and record high 
unemployment. Because of the recession, Obama time and again criticised the practice 
of business outsourcing to India.12 
A change in the attitude of the Obama Administration was seen in mid-2010, however, 
when higher echelons of the Administration started to realise the importance building 
up strategic relations with emerging India as a counterbalance against the rise of China, 
as had been understood by the previous Bush Administration. The Under Secretary of 
State for Political Affairs, William J. Burns, asserted openly that India’s strength and 
progress on the world stage was deeply in the strategic interest of the US, and he further 
said that ‘This Administration has been, and will remain, deeply committed to 
supporting India’s rise and to building the strongest possible partnership between us’.13 
6.3 Divergence of Approaches and Sources of Tensions between the US and India 
under the Obama Administration  
Indo-US relations were strained for at least a year after Obama came to office. Apart 
from the issues mentioned above, there were other matters that raised concern that, 
taken cumulatively, were a source of tension. These sources of tension were 
increasingly making India unhappy in its relations with the United States.14 
Obama’s enthusiastic multilateral diplomatic approach in Asia made India more 
concerned. During the entire period of 2009 and much of 2010, until Obama’s visit to 
India, US policy was not focussed on bilateral relationships, as it had been under the 
Bush Administration. During this period Washington paid too much attention to its 
relations with Beijing in such a way that threatened to lessen India’s influence in the 
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region. The US also intended to deepen relations with India’s arch enemy, Pakistan, 
which raised the serious security concern in New Delhi that the US might apply an 
interventionist approach to the conflict on the request of Pakistan.15President Obama’s 
initial intention to re-hyphenate Pakistan and India in US policy calculations and insert 
America in the Kashmir issue raised serious concern among the policy-makers in New 
Delhi. Later, however, Obama proved himself a reliable champion of Indo-US bilateral 
relations, evidenced by the US engagement with India in a number of vital areas, and 
his decision to give up the habit of seeing India through the so-called Af-Pak lens.16 
It has been discussed earlier that there were differences in approach between the US and 
India regarding nuclear technology. Although President Obama and India were 
committed to nuclear disarmament, they had different views on how to achieve it. The 
US wanted to achieve it through the NPT, but India disagreed. The Obama 
Administration essentially put the nuclear deal on the backburner, and did not pay 
significant attention to whether American companies were fulfilling their obligations in 
making contracts with India.17 The US wanted India to enact laws limiting the liabilities 
of foreign companies in case of nuclear accident, but India wanted to assign the 
liabilities to the suppliers rather than operators, which discouraged American 
companies, as well as French and Russian manufacturers, from finalising sales to 
India.18 
Tensions arose between India and the US due to Pakistan’s stance on terrorism and the 
future of Afghanistan. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, India started to believe that the 
US would force Pakistan to relinquish its relations with, and reliance on, terrorist 
proxies. Over the years, however, US relations with Pakistan have been such that India 
has given up hope that the US would pressure Pakistan to change its policies toward 
terrorism.19 Many officials in Washington held views similar to those in Islamabad, that 
peace in the South Asian region was intimately related to the Kashmir conflict.20 In the 
event, the administration tried to keep its distance from taking any direct stand in the 
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conflict. Richard Holbrooke actually technically avoided even using the name 
‘Kashmir’ and used the letter ‘K’ instead. During a discussion about Kashmir in 
February 2010 he said: ‘we are not going to negotiate or mediate on that issue and I’m 
going to try to keep my record and not even mention it by name’.21 
India was very much concerned about US policies toward Afghanistan. In order to 
mitigate Pakistan’s worry about the formation of a Delhi-Kabul axis against Islamabad, 
the United States put pressure on New Delhi to limit its diplomatic presence in 
Afghanistan. This undermined US overall strategy in the region, and caused great 
frustration in India.22 In February 2011, when Secretary Clinton suggested the US might 
soften its policy towards the Taliban, this caused much discomfort for India, which 
remained sceptical of rehabilitating Taliban leaders.23 
The US and India had significant policy differences over the future course of action on 
Afghanistan, which has been a continuous source of contention between them. As the 
Indian government had heavily invested in Afghanistan over the previous decade, India 
was particularly concerned about what would be the post-American settlement in 
Afghanistan and how its interest would be protected. The United States did not seem 
concerned about the protection of Indian interests. This policy difference between them 
negatively impacted their bilateral relations.24 
The Indo-US relationship has also been impacted by the Indian attitude toward Iran over 
the nuclear issue. India very much valued its relationship with Iran. Although India in 
principle opposed the Iranian pursuit of nuclear weapons and supported UN sanctions 
against it, it was unwilling to support US unilateral sanction as India did not want to 
sacrifice its long-standing historical, cultural cordial relations with Iran. India 
consistently tried to maintain its relations both with Iran and the US. India was 
unwilling to publicly support US sanctions against Tehran as it has a very strong lobby 
at home favouring deep Indo-Iranian ties. New Delhi’s unwillingness to impose oil 
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sanctions against Iran, as the US wanted, was a source of tension, even though India 
quietly had been trying to reduce its dependence on Iranian oil.25 
The Indian government also became frustrated by the moves (India called it a 
protectionist agenda) taken by the Obama Administration to limit the number of Indian 
workers in the United States. The Obama Administration introduced a tougher policy 
for the Indian highly skilled workers, making it harder for them to get jobs in the US. 
The visa denial rate26 for Indian researchers and professionals was higher than that of 
any other country during the first Obama Administration, causing yet more tension 
between India and the US.27 
All the above issues and factors caused concern for Indo-US relations, and one can 
safely say that there was no honeymoon period in Indo-US relations after Obama’s 2008 
election victory. 
6.4 Improved Relations with India as a Rising Global Player  
After the period of strained Indo-US relations, the Obama Administration took certain 
initiatives to bring their relationship back to the level of cordiality enjoyed during the 
Bush Administration. The first step toward mitigating the strain in relations was taken 
by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his visit to the US on 24 November 2009, which 
was first visit of any head of government to the Obama Administration.28 The visit 
proved a very successful one, and President Obama was able to state how important 
India was to the US in building security and prosperity of the world. For the first time, 
he even said: ‘India an indispensable partner as the two countries build a future of 
security and prosperity for all nations’. During that visit, the President also 
acknowledged India as a nuclear power and backed the Indo-US Civil Nuclear 
Agreement signed by the Bush Administration.29 Many critics said that, although the 
visit was important in symbolic sense, the outcome was not satisfactory as there was no 
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breakthrough. It can be safely said, however, that this visit was a milestone in pacifying 
the concerns that India had toward Obama.  
Before Manmohan Singh’s visit, Secretary Clinton’s four-day visit to India in July 2009 
served as a significant step to strengthening the US relationship and deepening its 
partnership with India.30 When she met Indian Foreign Minister Krishna they agreed to 
‘further strengthen the excellent bilateral relationship’.31 Clinton’s visit was largely 
considered a success, and Clinton made an important symbolic point by holding a high-
profile meeting with a women’s group at Mumbai’s Taj Mahal Hotel. While in New 
Delhi, Clinton set forth five key pillars of Indo-US engagement, namely: 1) strategic 
cooperation; 2) energy and climate change; 3) economics, trade, and agriculture; 4) 
science technology and 5) innovation.32 
In Obama’s first State of the Union address on 27 January 2010, India figured twice, 
and he bracketed India with Germany and China, saying: ‘These nations aren’t playing 
for second place. They’re putting more emphasis on math and science. They’re 
rebuilding their infrastructure’.33 Obama’s intention to continue the Bush 
Administration’s effort to build a special relationship with India was evidenced by the 
following steps: first, Obama’s visit to India in November 2010; second, mentioning 
India’s importance in his National Security Strategy of 2010; third, Secretary Clinton’s 
second visit to India in July 2011; fourth, the US desire for India to play an enhanced 
role in Asia; and finally, Clinton’s urge to India in November 2012 to play a larger role 
in Asian institutions and affairs. 
The main difference was that whereas the Bush Administration wanted to build a shared 
identity with ideas of freedom, the Obama Administration wanted to do so through a 
rule-based international order, where US leadership would be central and India would 
be treated as indispensable.34 
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6.4.1 Defence Relationships 
The United States already recognised military power of India in the Indian Ocean 
region. The United States realised and acknowledged that a strong Indo-US relationship 
had the potential to change the political contours and the power dynamics not only in 
Asia but in the world as well. Since India has the most capable military, vibrant 
economy, and is the most dynamic country in the region, so military ties with it would 
be key to the Indo-US partnership. During his visit to New Delhi in May 2012, Leon 
Panetta, the US Secretary of Defence, highlighted India’s importance and prominence in 
the new US defence strategy of pivoting to Asia. He said:  ‘Defence cooperation with 
India is a linchpin in this strategy’.35 It was hardly a secret that the United States wanted 
India to increase its geopolitical footprint in Asia.  Again, in July 2012, Leon Panetta 
said that the United States desired to work with India to modernise the bureaucratic 
processes to encourage more defence trade, and he nominated Ashton Carter to 
accomplish the job.36 
In order to develop the Indo-US strategic partnership, defence relations were a key 
component and the realization of partnership largely depended on increased Indian 
preparedness to purchase and integrate into the US system.37 Indo-US defence ties 
grew, though still not at the expected level. In spite of setbacks, such as India’s decision 
to purchase French fighter jets, the United States signed $8 billion in defence contracts 
with New Delhi in this period, making the US the largest arms seller to India. Contracts 
included the sale of C-130J and C-17 transport aircraft and P-81 maritime surveillance 
aircraft.38 The US Defence Department Report of 2011 recommended providing India 
with information on the F-35 joint Strike Fighter. The report also suggested sending a 
signal to India that the US considered it one of its important defence partners for the 
years to come and the United States was even ready to consider joint-production of 
many of its highly sophisticated defence technologies.39 
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During the Obama period the defence sales to India were at all-time high and military 
ties have deepened as forces from both sides increasingly participate in joint exercises. 
Indo-US Army Cooperation providing training for war known as Yudh Abhyas started in 
2001 and the largest exercise of its kind ever held was in 2009 in India. India came to 
conduct more joint exercises with the US than any other country. In 2011 alone, there 
were 56 cooperative events from all services.  Joint naval exercises also grew 
dramatically. In 2010, Indian Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and US Pacific Command 
(USPACOM) conducted the inaugural joint exercise in Alaska40 and again in 2012 they 
held Joint Exercise India (JEI), which included a command post.  
There was, however, a major gap between the US and India when it came to the issue of 
the transfer of sensitive technology. With regard to technology transfers, India 
perceived that the US was refusing Indian access to its sensitive technologies. The US 
State Department rejected this, stating that less than 1% export control licenses were 
denied to India. The Pentagon reformed its rules and regulations governing American 
defence exports from time to time and the US felt the bilateral relationship would 
benefit if India pursued similar reforms.41 It is important to mention here to the context 
that the Obama administration firmly believed and once expressed a view that even if 
other initiatives, steps or agreements failed to bring India on board, nothing would 
hamper bilateral military to military cooperation.42 
6.4.2 Advancement of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal  
Obama’s thinking on nuclear weapons and his stance as a senator on the Indo-US 
nuclear deal gave an early impression of uncertainty as to whether his administration 
would maintain US relations with India with the same vigour as was maintained by the 
Bush Administration. Despite having voted in favour of the deal, he remained strongly 
in disagreement with certain provisions in the bill, and was reluctant to give India a 
special status as a responsible nuclear power. During his entire campaign, Obama had 
vehemently opposed any nuclear weapons deal, evident in his killer amendments to the 
Indo-US nuclear deal which sanctioned the ‘123 Agreement’ with India. India became 
concerned over whether Obama would put up more hindrances as president in 
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implementing the Indo-US Nuclear agreement signed in October 2008.43 It was also the 
case that while the Bush Administration was eager to develop a partnership with India, 
the Obama Administration initially seemed less committed to carrying on the same 
policy. After assuming office it became obvious that President Obama had essentially 
put the nuclear deal on the backburner, whereas President Bush had been enthusiastic 
about elevating India as an influential and responsible global player.44 
India’s worries became more pertinent when President Obama decided to appoint 
Robert Einhorn as the Undersecretary for International Security Affairs. It caused 
uneasiness to strategists in India, as Einhorn had earlier been opposed to the Indo-US 
nuclear agreement. They even scolded him as a’ non-proliferation ayatollah’.45 As soon 
President Obama realised the reality, importance, and emerging role of India, however, 
he revisited the nuclear deal with India.46 Having realised the fact that the nuclear deal 
was never only about India buying a few reactors from the United States, but about an 
opportunity to alter the world order fundamentally, the Administration made clear that it 
would go along with the nuclear deal. 
For the issuance of licenses for US nuclear exports to India, it was required that the 
president notify Congress that the declaration from India regarding its nuclear facilities 
was not inconsistent with the facilities of the agency, and its IAEA safeguards 
agreement had entered into force. India signed its safeguards agreement on 2 February 
2009 and it entered into force on 11 May of the same year, and India also submitted its 
nuclear facilities declarations of the safeguards agreement accordingly. Consequently, 
President Obama submitted the required certification to Congress on 3 February 2010, 
and determined that New Delhi had fulfilled the legal requirements.47 
When the Obama administration made clear that it would go along with the deal, several 
high officials in Washington, including Secretary Clinton, restated that Indo-US nuclear 
                                                        
43 A. Vinod Kumar, ‘A Doctrine at Work: Obama’s Evolving Nuclear Policy and What it Bodes for 
India’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 35, No. 2, March 2011, pp. 215-6. 
44 M.K. Bahadrakumar, ‘India frets over Obama’s Chinamania’, Asia Times 14 March 2009, available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/KC14Df01.html, Accessed 11 January 2016.  
45Alex Stolar, ‘Non-Proliferation Ayatollahs or Thoughtful Scholars: Understanding the American Non-
Proliferation Lobby ‘, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies,  India, 6 July 2006, available at 
http://www.ipcs.org/article/us-south-asia/non-proliferation-ayatollahs-or-thoughtful-scholars-
understanding-the-american-non-2062.html , accessed 15 March 2016. 
46 M.K. Bahadrakumar, op. cit. 
47Paul K. Kerr, ‘U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issues for Congress’, Congressional Research 
Service, June 26, 2012, p. 3. 
166 
 
cooperation was a commitment of the American government. In responding to a 
question in October 2009, Secretary Clinton said; ‘the nuclear accord, which we support 
– I supported it as a senator, the Obama Administration supports it as a government – is 
embedded in a broader strategic dialogue that we are engaged in with the Indians. We 
view our relationship as one that is comprehensive and very deep in terms of the issues 
that we wish to explore with our Indian counterparts and the areas where we are either 
already or looking to cooperate’.48 
In spite of the ups and downs, the Obama Administration finally endorsed, and gave a 
go-ahead to the Bush Administration’s policy of Indo-US nuclear cooperation. Obama 
acknowledged India as an important strategic partner and described the nuclear deal 
with India as a landmark achievement that also set the stage for a move toward 
commercial cooperation in the civil nuclear energy agreement.49 The White House Fact 
Sheet of November 2010 affirmed that the US intended to support India’s full 
membership not only of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, but in three other multilateral 
export control regimes: the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group 
(for chemical and biological controls), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (for dual-use 
and conventional arms controls).50 
But still there remained a question why the Obama Administration took so long after 
this early period to finally ratify the agreement. No doubt, it was a misstep on the part of 
the Obama Administration not to give the deal a go ahead. This was because of at least 
two reasons: Firstly, since the beginning of the deal Obama was not in favour of the 
deal and he wanted a world without nuclear weapons, as he eloquently articulated in his 
Prague speech. The deal actually hurt the progress toward Obama’s view of total 
elimination of nuclear weapons and undermined the NPT. Secondly, the Bush 
Administration wanted India to counter a rising China and the deal was largely directed 
toward that end, but initially the Obama Administration did not want to alienate China 
and downplayed the tie with India so as not to risk the relationship with China. 
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6.4.3 Strategic Dialogue 
Having considered the trend of Indo-US relations since the end of the Cold war, many 
analysts viewed the US relationship with India as one of the world’s most important 
relations in the present and for decades to come. In pursuit of this, the ‘US-India 3.0’ 
diplomacy was seen on display in the second half of 2011, when a large delegation of 
US officials visited India on the occasion of the second US-India Strategic Dialogue 
session held in New Delhi, where they discussed a wide range of bilateral and global 
issues.51 
Secretary Clinton and Mr. Krishna strengthened Indo-US bilateral relations through an 
enhanced strategic partnership between them. The results of their efforts were the 
establishment of the Strategic Dialogue and measures of civil nuclear cooperation.52 The 
US-India Strategic Dialogue was established in July 2009 during Secretary Clinton’s 
visit to India. It was established with the objective of strengthening Indo-US bilateral 
co-operation in various sectors to serve as the ‘capstone’ dialogue between them. The 
purpose of the Dialogue was to assess the progress, provide policy guidance, and 
propose new areas of cooperation in their relations. The first round of the Strategic 
Dialogue was held in Washington DC in June 2010, the second round in New Delhi in 
July 2011, and the third round again in Washington in June 2012.53 
The importance of this Strategic Dialogue was mentioned in the US National Security 
Strategy of May 2010 announced by President Obama. The 2010 NSS said that India 
and the US were building a strategic partnership between them that was underpinned by 
the shared interests and values of the largest, oldest, and most successful democracies in 
the world, and involved making a close connection between the people of both nations. 
Working together through our Strategic Dialogue and high-level visits, we seek a broad-based 
relationship in which India contributes to global counterterrorism efforts, non-proliferation, and 
helps promote poverty-reduction, education, health, and sustainable agriculture. We value 
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India’s growing leadership on a wide array of global issues, through groups such as the G20, and 
will seek to work with India to promote stability in South Asia and elsewhere in the world.54 
The Strategic Dialogue had five pillars: strategic cooperation; education and 
development; energy and climate change; economics, trade, and agriculture; and science 
and technology, health, and innovation. During the first round of the strategic dialogue, 
Secretary Clinton, as the head of the US delegation, praised India as the Indian 
delegation attended the dialogue with a large number of high officials led by Indian 
External Affairs Minister, Mr. Krishna. Secretary Clinton described India as ‘an 
indispensable partner and a trusted friend’ and President Obama also appeared for a 
very short time at the reception of the State Department to announce his firm belief that 
the Indo-US relationship would be a defining partnership in the 21st century. Following 
the strategic dialogue, a joint statement was produced in which both states promised to 
deepen people-to-people, government-to-government, and business-to-business link for 
mutual benefit, and for promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the world. The 
statement summarised ten key areas of bilateral initiatives: 1)Advancing Global 
Security and Countering Terrorism, 2) Disarmament and Non Proliferation, 3)Trade and 
Economic Relations, 4) High Technology, 5)  Energy Security, Clean Energy and 
Climate Change, 6) Agriculture, 7) Education, 8) Health, 9) Science and Technology, 
and 10) Development.55 
William J. Burns delivered a policy speech titled ‘India’s rise and the future of the US-
India relationship’ in which he anticipated the Strategic Dialogue as such: ‘The simple 
truth is that India’s strength and progress on the world stage is deeply in the strategic 
interest of the United States’.56 He said that the progress in the Indo-US partnership was 
not an automatic one, but rather it would require a sustained effort from both parties. He 
also wanted to mitigate the Indians’ concern and perception that the US saw New Delhi 
through the prism of its ties with Islamabad and was overly focused on Beijing, 
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reassuring India by saying the US would not maintain its relations with Islamabad at the 
expense of New Delhi.57 
The second round Strategic Dialogue played an important role in the evolution of the 
Indo-US strategic partnership where a wide range of agreements were signed which 
included countering terrorism, cyber security, aviation safety, scientific cooperation and 
clean energy, women’s empowerment, information sharing, and higher education. 
Immediately after the Strategic Dialogue meeting, Secretary Clinton’s speech in 
Chennai acknowledged India’s stake in Afghanistan and its major contribution in 
rebuilding Afghanistan. She praised India’s ‘Look East’ policy and encouraged India to 
follow the policy of ‘Act East’ and ‘Be East’ instead of ‘Look East’, which was 
essential for further integration of the Asia-Pacific Region.58 
India’s ‘Look East’ policy was formulated by Prime Minister Narasima Rao in the early 
1990s for better economic engagement with the countries of East Asia.  India, since 
then, has been developing economic relations with those countries and gradually turned 
it very successfully into a tool for forging strategic partnership and security cooperation 
with states of that region in general and Vietnam and Japan in particular.  The ‘Act 
East’ policy should refer to more extensive engagement with those countries, 
developing a collective approach, which would help to bridge the gaps and bring all 
together in working for peace. More specifically, India’s ‘Act East’ policy was about 
balancing the increasing Chinese influence in the Southeast Asian region.59 
The third round Strategic Dialogue reflected on the considerable expansion of Indo-US 
bilateral relations since the Strategic Dialogue was launched. The leaders pledged to 
further deepen the Indo-US global strategic partnership, and sketched an outline for the 
future course and shared security, peace, prosperity and stability. A record number of 
sub-dialogues have taken place, such as the Counterterrorism Joint Working Group, 
Cyber Consultations, the Higher Education Dialogue, the Information and 
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Communications Technology Working Group, Homeland Security Consultations and 
the Women’s Empowerment Dialogue and many other events.60 
The Strategic Dialogue was a strong sign of goodwill but it is questionable whether it 
had much impact on broader US policies toward India. For example, it was said many 
times that the US would not cultivate Pakistan in such a way as to harm India, but in 
reality, those statements remained rhetorical in many cases, including the Afghan war. 
In addition, the Strategic Dialogue did not bring about major change in US policy 
making on most of the issues deliberated on in its various rounds, and so its significance 
remained largely symbolic. 
6.4.4 Obama’s India Visit of 2010 – Announcement of US Support for UN Security 
Council Membership for India and its Impact 
President Obama visited India for three days in the first week of November 2010. He 
was the sixth US president visit India and, most importantly, he became the first US 
president to visit the country in his first term. This visit was not a surprising one as he 
received the invitation from Prime Minister Singh one year earlier in 2009. Considering 
President Obama’s initial stance on India’s nuclear cooperation agreement, and 
hesitation to recognise India as a responsible rising world power, this visit was very 
significant.61 
President Obama’s visit to India came after the successful visits in 2000 by President 
Clinton and in 2006 by President Bush. Obama’s visit was also regarded as a successful 
one which added content to the partnership of the Indo-US relations. The visit proved 
that the United States had changed its approach toward India permanently, reassuring 
India that the Obama administration welcomed India as a prominent rising world power, 
and intended to build a genuine alliance with the US. The visit showed that the 
administration was willing to take forward the improvement in relations that had begun 
during the Bush Administration. President Obama had already said he regarded the 
Indo-US alliance as one of the ‘defining and indispensable partnerships of the 21st 
century’ and during the visit he reiterated this sentiment and expressed his willingness 
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to work with India to promote peace and stability in the region, and to set the rules of 
interaction with other countries in the world.62 
During the visit, while talking to students in Mumbai, Obama said that, though many 
people believed that India was a rising power, the US believed that India has already 
risen. He also said that India was taking its rightful place in Asia and in the world and 
the United States saw India’s rise as not only good for the US but good for the entire 
world.63 This recognition of India’s rise was a key element in deepening Indo-US 
relations.64 
During his speech to the Indian Parliament, President Obama described the purpose of 
the Indo-US partnership as serving three broad areas: i) promoting prosperity for both 
nations through two-way investment and through greater trade; ii) preventing terror 
attacks through the enhancement of shared security; and iii) working to strengthen 
democratic governance and human rights.65 President Obama declared his support for 
the inclusion of India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group along with three other 
multilateral export control groups. He also committed to reforming US export controls 
to ramp up innovative high-technology trade with India, and treating the latter as a 
partner country. Subsequently, in the beginning of the following year, the United States 
removed the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and the Indian 
Space Research Organization (ISRO) from the Entity List of the US Commerce 
Department, which facilitated dynamic cooperation on high-technology sectors.66 
The other contribution made during Obama’s visit was the US announcement that it 
would expand and upgrade the Indo-US Nuclear Agreement Cooperation, cooperation 
in space and in the defence sectors as well. Obama was very supportive of India’s 
concern about terrorism stemming from the Pakistani side.67 He fully backed India 
saying: ‘We will continue to insist to Pakistan’s leaders that terrorist safe havens within 
their borders are unacceptable, and that the terrorists behind the Mumbai attacks be 
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brought to justice’.68 The Mumbai attack, known as India’s 9/11, reminded the Obama 
Administration of its vulnerability to global terrorism and their shared interest in 
struggling against extremism. President Obama also emphasised the mutual ‘terrorist’ 
insecurities of the US and India and their strategic interdependence. 
The main contribution that came out of President Obama’s visit to India was the US 
announcement of its support for India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security 
Council. Obama received loud applause from the members of the Indian Parliament for 
his endorsement of Indian seat in the UNSC. It was a step toward elevating India to a 
major power status in the world. Before that, the United States had only endorsed Japan 
for a permanent seat.69 It should also be noted here that while announcing US support 
for India, President Obama cautioned India with the words: ‘with increased power 
comes increased responsibility’.70 Indicating on-going gross violations of human rights 
in Myanmar, and suspicions over the nuclear programme in Tehran, Obama said that it 
was the duty and responsibility of the international community especially India (being 
an emerging global power) and the US to condemn such illegal and immoral activities. 
In the past, India had failed to do so, shying away from the issue and this needed to 
change if India was to take its place in the international community.71 
This historic visit and particularly the historic announcement of the US endorsement for 
India’s permanent seat on an expanded UNSC had many effects on the region and the 
world as a whole. There were two different views regarding Obama’s endorsement. 
While many US experts viewed the announcement as merely symbolic in nature and 
lacking substance, many Indians considered the President’s promise to support India’s 
quest for a permanent membership in the UN Security Council the highpoint of the visit. 
Robert Hathaway argued that since every one believed India’s accession into the UNSC 
was not going to happen in near future, the endorsement was merely symbolic, though it 
carried real significance for their relations.72 Likewise, Lisa Curtis argued that ‘from 
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India’s perspective, Obama’s endorsement for India to obtain a permanent seat on an 
expanded UN Security Council is the most symbolically important statement he made. 
The reality, however, is that UN Security Council Reform is likely still years away’.73 
Some observers like Anthony Quinton74 maintained that the Indian government behaved 
too timidly in the international arena, which did not necessarily make India qualified for 
a position with global responsibility. He argued that India seemed unwilling to take the 
kind of policy stand required from a global player especially from one with a UNSC 
seat. It should also be noted, however, that at the BRICs Summit of 2011, China and 
Russia issued a joint statement for the first time, supporting Indian, Brazilian, and South 
African ‘aspirations to play a greater role in the UN’.  Such an endorsement will not be 
enough however, unless a concrete step is taken by the P5 favouring reform of the 
Council.75 The chances for reform of the Council still remain slim in the near future. 
The offer of a UNSC seat for India certainly made Pakistan angry and created 
dissatisfaction in Beijing.76. Although the US offered support for an Indian permanent 
seat on a reformed UNSC, these countries and others did not want to give India a veto 
power, and one possible compromise was that India might be given a semi-permanent 
seat or permanent seat without a veto power. The US offered the same to the Japanese. 
The United States said to India that it deserved to be in the group of the top ten, but it 
was not pushing hard for India, and not even pushing the reform very hard at all.77 The 
US position was rhetorical.78 
Though some scholars held the view that this announcement dissatisfied China, 
Ambassador Quinton saw it differently, arguing that China knew that they could always 
veto India’s admission to the UNSC. It was not a commitment to do anything; it was 
just the recognition of India’s status. If a proposal comes to the table, China will 
probably veto. China was more concerned that Japan would get a permanent seat. Japan 
itself would not like to be surrounded by two other great powers. The United Kingdom 
might use its veto, along with China, against an Indian seat, as London has been in 
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favour of a permanent seat for Brazil.79 It was a big step for India to get United States’ 
support for its status as a global power and constructive player.80 But reform seems very 
far off, as it looks like each of the permanent members has its own choice and 
reservation. But it is also true that if reform takes place, India is likely to be one of the 
powers that will gain a place. 
Stephen P. Cohen and Professor Deepa were of the same opinion. Publically, the United 
States supported India’s bid for a UN Security Council seat but realistically that was not 
going to happen as other countries would veto.81 The United States was giving support 
because it cost little for the US even though it would make Pakistan angry and China 
was certainly not for it. Ambassador Schaffer was of the opinion that it was very 
important for the United States to support India in its effort to gain a global power 
status. China has been ambiguous about India’s seat on the UNSC on a permanent basis, 
and Pakistan was certainly against it. Pakistan was always against any recognition of 
India as global power. Basically the United States should not be worried about what 
Pakistan said about this issue.82 More important from Ambassador Quinton’s 
perspective was that: ‘We don’t accept India as a global power because India does not 
act like a global power. India does not comport itself to be a global power’. The United 
States did not want India to be a global power for India’s sake but because it wanted to 
restrain China’s elevation to a global power. The United States did not want to push 
India to be the equal of China in the global power race but needed it to balance China’s 
rise.83 
In short, whatever motive was behind the President Obama’s visit to India in 2010, it 
was a historic moment and reflected India’s emerging visibility on the world stage. The 
endorsement by the US was a recognition of India’s rising power status. Whether and 
when reform of the UNSC might take place is unknown, but the announcement of US 
support mitigated India’s concerns and improved the strained relations between India 
and the Obama Administration. This visit made Indo-US relations more cordial than at 
any time previously. 
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6.5 Winding down the Afghan War – Impact  
President Obama’s intention was to continue fighting terrorism, but with a different 
strategy to that of President Bush, and he therefore never accepted Bush’s concept of a 
global War on Terror. He also considered the Iraq War a war of choice, and therefore 
illegal under international law, and he promised to bring the war to a responsible end. 
Although he considered the Afghanistan War a war of necessity, he sought to wind it 
down as well, and planned to bring all US troops back home by 2014.  
The Obama administration demonstrated flexibility and willingness to adapt in its 
policy toward Iraq and Afghanistan, by reconciling and adjusting previous positions 
stated during the campaign with the ground realities. During his campaign, Obama 
promised to end the Iraq War immediately, but considering the reality on the ground, he 
slowed down the withdrawal and finally ended it in late 2011, nine months after the date 
scheduled by the Bush administration and Iraqi Premier Al-Maliki.84 It also should be 
noted here that, before declaring his pivot toward Asia, Obama ended the Iraq War and 
planned to withdraw from Afghanistan.  
It was a well-known fact that the war in Afghanistan was the most difficult conflict the 
Obama Administration inherited. He said many times that the US did not come to 
Afghanistan to control the country or design the future, but to defeat Al Qaeda. When 
he renewed his strategy for Afghanistan and planned to withdraw US forces, he thought 
of strengthening the Afghan’s armed forces and setting up a trust fund to ensure the 
sustainability of the mission. In order to strengthen and train the Afghan armed forces, 
the United States sent 4,000 additional US forces, so as to enable the former to defend 
their sovereignty and territorial integrity, and fight the terrorist threat.85 
The war in Afghanistan was very expensive for the US, as it had to maintain 100,000 
troops, and cost more than $10 billion every month. Considering such a financial loss, 
the Obama Administration was reluctant to continue its military presence there after 
2014, and started taking the necessary steps to wind down the war. To do this, it had 
various meetings to set up the conditions which would allow the US and NATO forces 
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to withdraw from Afghanistan.86 As a part of this winding down, the Obama 
Administration announced the withdrawal of 10,000 troops before the end of 2011, and 
23,000 troops by September 2012. At the beginning of 2012, President Obama 
reaffirmed the deadline for withdrawal, and released a defence budget of overall 
reductions in US infantry forces.87 
The main objective of the United States and the Western world in Afghanistan was to 
prevent the country from becoming a safe haven for international terrorists, and an ally 
to the terrorists.88 India had the same objective. The US and India have very strong 
national interests in preventing Afghanistan from being further used as a base from 
which terrorists can attack US and Indian interests.89 India has traditionally maintained 
strong cultural and political ties with Afghanistan. For India’s security, and the stability 
in the region, New Delhi has hugely invested in Afghanistan ever since the declaration 
of war in Afghanistan in 2001. New Delhi invested in various sectors, including 
development projects, humanitarian assistance, and nation-building.90 India became one 
of the leading contributors to the reconstruction of Afghan infrastructure. India’s 
extensive assistance programme covered almost all areas of development in 
Afghanistan. New Delhi opened a number of consulates there and has declared itself 
‘committed to the unity, integrity and independence of Afghanistan underpinned by 
democracy and cohesive pluralism and free from external interference’.91 India has 
committed some $1.3 billion for the overall development of Afghanistan.92 
The Obama Administration realised that New Delhi could play a vital role in ensuring 
peace and stability in Afghanistan as bilateral ties between them spanned centuries. 
Given the eternal rivalry between India and Pakistan, New Delhi had every reason to 
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play a significant role in Afghanistan.93 When the question of US troop withdrawal 
surfaced, and President Obama expressed his intention of avoiding a prolonged 
presence of US forces in Afghanistan, to ensure a smooth exit for the US military, he 
tried a reconciliation effort with insurgents, which made India nervous.94 India was 
concerned about the possible chaos that might ensue, and the potential return of the 
Taliban regime. The desire of some in the US to appease Islamabad at the cost of New 
Delhi and Kabul made India more concerned.95 It was also predicted that the two eternal 
rivals, India and Pakistan might be fighting proxy war inside the country with spies. 
The announcement of the US military withdrawal left India at a crossroads, as it wanted 
to preserve its interests in Afghanistan.96 The exit of US forces from Afghanistan has 
limited the opportunity for India to preserve and protect its interests, and naturally 
restrained its ability to strengthen India’s ‘Indo-Pacific’ outlook beyond the region. This 
announcement has necessarily led India to increased and accelerated efforts to have new 
strategic ties with Kabul, and to strengthen its position so as to influence peace 
negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban. In the autumn of 2012, 
India signed a strategic partnership agreement with Afghanistan, in which it committed 
to guaranteeing stability in Afghanistan once foreign forces departed.97 The 
announcement also made India anxious about its partnership with the United States, and 
increased the concern that it did not pay adequate attention to India and India’s security. 
The Obama Administration has tried to ease India’s worries by assuring it that India has 
a legitimate role to play in Afghanistan. Again during 2012, the US took significant 
steps to reassure New Delhi that it was not planning to abandon Afghanistan. Rather, it 
has signed a strategic partnership with Kabul and encouraged India’s strategic 
agreement with Afghanistan.98 
The biggest worry for India was whether Afghanistan can control the Taliban and what 
role Islamabad would play. India was totally unconvinced that Afghanistan would be 
ready to assume full responsibility for the security of their country, and India’s 
nightmare was that Islamabad would facilitate the movement which would lead to 
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terrorist attacks on its territory and make the region unstable.99 If things were to worsen 
after the US withdrawal, then the US relationship would be much stronger with Pakistan 
which would be another major concern for New Delhi.100  India’s desire to play a 
greater role in the Asia-Pacific would largely depend on its ability to appear as a 
dominant regional power and deepen its relations with neighbours. Therefore, the 
normalisation of relations with Pakistan, and its ability to establish stability in 
Afghanistan in the post-withdrawal period remain key challenges for New Delhi.101 
If we critically look at the Afghan problem, it became clear that Afghanistan has been a 
serious difficulty for Indo-US relations. The dilemma for the US was that it could be 
close to have Pakistan or India but it was not realistic to have both on the issue. India 
was important to the US for the Middle East and Asia, and Pakistan was important for 
Afghanistan. But in practice the situation in Afghanistan pushed the US towards 
Pakistan and marginalising India even though in broader regional terms it was clear the 
US wanted to cultivate India. It has struggled to balance these competing pressures.  
6.6 Counterbalancing the Chinese Rise 
Obama’s policy toward Asia has been wrapped up in the rise of China and its strategic 
assertion in the Asia-Pacific, and America’s response to this. The Obama administration 
since the beginning of its term looked for active engagement with Asia. It has been 
trying to improve its ties and relations with friends and allies in the region. Having 
realised China’s growing importance in the present world, the Obama Administration 
also wanted to improve relations with Beijing on bilateral, regional and global issues. In 
spite of the US concentrated effort to work closely with Beijing, relations were not 
entirely cordial.102 It has not been forgotten that they fought a brutal and deadly war on 
the Korean Peninsula a mere six decades ago. Although they have become closer on 
several issues, particularly on terror since 9/11, neither considers each other a ‘real 
friend’.  Interestingly, they have been following a policy of pretending to be friends in 
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their bilateral relations103 and avoided any major deterioration, reflecting the maturity of 
the leadership and their desire to keep disagreements within limits. 
After 9/11, with the Chinese support for counterterrorism, the US started to no longer 
see China as a rival but a partner or a responsible stakeholder. Like President Bush, 
President Obama sought a ‘positive, cooperative, and comprehensive’ US relationship 
with China, and also asked China to play a role as a responsible stakeholder.  It was 
interesting, however, that the Obama Administration continued to have the same ‘two-
pronged strategy’ as pursued by the Bush Administration. The two-pronged strategy 
was such that the US was seeking more Chinese cooperation in asserting China as a 
responsible stakeholder in the world, and, at the same time, wanted to contain Chinese 
power by maintaining a US presence in the region.104 
From the beginning of his second year in office, Obama reaffirmed the importance of 
the US’s Asian allies, saying that ‘we are here to stay’, and Secretary Clinton made it 
even clearer in a speech in Hawaii, saying that the United States planned to continue 
playing a leading role in the regional architecture of Asia.105   Although the Obama 
Administration has often said that its moves were not directed toward any particular 
country, observers believed that at least in part moves were aimed to counter China’s 
growing influence.106 
Since every US policy was seen by China as part of a sophisticated conspiracy against 
China’s rise, the US pivot toward Asia was also seen through this lens by China. But at 
the official level, China responded to this US policy shift toward the region very 
cautiously. In February 2012, Chinese Vice President Xi during his visit to the US said: 
‘China welcomes a constructive role by the United States in promoting peace, stability 
and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific, while, at the same time, we hope the United States 
will respect the interests and concerns of China and other countries in this region’.107 
The United States argued that China’s perception of every US policy being directed 
toward an effort to frustrate Chinese growing influence was a simplistic reading of US 
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foreign policy. The US rebalancing policy was driven and directed by a broader set of 
strategic, political, and economic considerations not to counterbalance against a Chinese 
rise; this policy was the US grand strategy of Obama’s foreign policy.108 The Obama 
Administration was also very much mindful that virtually every other country in the 
region desired the US to counterbalance the Chinese rapid rise, but none wanted to 
choose between two great powers.109 
Both the US and India have relationships with China, and each has a different approach 
toward engagement. Their relationships with China have varied, depending on the 
situation and issues; both of them have elements of cooperation and potential conflict, 
competition and collaboration. Each knows that a good relationship between the US and 
India, would send the wrong signal to China, but none of them wanted to antagonise 
China, and choosing China at the cost of their own bilateral relationship was also not 
realistic. Both became concerned when the question arose of China’s role in the Asia-
Pacific, and both remained uncertain and suspicious of each other’s intentions.110 
The United States recognised India, China, and the US itself as the great players in Asia 
and they will continue to be so. At the same time, however, it was also in the interests of 
the US to ensure that India was considered a key player in US strategy. As committed to 
democracy and the rule of law, India would remain a model of development for the 
developing world.111 The United States as a world power had to balance its relations 
with China and India. The Obama Administration wanted India and China to succeed as 
they were major markets,112 but Professor Deepa Ollapally was of the opinion that 
Obama was not looking in purely in geopolitical terms; he had a more complex view. 
India was going to be primarily a partner, a hedge against China, and not a player in its 
own right. 113 
Both the US and India were engaged in a hedging system involving China and Japan. 
The hedging strategy was designed to keep all players in the system. The United States 
and Japan were strategically closer and it was their shared interests to build an 
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economically vibrant and militarily strong India to play an effective role in balancing 
Asia.114 When the Obama Administration announced a new era of engagement in its 
foreign policy, it necessarily indicated to China that the US wanted to counterbalance 
the Chinese rise. Lisa Curtis also argued that both India and the US were trying to 
contain China’s rise, citing private dialogue between the two governments. Secretary 
Clinton has clearly stated that the US wanted to see India play an active and greater role 
in East Asia, counterbalancing the rapid rise of Chinese military strength and economic 
capacity. India responded carefully to such a desire and showed that it did not want to 
contain China.115 
Since India sought access to Western technologies and investments, and the US wanted 
to counter China’s rapid rise and global influence, both the US’s and India’s interests 
converged in developing a global strategic partnership. India was hesitant about 
attempting to contain China, and, instead, Indian strategists argued that India should 
pacify China. India’s doubt was over whether it would benefit from close relations with 
the US if the latter’s presence in the Pacific delayed the expansion of Chinese maritime 
power in the Indian Ocean.116 Policy makers in New Delhi argued it would be risky for 
New Delhi to be too heavily depending on the US as the Indo-US partnership ‘could 
become a casualty of any technical upswing in Sino-American ties’.117 They argued that 
it could threaten India’s interests, reducing its influence to a secondary role. They 
therefore framed their own complex strategic responses to adjust to uncertainty, centring 
on rising China.118 India never wanted to be seen as allied with the US and following a 
containment strategy against China.  In New Delhi’s perception, India might be put into 
a highly vulnerable position when the US took the initiative to accommodate China at 
the cost of the other smaller power in the region. 119 On the other hand, the Chinese 
were more cautious and concerned over the growing US strategic partnership with 
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119 Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, ‘The American “Pivot” And The Indian Navy: It’s Hedging All the 
Way’, Naval War College Review, Winter 2015, Vol. 68, No. 1, p. 64. 
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India, and China expressed its uneasiness over such alignments in the region that could 
encircle China.120 
The main concern on India’s part was that the United States considered India as a means 
to achieve its goal vis-à-vis China. The US did not show its inclination to concentrate 
on issues that India actually wanted assistance with. India did not have history of 
alliances against any power, rather they have a strong history of non-alignment and was 
not interested to join any US led alliance against China. This left room for cooperation 
short of an alliance. As Ambassador Howard Schaffer argued, the United States 
believed there should be a number of power centres in Asia. The US was therefore less 
interested in developing an alliance with India against China than in welcoming, it 
would welcome India as an active player in the international arena and one of the 
dominant powers in Asia, as the second or third strongest country after China and 
perhaps Japan.121 
6.7 Inauguration of Modi and the Obama Administration 
The timeline of the current thesis was set out as US policy after 9/11 until the first term 
of the Obama presidency, but there has been a great change in India under Modi’s 
leadership and a lot has changed during his short period in power. US relations with 
India under the Obama Administration in its first term have been seen to have followed 
an upward trend despite some initial strains and superficial ups and downs. In another 
backward step in 2013 we have seen the pattern continue with the strain in the Indo-US 
relationship caused by the expulsion of India’s diplomat Debjani for her illegal and non-
diplomatic actions.  
When Narendra Modi was elected as Prime minister of India, worries and concerns have 
been expressed in India and the US as to how the Indo-US relations will be under his 
leadership. Modi was refused permission to enter the US for a long time due to his 
aggressive Hindu nationalism and the accusations that he was complicit in religiously 
motivated killings against Indian Muslims. When he assumed power, he took various 
positive steps to create an image of himself as a tolerant leader of a great democracy, 
and continued the policy of developing Indo-US relations. He mitigated the Indo-US 
strains caused by Debjani case and restored relations to normality. 
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As his goodwill gesture, Modi had two summit-level meetings within four months of 
becoming Prime Minister. He invited President Obama to attend India’s Republic Day 
which was a huge indication of Modi’s intention of making Indo-US relation better than 
ever. Despite the US previously refusing him a visa, when Modi came to power he 
made his intention clear that he wanted to have a different level of partnership with the 
US, falsifying the expectation that Indo-US relations would worsen if he was elected as 
Prime Minister of India.122 
As a great sign of his intention to take the Indo-US relations to a different level, a 
hotline was established between India and the US during President Obama’s historic 
visit to India on India’s Republic day on 26 January 2015. This has a great significance, 
as the US has established such a hotline with only three other countries: Russia, the UK 
and China. It was also significant for India, as it was India’s first state-to-state hotline. 
India established a hotline with Pakistan in 2004 at the level of foreign minister, and 
with China in 2010 which has not yet become operational.123 Obama said: ‘We’ve 
elevated our ties.  We’ve committed ourselves to a new partnership between our two 
countries. And there’s been excellent follow-through on a whole range of issues’.124 
Some scholars were of the opinion before Modi’s election that, if Modi was elected, 
Indo-US relations would be worsened. Another group saw differently, as the US would 
be maintaining relations with India not personally with Modi. Modi would be treated as 
an elected representative of more than 1000 million people.125 Therefore, the US cannot 
ignore Modi, irrespective of his past actions, but must maintain the trajectory of 
improving Indo-US relations. The future Indo-US relations under Modi will show how, 
and how far he will be successful in taking their relationship to a different level. 
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6.8 Conclusion 
From the beginning of the present century, it has become evident that US relations with 
India have entered into a new phase of engagement, in which both sides persistently 
sought to foster expanded cooperation. The US supported India’s rise in many ways, 
encouraging India to play a major role in maintaining the security and stability of the 
region. The Obama Administration also sought to carry on the same kind of engagement 
and cooperation with India as sought by his predecessors though with varying degrees 
of success. 
Undoubtedly, there was a great hope in the minds of the US population and elsewhere 
in the world that Obama’s campaign rhetoric would come true. People around the world 
desired a fundamental shift in US approaches to the issues of the time, as Obama 
himself promised. But to the contrary, there were a lot of worries and concerns arose 
among Indian policy-makers, who initially wondered whether the Obama 
Administration would undo what the Bush Administration painstakingly constructed 
during his two terms. India was very much concerned by Obama’s policies to China and 
Pakistan, as they threatened to decrease India’s influence if China was the centrepiece 
of Obama’s policy, and India’s security would seriously be threatened as Pakistan was 
given priority because it might lead to an interventionist approach to the Kashmir 
dispute. The US did not initially emphasise its bilateral relations with India, and the 
possibility arose that India might pursue protectionist economic policies which could 
badly damage bilateral trade also in both goods and services.126 The early 
miscalculations or missteps taken by President Obama left a marked impression on the 
minds of Indians because they felt that either Obama had intentionally ignored India or 
paid attention to India later than when it was needed, seeing India as a tool by which to 
solve US problems rather than as a full strategic partner.127 
Obama was progressive where possible and pragmatic when needed. Overall, he proved 
himself more of pragmatist.128 The United States quickly corrected the initial mistakes 
made under his presidency and made Indo-US relations more cordial and co-operative.  
India’s concerns were mitigated when he visited India in late 2010 with a large number 
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of business delegates, and announced US support for an Indian permanent seat on the 
UNSC, calling Indo-US relations a defining partnership of the 21st century, and 
encouraging India to pursue an ‘Act East’ policy instead of a ‘Look East’ policy. Other 
than the security issue, President Obama emphasised the importance of enhancing 
cooperation in numerous fields, including economic trade, education, health, green 
partnerships, people-to-people contact, climate change, and women’s empowerment129 
and described India as ‘an anchor of stability in a critical part of the world.130 
After a haltering start Obama promoted the relationship with India on a comprehensive 
basis. This was commensurate  with his view of  the evolution of an international 
system in which Asia would become the  centre of gravity in world affairs, where the 
Indo-Pacific would  therefore become the region in which  US  interests required 
stability above all, and the area in which India could contribute to stability and the 
embedding of democratic values.  
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CHAPTER - SEVEN 
Conclusion 
This concluding chapter touches upon the themes which have been demonstrated 
throughout the chapters of the thesis to show that the US relations with India after 9/11 
have been a gradual development that has followed an upward trajectory. The chapter 
will also assess Indo-US relations under the two administrations by comparing the 
similarities and contrasts of their policies. This study set out to investigate why India 
became so important to the US and how the US tried to develop its relations with India, 
particularly after the 9/11 attack. In fact, it was not the 9/11 that made the major 
difference as Indo-US relations have been developing significantly since the end of the 
Cold War, albeit with various ups and downs. The end of the Cold War gave an 
opportunity for both democracies to become closer because of a combination of 
globalisation and India’s policy of economic reforms. 9/11 created a conducive 
environment for, and played a role in accelerating, the process but India and the US’s 
close partnership and current strong relationship has arisen in response to the realities of 
power shifts in the 21st century, one consequence of which has been to place India at the 
heart of  US grand strategy. 
Chapters Summary 
The current chapter now will try to summing up various points discussed in each 
chapter to substantiate the main argument of the thesis. 
In Chapter I, it was demonstrated that from time immemorial India has been important 
to the world powers, and in the 21st century, India’s growing importance in the changed 
international political scenario has become important to the United States not only for 
its geo-strategic location but also for its rising economic growth.  
In Chapter II, I tried to illustrate the various ups and downs of Indo-US relations since 
the two states resumed official relations in 1947 until the end of the Cold War, and how 
they were affected by superpower rivalry. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, I also 
attempted to show how the US, as the only remaining superpower, took the initiative to 
recognise India’s importance, and how President Clinton’s leadership laid the 
foundation for better US relations with India, already a regional superpower.  
187 
 
Chapter III demonstrated how President Bush changed his foreign policy and became 
more aggressive throughout his presidency, despite his initial promise that the US 
would follow a humble foreign policy and not appear as an arrogant nation. The chapter 
explained how the US changed its tone after 9/11, as the attacks changed the political 
contours and how the neo-cons exploited 9/11 to be aggressive in their attitude to the 
outside world. Initially, they viewed 9/11 as a crusade but later corrected it, so as to 
avoid aggravating the Muslim world.  They used 9/11 as an excuse to attack Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Although 9/11 has not changed everything, it did change US policy 
significantly, and provided the Bush Administration with a great opportunity to 
materialize its pre-conceived agenda. In the immediate aftermath of the attack the entire 
world, even Iran, stood beside the US but President Bush did not capitalize on this and 
instead sought to reorder the world through the policy of unilateralism, shunning the 
option of using the soft power of persuasion.  
The chapter also showed how the rise of China made the US more interested in India, 
and caused Bush to pursue a more proactive pattern of cooperation in developing US 
relations with India. Where Clinton perceived India as a potential destabilizer in the 
non-proliferation issue, Bush kept the issue on the backburner, and incorporated India 
as a constructive and positive player in overall Asian security. Bush no longer perceived 
India as being of less value than China, and wanted to put India in its right place in the 
international system, extending a hand as a strategic partner. Bush followed the policy 
of de-hyphenation in regarding to US relations with India and Pakistan. The chapter 
also showed how 9/11 trauma gave an impetus to take Indo-US relations on an upward 
trajectory, and provided them with an additional common interest in combating 
terrorism. The chapter also tried to show how the Bush Administration was different in 
its second term compared to the first term in its policy toward India.  During the first 
term of the Bush Administration, India was not paid much substantive attention 
although they championed India in rhetorical terms. Relations with India suffered as the 
US was preoccupied with 9/11 agenda and war in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Chapter IV showed how the Bush Administration has implemented the neo-cons’ 
agenda of regime change, ignoring other countries’ national interests in following the 
policy of unilateralism – the ‘go it alone’ policy. The chapter clearly demonstrated how 
the Bush Administration implemented Bush’s policy thinking in relation to India 
throughout his eight years of presidency. It tried to show how the Indo-US relationship 
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was advanced further by the efforts of the leaders of the two countries, recognising 
India as a responsible world power through the culmination of the historic Indo-US 
Nuclear Deal. The Administration proved that in a changed 21st century, Indo-US 
relations were not based on any temporary consideration, but rather the long-term 
national interest of the two states converged. Bush’s first term was preoccupied by the 
consequences of 9/11, and his invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, but Bush nevertheless 
retained an understanding that of the importance of developing the Indo-US relationship 
into a partnership, in particular because of the strategic implications of the rise of China 
The chapter demonstrated how the US and India continued to build the relationship, 
taking lessons learned from the first term through defence cooperation, and by 
undertaking joint military exercises, special-forces training, and arms sales. In 
implementing their shared vision, the US introduced the NSSP, which was a milestone 
in their strategic partnership, and demonstrated clearly that they had escaped from Cold 
War perspectives. Their trade and economic cooperation increased by 700%. In a 
sentence, although President Bush could not improve America’s positive image 
worldwide, he developed a success story in Indo-US relations by the end of his 
presidency. 
Chapter V explained Obama’s conceptual thinking toward US foreign policy and sought 
an answer to the question of whether the Obama Administration was different from that 
of its predecessor, as he promised to bring change and regain the US image worldwide 
that had been lost during the Bush Administration. The chapter discussed how Obama 
reshaped US foreign policy, recognising US relative decline, and facing the challenges 
of deep economic recession. It explained how he managed the Bush legacies as he had 
to struggle with the two wars he had inherited. His main goal was to restore US moral 
supremacy and legitimacy. 
The chapter also demonstrated how he wanted and declared a new global order of a 
nuclear-free world, emphasising a changed relationship with Asia that would focus on 
China, nuclear disarmament, and non-proliferation. Obama also aimed to replace the 
US’s strained relationship with the Muslim world with one of cooperation, and wanted 
to maintain a good relationship with all the major powers including its erstwhile enemy 
– Russia. The chapter also explained how Obama was different from Bush when it came 
to fighting terrorism, and how he was very clear about terrorists and Islamists. He was 
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very much focussed on the Afghan war and tried engaging the Taliban in resolving the 
problem. Initially, Obama tried engaging Iran but when this proved fruitless, he chose to 
pressure Iran. He followed the policy of leading from behind and emphasised using soft 
power. It discussed at what point he announced the US pivot toward Asia, and India’s 
place in that setting.  
Chapter VI attempted to demonstrate how, and how far, President Obama has been able 
to implement his world views, especially toward India. As Obama believed the US had 
lost influence in world affairs, he was trying to gain more friends and allies particularly 
in Asia to check China’s rise. At the beginning of his Administration, Indo-US relations 
lost their momentum, as President Obama was paying more attention to China. The 
chapter also highlighted the factors responsible for the initial strained relations between 
them and later how they improved them, taking them on an upward trajectory, 
identifying fields of mutual cooperation and engagement, and acting accordingly. The 
chapter showed how Premier Manmohan Singh’s visit to the US in November 2009, the 
subsequent visit by Obama in 2010 to India, and his commitment to supporting an India 
permanent seat to a reformed UNSC,  improved Indo-US relations. 
It also discussed how the strategic dialogue introduced by the Obama Administration 
contributed to develop Indo-US relations in various fields. This included Obama’s 
decision to give a go-ahead to the nuclear agreement signed by the Bush 
Administration. The chapter also outlined Obama’s policy of winding down the Afghan 
war, and the possible impact this would have on India and Indo-US bilateral relations.  
Comparison of Bush and Obama’s General Conceptual Approaches 
As we have seen, President Obama has fundamentally different worldviews from those 
of President Bush. While President Bush came to office with a foreign policy influenced 
by neoconservatives, President Obama assumed office believing in liberal 
internationalism1, reaching out to international institutions showing a more co-operative 
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attitude toward other actors. Accordingly, Obama’s policies toward other countries 
varied according to different issues in international politics. When Obama assumed 
power, although he followed the same policy as his predecessor on a number of issues, 
he formulated new and distinct policies on others. 
President Obama avoided the belligerent approach of the Bush Administration, unless 
the security of the country was directly threatened. From the beginning, he was against 
the use of force and chose a winding down policy instead of escalation in the War on 
Terror as it had greatly damaged the US image abroad and posed a challenge to its 
credibility.2 Obama gave up using the term ‘War on Terror’ but continued fighting 
terrorism for example by authorising drone attacks in Pakistan aimed at destroying Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban network.  
The Obama Administration was trying to create a system of multilateralism, instead of 
the unilateralism promoted by the Bush Administration. His emphasis in US foreign 
policy was on ‘a marriage of principles and pragmatism’ and ‘cooperative 
engagement’.3 Dialogues and negotiations were preferred by his Administration as 
important instruments for resolving any conflict or differences even in the most difficult 
situations of international conflict. The US relations with the Muslim world reached a 
record low during the Bush Administration. The Obama Administration tried to repair 
the damage, and restored relations. He very clearly stated that the US was not an enemy 
of Muslims or Islam. 
There were differences of views between President Bush and President Obama 
regarding the nuclear issue. Obama believed in a nuclear-free world, and was in favour 
of reducing nuclear stockpiles gradually with the aim of eventually eliminating all 
existing nuclear arsenals.4President Obama tried to lead the world by deeds and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
liberal democracy have a duty to act to promote that spread in competition with tyrannical or totalitarian 
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2012, p. 111. 
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4 Brandon C. Prins and Allan Wilford, ‘US Leadership in Post 9/11 World: Comparing World Views and 
Foreign Policy Decisions of George W. Bush and Barack Obama’, Policy Brief, 1:14, Fall 2013, The 
Howard H. Baker Centre for Public Policy, pp. 6-10. 
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examples, not by force or dictates. Therefore, another clear difference between the 
Obama and the Bush Administration concerns the promotion of democracy. While the 
Bush Administration believed that spreading democracy would make America safer and 
he made it a central part of American strategy, Obama believed that countries should 
work together on the basis of common interests and not on the basis of a common type 
of government.5The Bush Administration policy toward China was tough at the 
beginning but became softer later. In contrast, Obama was softer and accommodating in 
his first years toward China but made changes in late 2009 that showed a much more 
conservative attitude.6 
Despite using rhetoric about creating an extensive change in policies, Obama has, in 
reality, shown a substantial degree of continuity with his predecessor. Obama’s NSS of 
2010 was the continuation of Bush’s NSS of 2006, where both emphasised American 
leadership. Obama realised, however, that the United States was no longer an 
indispensable nation but rather an indispensable leader.7 During the campaign, he 
emphasised the need to pursue a smarter and less hawkish policy than President Bush in 
foreign relations, but when he assumed power he did not fundamentally change overall 
military spending. He rather increased defence spending in his first two years, slightly 
reduced it in his third year, and again increased it in the final year of his first term.8 
While Obama has rejected many neoconservative policies, he did not hesitate to adopt a 
number of realist policies from the past Republican administrations of Bush Sr., 
Eisenhower, and Nixon. At the same time, he has continued many policy initiatives 
introduced by the Bush Administration in foreign affairs. His foreign policy approach 
was not a wholesale transformation but a hybrid of old and new.9 
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President Obama has been subject to severe criticism by those who found a 
contradiction between his rhetoric and his practice. People around the world thought 
that he would be very different from President Bush but in reality he showed less 
difference than many anticipated. He used to say that he was against any regime change, 
but regime change was precisely what he pursued in Libya. Critics like Tariq Ali, 
however, in his book The Obama Syndrome: Surrender at Home, War Abroad, argued 
that there has been no real break in US policies under Obama, that the ‘change we 
believe in’ has meant no change at all10. Even some analysts like Niall Ferguson 
accused him of saying one thing in public but doing another when in action.11  Professor 
Inderjeet Parmar branded him a more militarist president than Bush. Obama was 
different in rhetoric, but less so in action, partly because he wanted to keep some 
favourable legacies like enhancing the relationship with Japan, China, and India and the 
six party talks in dealing with the nuclear programme of North Korea.  
President Obama used American power in a smarter, more acceptable way than 
President Bush. Bush was expansionist and more assertive whereas Obama became 
adaptive. Many presidents found themselves pursuing a foreign policy that has more 
continuity than change, and in Obama’s case the continuity was more striking and has 
mostly worked. 
Assessment of the Similarities and Contrasts in their Approaches to India 
President Bush openly recognised India as a major global power in the 21st century, and 
he made India a de facto nuclear power through Indo-US nuclear cooperation and lifted 
sanctions imposed after 1998’s nuclear test.  President Obama was also quite 
supportive, like President Bush, of India as an emerging world power. The Bush 
Administration in its first term was very much occupied with 9/11 events and its 
consequent wars, and paid less attention to India, but in second term the administration 
took India seriously, the best evidence for which was the culmination of nuclear deal. 
Likewise, the Obama Administration in its initial period was less enthusiastic to India 
and was busy with China, but later ultimately corrected his stance and took the Indo-US 
relationship on an upward trajectory. 
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When Obama came to power, questions were raised in India over whether he would 
continue the same policies as Bush. On many issues in international politics, Obama has 
pursued the same policy as the previous administration from the beginning, but in 
India’s case it was different. The height of the US relationship with India under the 
Bush Administration was disrupted in the first year of Obama’s Administration. In his 
first year, President Obama did not pay due attention to India in continuing the policies 
of the Bush Administration. President Obama was not ready to carry on his 
predecessor’s policies with same vigour, and India hardly figured in his priority list. 
Instead, an attempt was made to bracket India along with Afghanistan and Pakistan in a 
so called Af-Pak strategy. While the Bush Administration tried to achieve a balanced 
relationship with India and Pakistan, the Obama Administration gave priority to 
Pakistan due to its role in fighting global terrorism, especially in Afghanistan. In a 
word, the Obama administration was less enthusiastic toward India in the beginning, 
and Pakistan along with China occupied a central place in his foreign policy in the 
region.  
Dr. Limaye argued that in the beginning, the Obama Administration was less 
enthusiastic toward India, and China was the centrepiece of its policy toward the 
region.12 A number of reasons could be mentioned here for Obama’s indifferent attitude 
to India. In Obama’s view, India posed no threat to the US interests. India was not a 
signatory to the NPT or CTBT and was not engaged in the production of WMDs. India 
was in no way a perpetrator of terrorism, but rather was a victim of terrorism. Probably, 
the most important reason America showed little interest in India, was that India’s 
economy was not so large that it could affect the US economy during the 2008 
recession. Finally, though India was committed to playing its role in fighting terrorism, 
its contribution in terms of military cooperation was very small in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Many analysts believed that Obama was taking India for granted. He even showed no 
hurry in appointing a new ambassador to India. Having considered all this, some 
observers were alarmed that the US was ‘losing India’ and many others warned that 
such an indifferent attitude and negligent treatment might push India closer to Russia 
and China.13 
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President Obama has been criticised for failing to maintain the momentum of the Indo-
US bilateral relations brought on by the Bush Administration through the path-finding 
nuclear deal. The Administration saw another side of the coin, however and took several 
steps to improve the relationship. In spite of the initial strains in Indo-US relations, 
Obama invited Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to the White House as his first 
official guest. Secondly, he became the first president since Jimmy Carter to visit India 
in his first term. Thirdly, during his visit to India in November 2010, he announced US 
support for an Indian permanent seat on a reformed UN Security Council, which was 
just as significant as the nuclear cooperation agreement. Finally, although George Bush 
declared his wish to see Osama Bin Laden dead or alive, and made efforts in that 
direction, he ultimately failed. President Obama, however, was successful in killing Bin 
Laden in the Pakistani city of Abbottabad in May 2011. No doubt this success brought a 
sense of ease to India and mitigated its fear of terror attacks stemming from Pakistan.  
Another important point that should be mentioned here is that trade became more 
important to the US. Indo-US trade has increased hugely since 2000, and, during his 
visit to Mumbai 2010, President Obama brought 200 business delegations with him – 
the biggest business delegation ever to any country. That was another substantial 
difference between the Bush and the Obama Administration. Bush saw India 
strategically whereas Obama understood the complexity in India’s wish not to be a 
junior partner.14 
Bush always made a point of acknowledging the normalization of relations that begun 
under the Clinton Administration, and the Obama Administration made a point of 
continuing the normalization of relations made under the Bush Administration. But the 
Obama Administration was very critical of the nuclear deal with India. Obama’s policy 
advisers debated among themselves; many of them initially opposed the deal, but 
eventually they supported it. Both administrations realised that India was a force for 
good in the world which could be useful for the United States 
Although President Bush was unilateralist, he was strategist too in maintaining relation 
with India. And President Obama though was multilateralist but he still cultivated India. 
In fact, both cultivated India but looked at it very differently, and both pursued very 
much same policy in relation to India in practice. Actually, President Obama wanted 
                                                        
14 Interview with Deepa Ollapally in Washington DC in December 6, 2012. 
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more from India than President Bush asked for. Whereas Bush wanted to see India as a 
counterweight to China, Obama wanted to see India not only as a counterweight to 
China, but to play a supporting role in the broader perspective of international order. 
Obama regarded India politically a very strong partner in reordering international 
system. He wanted India to play its greater role on various issues of international 
politics including climate change and WTO. Finally, President Bush was preoccupied 
with wars and with Middle East and paid relatively little attention to Asia, although 
India was to an extent an exception. When Obama came to power, he was determined to 
redress the balance.  Events prevented from doing this to the extent he would have liked 
but cultivating India as part of the Asian pivot was even more essential to his world 
view than to Bush’s. He was focussed on Asia where India was very much a part of it. 
Therefore, the US relations with India after 9/11 were not simply ones of continuity but 
rather an evolution of the relationship, and in that evolution, there were similarities and 
differences of approaches between the two presidents.  
This thesis has shown a number of reasons why Indo-US relations have not been as 
cordial in the past as they could have been. They have differences of interests but not a 
conflict of interests. They have shared values and shared interests in many areas. But the 
main cause of their spiky relations over the years has been the US tendency to treat 
India as a junior partner, dictating to India what role it should play. The Indian 
leadership has not been willing any longer to accept outside dictation. When the US 
tried to impose policy India showed its resentment and was unwilling to play a role 
dictated primarily by US interests rather than its own. Although the US was always in 
favour of free trade, Indians saw it not as free trade but US-dominated trade.  Despite 
having shared interest and values, the whole Indian economic and social system was 
totally different from that of the US and the US insufficiently   adjusted their policies to 
the local situation. India decided to work together with the United States, but they could 
never become very close, as US attitudes combined with India’s tradition, culture, and 
history did not allow it. 
The US wanted a stable South Asia and a strong India to balance Japan, Korea, and 
China. Neither the US nor India want a powerful China. India wanted to be China’s 
equal, China’s friend, and China’s partner but not a rival, and certainly not an enemy of 
China. The United States, however, wanted India to balance China. India still suffers 
from China-envy and continues to ignore US suggestions that it would serve as a 
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counterweight to China. The US has not always treated India with due attention, and put 
India on the backburner for almost 50 years during the Cold War. Too often the US 
failed to ask what India thought about international order, rather than trying to fit India 
into an America-led world. The US was not solely responsible for this, however, as the 
responsibility also lies with India’s leadership who also failed to create an image of 
India as a country with a full potential to be used for the betterment of the world in 
general, and for the US in particular. 
Due to President’s Bush’s perception of terrorism as the primary threat against the US, 
he took Pakistan as the US’s main ally against terrorism. He wanted to have good 
relations with India and Pakistan together, which was not realistic. For Obama India 
became important for its potential and strategic location and commentators like 
Ikenberry argued in favour of bringing India into international order to buttress 
American leadership.  This was not always easy as the UNSC issue shows. To India, it 
was not realistic to keep India out of the UNSC, since it has the second largest 
population in the world and although the United States promised India a permanent 
membership in UNSC, it cannot make it a reality, because Brazil, Germany, Japan also 
want the same and favouring just one of these will make enemies of the others. 
In short, Indo-US relations underwent significant change after the Cold War, and were 
transformed even more swiftly in the late 1990s due to the changing world order and 
increasing Indian potential. Leaders from both countries tended to describe their 
relationship with a variety of adjectives. In 2004, Prime Minister Vajpayee called as the 
US and India ‘strategic allies’; in 2006, President Bush called them ‘natural partners’; in 
2005, Prime Minister Singh declared there were ‘no limits’ to their relations; and 
finally, President Obama called the Indo-US relationship a defining partnership of the 
21st century. Although their relations have not always been so cordial, the increasing 
closeness represented a major transformation of their past relationship. Now, India has 
bilateral relations with the US in almost every area. The Indo-US relationship is now 
much stronger, has survived various ups and downs, and has reached an all-time high. 
Their shared interests will make it increasingly likely that they become important 
partners in the years to come. 
The purpose of my investigation has been to establish the argument throughout the 
thesis that Indo-US relations after 9/11 developed positively, despite superficial ups and 
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downs. This upward trend was not because of the trauma of 9/11. It was because of the 
changed international political contours, American relative decline, its search for new 
friends and allies, India’s rise, its geo-strategic, its potential and desire to play an active 
in the international sphere. 9/11 played a role but was not the primary factor because it 
was America and India’s shared values, common interests and rapid Chinese rise that 
has brought them closer to being leading strategic partners in the 21st century. 
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